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INTRODUCTION
"Empty gestures are all too easy to make: an effective, efficient and
equitable collective security system demands real commitment. " 1

According to UN Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, the biggest security threats the world faces today "go far
beyond States waging aggressive war [and] ... extend to poverty, infectious
disease and environmental degradation, war and violence within States; the spread
and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons;
terrorism; and transnational organized crime." 2
Africa is no exception in this regard. Regrettably the situation is even
more complicated given conditions of grinding poverty, the continued surge of
infectious diseases, the alarming environmental degradation, unresolved longstanding disputes, unsettled border disputes, rising ethnic tension, challenges of
good governance, the colonial legacy and the regional and international
dimensions of intrastate conflicts in the continent. It needs to be underscored here
that the international community cannot make itself invulnerable from the
impending threats of international peace and security while the security
challenges in Africa are still pressing.
The United Nations (UN) has primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security. 3 Though the ideological divide during the

1

Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more
secure world: Our shared responsibility, United Nations, A/59/565 (2 December 2004), p. 13
2
Id, II
3
See Article I of the UN Charter

1

Cold War era largely crippled the UN from acting on important collective security
issues, its involvement in global security issues including those in Africa
increased exponentially following the end of the Cold War. 4 The number of
Security Council Resolutions rose from an average of fifteen per year prior to the
end ofthe Cold War era to twenty-five in 2014. Its involvement in Africa has also
substantially increased. In 1988, immediately before the end of the Cold War, the
Security Council passed nineteen Resolutions out of which only four were on
Africa, 5 while in 2014 the Council passed twenty-five resolutions on Africa out of
an overall total of forty. 6 Between 1946 and 1989, the UN had only three
peacekeeping operations in Africa. 7 Following the end of the Cold War, the UN
conducted twenty-one peacekeeping operations out of which sixteen are still
active. 8
Increasingly, the African Union (AU) is also taking an active role in
responding to the crisis in the continent by providing leadership in the promotion
and advancement of regional security. The UN has welcomed the AU emerging
role with optimism and high expectations. 9 More importantly, there has been a
growing trend of cooperation between UN, AU and various sub-regional
organizations in Africa since the mid 1990s.

4

0scar Schachter, THE UN LEGAL ORDER: AN OVERVIEW, THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, (1997), 3 & 13
5
United Nations, Security Council Resolutions, 1988, available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1988/scres88.htm (last visited on May 7, 2009)
6
http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2014.shtml (last visited on November 18, 2014)
7
UN
Peace
Keeping,
List
of
Peacekeeping
Operations,
available
at
http://www. un. org/Depts/dpko/1 ist/1 ist. pdf (last visited on 10 October 20 14)
8
Id.
9
United Nations Security Council, Resolution on Peace and Security in Africa, S/RES/1809
(2008), 16 April 2008
2

Although the UN Security Council supports the general idea of stronger
cooperation between the UN, and regional organizations such as AU as well as
sub-regional organizations, 10 it has not traditionally shown much inclination to
consider this issue other than at the abstract level. Rather the Security Council has
tended to focus its energy on concrete cases in an ad hoc manner rather than
proceeding from the general to the specific.
Obviously the AU has neither the United Nations' level of resources,
institutional capacity nor experience in dealing with threats to regional peace and
security. Nonetheless, its founding instrument, the Constitutive Act of the African
Union, provides the promotion of peace, security and stability on the African
Continent as one of the major objectives of the Union. The important centerpiece
of the Organization of African Unity's (AU's predecessor) reform was in fact in
the area of conflict prevention, management and resolution that culminated in the
foundation of a more permanent legal and institutional framework under the
African Union. 11 In addition to creating the Peace and Security Council (PSC) as
a standing organ of the Union, the AU framework also provides additional
mechanisms, including: the Panel of the Wise; the PSC Secretariat; the
Continental Early Warning System; the Peace Fund; and, the African Standby
Force. 12

ld.
The first attempt by the OAU to institutionally address the issue of peace and security in the
region was the establishment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and
Resolution in 1993.
12
The Secretary General, Report of the Seminar on Cooperation between the United Nations and
the African Regional Organizations in the field of Peace and Security, (Dec. 15, 2005)
10
11

3

The AU Assembly attempted to make this mechanism even stronger
through the adoption of a Common Defense and Security Policy and, later on, the
AU Non-aggression and Common Defense Pact. 13 Despite the resource and
capacity limitations, AU has also gained considerable experience in the area of
conflict prevention, management and resolution. 14 This arguably puts AU in a
better position to take more responsibility in the maintenance of regional peace
and security.
African sub-regional organizations such as Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority for Development
(IGAD), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), and Economic
Communities of Central African States (ECCAS), Community of Sahelo-Saharan
States (CEN-SAD) also responded to the conflicts in Africa with the creation of
sub-regional security mechanisms.
And yet Africa is still expenencmg multiplicity of conflicts. 15 The
prevailing intrastate conflicts and internationalized intrastate conflicts is
particularly pressing. Reports suggest that Africa suffers more armed conflicts
than any other region and even compared to the rest of the developing world.
Regrettably conflict appears to be the hallmark of African societies.
The current state of insecurity in Africa is dire and is characterized by:

13

Assembly/AU/Dec.71 (IV) (2005)
Margaret Vogt, Analysis of African Mechanisms for Peace and Security, Seminar on
Cooperation between the United Nations and the African Regional Organizations in the field of
Peace and Security, (December 15, 2005)
15
Matthew S. Barton, ECOWAS and West African Security: The New Regionalism, 4 DEPAUL
INT'L L.J. (Winter 2000) 79, 80
14

4

•

armed conflicts both within and between states, including unresolved
longstanding conflicts;

•

extremely fragile peace accords;

•

uninterrupted flow of arms to the continent, including unchecked proliferation
of small arms;

•

the deplorable incidents of mass killings and genocide;

•

the influx of refuges and internally displaced persons;

•

a growing tendency of lawlessness;

•

the precarious situation of failed states destabilizing the continent;

•

the recent trend in Piracy against international navigation;

•

the tension over shared resources; and,

•

increased vulnerability of the continent to serve as a safe heaven for
international terrorism.

The enormity of these challenges is incontrovertible.
The prevailing conflicts in Africa understandably increased the security
responsibilities of the UN, which, in tum, has burdened AU and African subregional organizations, such as the ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC, ECCAS and CENSAD with more responsibilities in the prevention, resolution and management of
conflicts. Although one may persuasively argue that the situation could have been
worse without the increased involvement of the global, regional and sub-regional
security mechanisms, it still triggers an important question about the effectiveness
and adequacy of the existing security mechanisms. This will be one of the central
questions throughout the research. In the course of the inquiry, a closer

5

examination will be made on factors that hold back the international security
mechanisms from effectively averting the present dire security situation in the
continent. This will be done through an in-depth review of major conflicts in
Africa.
The dissertation will, therefore, examine the evolving concept of security;
the security mechanisms of the UN, AU and the African sub-regional
organizations and their respective mandates in the maintenance of peace and
security in Africa; assess the state of security in the continent; identify the key
factors for the deterioration of the security situation in the continent; evaluate the
effectiveness of the existing international security mechanisms in overcoming this
dangerous trend; identify the key challenges and drawbacks in the present global
security system; and suggest some recommendations on the way forward to meet
the security challenges of the African continent in the 21st century.
The first chapter explores the evolving concept of security. "Security" is
an important notion that divides the international community. However the
conception of this important notion is key in addressing the security challenges
the world faces today. This chapter will, therefore, discuss the traditional concept
of security; the pillars and values of collective security under the UN Charter; the
expansion of the concept of traditional security over the past few decades; and
factors that led to the expansion of this important concept. This will be followed
by an inquiry on the sufficiency of the UN security mechanism to cope with the
pressing challenges arising from the expansion of the notion of security.

6

The second chapter of the dissertation will discuss the UN security
mechanism and the place of regional security mechanisms under the UN Charter.
After providing some insights into the circumstances that led to the setting up of
the UN security mechanism, an attempt will be made to explore the security
mandates of the UN, the various mechanisms in place to discharge its security
mandates, and the place of regional security mechanisms under the UN Charter
that sets the underlying legal framework for the global-regional security
cooperation.
The third chapter will discuss the regional and sub-regional security
mechanisms in Africa. Following a historical synopsis on the AU security
mechanism, the dissertation will discuss the scope of AU's security mandates, the
respective responsibilities of those AU organs and bodies with a security mandate,
the regional legal frameworks in place to address the security challenges of the
continent, and the place of UN as well as African sub-regional security
mechanisms under the AU Constitutive Act. The dissertation will then examine
three sub-regional security mechanisms in Africa, namely ECOWAS, IGAD, and
SADC that have been active on the security domain. On the basis of a critical
evaluation of the cooperation agreement as well as the de facto cooperation
between AU and the three sub-regional organizations, an attempt will be made to
define and analyze the scope as well as challenges of the existing cooperation in
the security domain.
The fourth chapter will be devoted to an inquiry and analysis of the
existing cooperation among the UN, AU and African sub-regional security

7

mechanisms. This chapter will review and analyze the cooperation at different
levels. First an attempt will be made to review the de jure and de facto
cooperation between the UN and AU in the maintenance of regional peace and
security. The examination on the cooperation between the UN and sub-regional
security mechanisms in Africa will focus on bilateral cooperation between the UN
and each of the sub-regional organizations in Africa. It is hoped that this inquiry
will eventually lead to an identification of the missing link required for a more
effective cooperation of the UN-AU-African Sub-Regional Security Mechanisms.
The fifth chapter will discuss the contemporary security challenges in
Africa with a view to evaluating the sufficiency and effectiveness of the global,
regional, and sub-regional security mechanisms. After highlighting the current
state of security in Africa, this chapter will analyze selected case studies of
conflict situations in Africa in which the UN, AU and sub-regional security
mechanisms took part. The case studies will cover the conflict situation m
Somalia, the Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute, the conflict in Democratic Republic of
Congo, and the case of Liberia. The case studies will identify the root causes of
conflict and security challenges in the continent, internal and external factors
complicating the situation, and common cluster of security threats that loom large
in Africa, and perhaps those specific to Africa. Conceivably these case studies
will be important for the lesson they may hold for the much needed and effective
security system at the global, regional, sub-regional and national levels. Based on
the findings of the case studies, the key challenges and stumbling blocks that
adversely impact the effectiveness of the existing international security

8

framework in the prevention, resolution and management of conflicts in Africa
are also identified.
My conclusion will focus on what the United Nations, the African Union,
the African sub-regional organizations, and each African state need and ought to
do in order to meet the security challenges of the African continent in the 21st
century.

9

CHAPTER 1
THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
"No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor
commands the disciplinary power of 'security'" 1, Ronnie D. Lipshutz
"Security" literally means to be safe or free from danger. 2 It is 'the
absence of a threat to the stability of the international system, to countries or to
individuals. d Security has been the central preoccupation for both the powerful
and weaker governments. 4 Weaker governments are concerned of threats that
could bring their very existence questionable, while the powerful ones have
frequently had to face the threat of wars. 5
The concept of 'international security' implies a common interest in
security among nation states going beyond the particular interests of sovereign
states. 6 It is virtually understood as 'the ability of sovereign states to defend
themselves against external threats to their existence as states through conquest,
military defeat, or political and economic domination.' 7 The state is the primary
focus of analysis and action.

1

Ronnie D Lipshutz, ed., ON SECURITY, New York Colombia University Press, 24-25
Andrew Martin & Petro Patrice, Eds. RETHINKING GLOBAL SECURITY: MEDIA,
POPULAR CULTURE AND THE WAR ON TERROR, 2006
3
Sean Kay, GLOBAL SECURITY IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY: THE QUEST FOR
POWER AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, (2012), I
2

4

Patrick M Morgan, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS, (2006),
I

5

Id
Michael Howard, "The Historical Development of the UN's Role in International Security, "
United Nations Divided World, 63, (1993), at 63
7
Anne-Marie Slaughter, The New Challenges to International, National and Human Security
Policy, A Report to the Trilateral Commission, (2004), 58

6

10

The issue of international security has been at the fore-front of the world's
political agenda since the last century. 8 However the concept is invitingly broad,
and complex. This chapter, therefore, examines the evolving dimensions of
international security, surveys the major conceptual frameworks of the notion, and
identifies the major international security challenges in the twenty-first century.
The field of security studies has been considered as "a child of
Machiavellian and Hobbesian realism."9 It is important to understand the main
assumptions behind the traditional view of international politics, realism, in order
to properly understand the concept of security. This is rooted in the writings of the
ancient Greek historian Thucidides and great Renaissance and Enlightnemnt
philosophers such as Nicolo Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes, who tried in their
writings to capture how states behave. 10
Thucydides illustrated that the strong states do what they can, and the
weak states do what they must when it comes to international security. 11
Machiavelli in his study known as The Prince wrote the following:
"A man striving in every way to be good will meet his ruin among the
great number who are not good. Hence it is necessary for a prince, if he wishes to
remain in power, to learn how not to be good and to use his knowledge or refrain
from using it as he may need." 12 Machiavelli advised the Prince that where he
must choose between being loved or being feared, he should choose to be

8

Agostinho Zacharias, THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING,
( 1996), I
~eta Crawford, , Once and Future Security Studies, SECURITY STUDIES, I, ( I99I) 283, 292
10
Morgan, Supra note 4, at 3
11
Kay, Supra note 3, at 20
12

Id
11

feared.U In Machiavelli's view, a leader should "care nothing for the accusation
of cruelty so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal; by making a very few
examples he can be more truly merciful than those who through too much tenderheartedness allow disorders to arise whence come killings and rapine." 14
Thomas Hobbes, a renowned philosopher and scientist during the
1ihcentury, emphasized on the expectation of the citizenry from the state a
protection against both domestic and foreign threats. 15 He also advanced the
concept of power and anarchy. 16 In the anarchical world, incentives for war are
built into the international system as men seek to become first "masters of other
men's persons, wives, children and cattle". 17 Note that Hobbes also recognized
the dangers arising from domestic turmoil within a country.
The traditional conception of security only relates to issues of militarized
relations between competing states. 18 Until the late twentieth century, security
thinking emphasized the nation-state and competition for power in the
international system. 19
Realists conclude that the key objective of states is survival, and power is
the means to that end. 20 The Realists' tendency to equate international security

13

David P. Fidler, ,A Symposium on Reenvisioning the Security Council: Article: Caught between
Traditions: The Security Council in Philosophical Conundrum, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 411

14

Kay, Supra note 3, at Sean20
Sheehan, Supra note 15, at 16
16
Kay, Supra note 3, at 20
17 Id
18
Aristotle Constantindes, SECURITIZING DEVELOPMENT: ADVANTAGES AND
PITFALLS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S INVOLVEMENT IN DEVELOPMENT
ISSUES, 2003, at 204
19
Kay, Supra note 3, at I

15

12

with the use of force between nations is premised on the view that international
security involved territorial integrity of nations and the greatest threat to such
territorial integrity was posed by wars between states? 1
The realist understanding of international security is structured by specific
ideas about the nature of politics at the international level. 22 They start with the
premise that the system of international relations is anarchic, and 'dominated by a
struggle for power and security against the military capabilities of other states in
the system.' 23 For Realists the pursuit of power by states is assumed to be
"ubiquitous and inescapable", generating inevitable conflict of interest between
states. 24 For them such conflict of interest can only but mitigated but may not be
avoided.
For realists, the core purpose of the state is to protect its citizens from both
the external and internal danger. 25 It is out of this necessity that the working
definition of security under realism is strictly limited to military power.
For classical realists, the determining factor of the security dilemma is
attributed to a flawed human nature, which is power-seeking and prone to
violence. 26 It emphasized on the degree to which an effort by one state to increase
its security might be perceived as a threat by another state. 27 However, this realist
account of the security dilemma would naturally lead to insecurity because it

21

See for instance Joseph S. Nye Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "International Security Studies: A
Report of a Conference on the State of the Field," International Security, 12 (Spring 1988): 5-27.
22
Sheehan, Supra note 15, at 7
23
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assumes that all states or units in the international system behave similarly, and
this will further exacerbate the competition for more power making the realization
of security unachievable. 28
Structural realists, also known as Nco-realists, however questioned the
human nature explanation of classical realists. They argue that the human nature
explanation is flawed. For them, the determining factor of the security dilemma is
attributed to the structure of the international system and the patterns of behavior
it compelled states to fall into. 29
The continued centrality of international security consideration since the
establishment of the League of Nations indicates the significance of international
security in international politics. 30 In all the deliberations of the League of
Nations in 1918-19, the central theme of the discussion on international security
endorsed the traditional conception of security. The discussion was focused on
'deterring potential aggressors by agreeing in advance to oppose them with a
united front of all other states'. 31
President Woodrow Wilson's Final Addresses in Support ofthe League of
Nations explains the context under which the League of Nations came into
existence. President Wilson noted the following:
All the Nations that are going to be members of the League of Nations
enter into a solemn promise to one another that they will never use
28
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their power against one another for aggression; that they never will
impair the territorial integrity of a neighbour; that they never will
interfere with the political independence of a neighbour; that they will
abide by the principle that great populations are entitled to determine
their own destiny and that they will not interfere with that destiny; and
that no matter what differences arise amongst them they will never
resort to war without first having done one or other of two things either submitted the matter of controversy to arbitration, in which case
they agree to abide by the result without question, or submitted it to the
consideration of the council of the League of Nations, laying before
that council all the documents, all the facts, agreeing that the council
can publish the documents and the facts to the whole world, agreeing
that there shall be six months allowed for the mature consideration of
those facts by the council, and agreeing that at the expiration of the six
months, even if they are not then ready to accept the advice of the
council with regard to the settlement of the dispute, they will still not
go to war for another three months. 32
The League of Nations was established in 1919 with a view to providing
security for its members through collective action. 33 Under Article 10 and 11 of
the Covenant of the League of Nations, members of the League 'undertake to
respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and
existing political independence of all Members of the League. d 4 This is perhaps a
clear endorsement of the traditional conception of security.
When the United Nations was founded in 1945, the sovereign state was
still the building block of the international order. 35 The San Francisco Charter of
1945 was a response to the determination to avoid war, and the structure of the
Organization and the integration and competence of its bodies were geared to that
end. The forefathers had in mind the tragedies of interstate war when they
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negotiated the UN Charter. 36The threat of inter-state armed conflict was,
therefore, primarily in the minds of the architects of the UN Charter. 37
The UN Charter also endorsed the traditional conception of security by
envisioning the UN collective security system with a view to save the world
above all from the "scourge ofwar". 38
Though the underlying consideration m setting up the UN security
mechanism was the existing reality at the end of World War II, the UN
preparatory documents suggest that any other situation or dispute which may lead
to international friction or which is likely to endanger international peace and
security falls within the conception of international security. Though the drafters
of the UN Charter were preoccupied with state security, "they understood well,
long before the idea of human security gained currency, the indivisibility of
security, economic development and human freedom." 39
For example, the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Conference suggested that the
UN Security Council "should be empowered to investigate any dispute or any
situation which may lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order
to determine whether its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of
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. 1 peace and secunty.
. ,40
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The Dumbarton Oaks Conference, however, qualified the reference to
"any dispute or any situation which may lead to international friction ... " by
stating that it "should not apply to situation or dispute arising out of matters which
by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state
concerned."41 This view was eventually endorsed as one of the key principles in
the UN Charter. It provides that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state".
Paradoxically the Charter has not defined the matters that fall under
"domestic jurisdiction" of states. At the time, Uruguay, Belgium and Peru
expressed their regrets that the UN Charter failed to establish a rule of
international law that sets a criterion as to what matters fall within domestic
jurisdiction of states. 42
This attitude reflects the then mentality of the founders to jealously guard
the sovereignty of states, even at the expense of international peace and security.
One could perhaps conclude that they ignored the critical importance of domestic
matters in the maintenance of international peace and security.
In the immediate post-World War II period, the expression "national
security" was used to describe the preservation of state independence and
autonomy. 43 In 1952, Arnold Wolfers, a realist, introduced debate over the larger
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meaning of national security beyond the defense ofterritory. 44 He made a crucial
distinction between objective and subjective security, the absence of threats to
acquired values as against the absence of fear that such values will be
attacked. 45 Wolfer also made the point that the realist conception of security was
no less idealistic than conceptions proposed by its critics, since "the demand for a
policy of national security is primarily normative in character. 46
Nation states tend to strengthen their military security, either through
unilateral force improvements or through membership of alliances until the Cold
War evolved toward the superpower detente of the 1970s, at which period this
prevailing Western conception gradually shifted from "national security" to
international security. 47 Throughout this period, however, the concept of
international security was conceived purely in the military context, i.e. military
security against the military power of other states. 48
In 1977, Lester Brown introduced global assessments of environmental
and energy challenges, arguing that national security included these dimensions as
well as military issues. 49
Richard Ullman, in his 1983 article entitled, "Redefining Security" 50 , first
challenged the traditional conception of security, which ultimately sparked
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theoretical debate over the subject. The debate was centered on whether or not
certain threats could reasonably fall under the common rubric of security. 51
Barry Buzan's, in his book People, State and Fear, 52 advocated a much
broader approach to security. For Buzan what counts as a security issue is a result
of political and social discourse. 53 Buzan presented Security as an "essentially
contested concept". 54 He further portrayed security as a socially constructed
concept conveying specific meaning only within a particular social context and
accordingly introduced the concept of securitization. 55 Buzan presented the issue
as "urgent and existential threat" and asserted that it should be prioritized with a
view to handling it through extraordinary means." 56
These debates opened up the possibility to broaden the scope of security to
include a wider range of areas, including the economic and environmental
realms. 57
There

IS

a marked shift in security discourse in the post-Cold War

period. 58 The end of the Cold War not only ended the superpower rivalry and
bipolar politics 59 , but also the notion of international security has become a
subject of serious rethinking among scholars and perhaps the international
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community. 60 The nature of security challenges have changed radically with the
end of the Cold War era. 61
Since the UN Charter was fashioned in response to interstate wars, the
central problem since the end of the Cold War has been how to define security in
light of this new shift from inter-state conflict to predominantly intrastate
conflicts. 62 Given the potential impact of intrastate conflicts on international
security, it has become increasingly problematic to simply characterize it as a
purely domestic matter. 63 It was equally problematic for the UN since Article 2(7)
of its Charter put a restrain on it from intervention in matters within the domestic
jurisdiction of a state. Coupled with its traditional reluctance to get involved in
ostensibly domestic affairs, the efforts of the UN have been belated and hesitant. 64
The traditional realist conceptualization of security, whose focus is
"limited to issues of militarized relations between competing states" 65 , therefore,
came under manifold criticism as narrow and inadequate. According to Sheehan
this was primarily because the concept "was increasingly seen as unsatisfactory in
its own terms, and because it was ignoring important aspects of an emerging
international policy agenda." 66 The post Cold War period is, therefore, defined by
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changed priorities, and it has become commonplace to reconsider the concept of
security in the new context. 67
Proponents of new conceptions of security maintain that the security
definition must be broadened to incorporate new threats, such as environmental
degradation. 68 This view is premised on the marked change and transformation in
the familiar imperatives of international security. 69
The ON-sanctioned imposition of no-fly zones in Iraq in 1991 signaled a
new willingness on the part of the Security Council to broaden its interpretation of
its Chapter VII powers to include intra-state humanitarian crises. 70 In its landmark
resolution 688/1991, the UN Security Council condemned 'the repression of the
Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish
populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and
security in the region.'
The ensuing international security debate over the notion of "humanitarian
intervention" triggered significant divisions on the legal conception of the scope
of international intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. 71 When
civil wars broke out in Somalia, Yugoslavia and Rwanda at the beginning of the
1990s, the UN was not prepared to employ more effective action such as robust
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peacekeeping or peace enforcement to protect the population from death and
ethnic cleansing.
In the face of this failure, the notion of humanitarian intervention to save
the people from war became a highly controversial issue. At first, the legal
permissiveness of humanitarian intervention was questioned. After all, the
principle of non-interference in domestic affairs is a cornerstone of the UN
system. Non-interference is also an expression of sovereign equality between the
UN members to shield the weak from the strong. But Article 2 paragraph 7 of the
Charter also states that 'this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.' Consequently, if the Security Council
decides that a civil war constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
collective action to maintain or restore peace may also be mandated. One possible
approach to build a broader consensus for legalizing and legitimizing
humanitarian intervention may have been a focus on averting the international
consequences of serious violations of human rights. 72
Throughout the 1990s the Security Council repeatedly found that the
conditions prevailing within a state, from starvation in Somalia to political
intimidation and massacre in East Timor, constituted threats to international peace
and security sufficient to require collective armed intervention. 73
In 1991 the UN Security Council recognized the continuation of fighting
m Yugoslavia, which was causing a heavy loss of human life and material
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damage, and by the consequences for the countries of the region, in particular in
the border areas of neighboring countries as a breach to international peace and
.

secunty.
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In 1992, the UN Security Council formally recognized that "non-military
sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields
have become threats to peace and security." 75 For example, the Security Council
considered the continuation of the "rapid deterioration of the situation in Somalia
and the heavy loss of human life and widespread material damage resulting from
the conflict in the country" constitutes a threat to international peace and
•

secunty.

76

The President of the Security Council in his statement of 31 January 1992
pointed out that "the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a
threat to international peace and security." 77 The UN Security Council reiterated
this position in its resolution of 6 June 1998. 78
In 1993, the UN Security Council formally determined that a widespread
violation of international humanitarian law occurring within the former
Yugoslavia, including mass killings and the continuance of the practice of ethnic
cleansing, constitutes a threat to international peace and security. 79
In 1994, the UN Security Council determined that the magnitude of the
humanitarian crisis in Rwanda, which actually resulted in the death of thousands
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of civilians, constitutes a "threat to peace and security of the region". 80 Though
the Security Council decided to remain seized with the matter, it did limit the
extent of the threat to the security of the region. It was only in 1996 that the UN
Security Council eventually recognized the situation in Rwanda, i.e. the
"genocide and other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of
international humanitarian law ... committed in Rwanda" as constituting a threat
to international peace and security. 81
In 1994, the UN Security Council reached "a high point of decisive
action" when it approved Resolution 940 authorizing member states of the UN to
use all necessary force to remove General Raoul Cedras of Haiti, who in 1991
topples Haiti's democratically elected President Aristide. 82 This presents a shift in
the conception of international security to embrace a matter which is traditionally
perceived as a subject of domestic jurisdiction or internal sovereignty. Such quick
response of the UN defused a developing threat to international security. 83
As evidenced by interventions in Somalia and ex post facto acceptance of
the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the Security Council itself has adopted a
broader understanding of the international peace and security agenda.
In 1996, the UN Security Council identified international terrorism as "an
essential element for the maintenance of international peace and security." 84
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In 1998, the UN Security council recognized "the close relationship of the
problem of illicit arms flows to and in Africa with international peace and
security. " 85
In 2000, the UN Security Council underscored that "the HIVI AIDS
pandemic, if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security." 86
The 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States and the global war on
terror provided a new dimension to the debates over the nature and utility of
international law in the maintenance of international peace and security. 87 It also
reinvigorated the state centric conceptions of security. The debate over this new
dimension had also shaken the progressive 'humanization' of security. 88
Following the September 11 terrorist attack in the United States, the UN
Security Council adopted a resolution declaring in the strongest terms that "acts of
international terrorism constitute one of the most serious threats to international
peace and security in the twenty-first century". 89 UN Security Council Resolution
1368 of 12 September 2001 declared that international terrorism constituted a
threat to international peace and security, and in this context recognized the right
to self-defense. Moreover, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1373 of
28 September 2001, and obliged all UN members to combat terrorism by
translating an extensive catalogue of countermeasures into domestic law. Even
though Article 25 of the UN Charter implicitly allows the SC to issue binding
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decisions, the making of international law neither by treaty nor by custom was a
rather unusual act. 90
The concept of human security emerged as an important component of
international security in the 1990s. This concept found an early champion in the
Canadian government, particularly Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy. 91 Kofi
Annan then embraced the concept in his millennia} "We the Peoples" report,
where he spoke of the need for a more human-centered approach to security. 92
Human security, therefore, is not a concern with weapons. 93 It rather marks a
process of broadening the scope of security beyond state/military security towards
the human being,
A concern for human security is not a new phenomenon. 94 However it
entered the mainstream discourse after UNDP's 1994 Human Development
Report. The term was coined to shift the focus of security from the state to the
individual, to emphasize freedom from fear and want.
This brought the traditional conception of security under stern criticism
that it is "narrow and inadequate." 95 The need was also felt to redefine the concept
of international security to include both state and human security. This was
perhaps considered as a way to forge a consensus among all the world's nations,
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developed and developing, regarding the nature of the threats the international
community face and the best strategies to respond. 96
This new conceptions of security - human security - has considered the
individual to be the unit of analysis. And a new set of global issues were
identified as distinctive challenges to national and international security.
According to Kazuo Ogura, these include terrorism, environmental destruction,
drug trafficking, international crimes, infectious diseases and refugee problems. 97
Crucially, globalization has an important role in heightening new security
priorities because it forces a more expansive understanding of the security
dilemma. 98
The UNDP report defined human security as follows:
"Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first,
safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And
second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the
patterns of daily life-whether in homes, in jobs or in communities." 99
The concept contained seven security elements: economic, food, health,
environmental, physical harm, community, and political.
The Commission for Human Security, which was launched following the
UN Millennium Summit by the Government of Japan, defined human security as
the protection of "the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human
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freedoms and human fulfillment." 100 The Commission observed that "[t]he state
remains the fundamental purveyor of security. Yet it often fails to fulfill its
security obligations- and at times has even become a source of threat to its own
people." 101 The human security approach represents an important shift in the way
security is viewed- from the level of the state to the level of the individual. 102
According to the United Nations secretary-general's High-Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change, "the central challenge for the twenty-first
century is to fashion a new and broader understanding ... of what collective
security means ... " 103 This is premised on the marked change in the character of
international security that triggers the need to revisit the 1945 consensus
underlying the UN Charter, and perhaps build 'a new security consensus' . 104
The High-Level Panel underscored the need for 'a. new security
consensus' that

view of security that understands state security and human

security to be fundamentally intertwined. Note that the collective security system
envisaged by the forefathers of the UN Charter is principally designed to save the
world from the 'scourge of war' .105 Accordingly, the High-Level Panel suggested
the need to broaden the traditional definition of the concept of international
security to include both state security and human security. The High-Level Panel
on Threats, Challenges, and Change boils down its own conclusions to the
following proposition: the "dignity, justice, worth and safety" of the citizens of
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every state "should be at the heart of any collective security system for the
twenty-first century." 106
In 2005, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 60/1 recognizing
that the world is facing a whole range of threats that require the international
community's urgent, collective and more determined response. 107 Member states
further reaffirmed their "commitment to work towards a security consensus based
on the recognition that many threats are interlinked, that development, peace,
security and human rights are mutually reinforcing, that no State can best protect
itself by acting entirely alone and that all States need an effective and efficient
collective security system pursuant to the purposes and principles of the
Charter." 108
The World Summit further offered the basis for defining the notion, i.e. a
common understanding that "all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are
entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity
to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential." 109

While

recognizing the importance of ensuring human security, members of the UN
committed to discuss and define the notion of human security in the General
Assembly. 110
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The Security Council reform discussion at the 601h anniversary of the UN
m 2005 further reinforced 'the importance of dealing with the threats to

.
. 1 secunty
. m
. a legal manner ' . Ill
mtematwna
Following this World Summit, Japan and Mexico organized an open
ended, informal forum called Friends of Human Security every six months since
October 2006 to explore collaborative efforts and mainstreaming human security
in UN activities. 112

The Human Security network, an inter-regional group

established in 1998 and composed of thirteen countries, also provided a platform
of communication between policy makers, diplomats, civil society and the
academia to tackle critical human security threats. 113
The General Assembly conducted a thematic debate on Human Security in
May 2008. 114 The thematic discussion on the "Human Security" was indeed
politically loaded. For example, Israel understood human security as a "peoplecentered and individual focused approach that can be implemented in a variety of
areas such as climate change, environment, sustainable development, non
proliferation, human rights, armed conflict, culture of hate, crime prevention,
terrorism and others." 115
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Egypt cautioned the August Assembly "not to confuse "Human Security"
with the attempts to use the "Responsibility to Protect" to justify intervention in
domestic affairs, particularly between governments and their peoples." 116 Egypt
suggested that any such attempt to define and implement human security "has to
focus on human development, in order to preserve human dignity and enable all
human beings to enjoy freedom from fear of poverty, hunger or disease ... freedom
from want, freedom from occupation and oppression ... freedom from weapons of
mass destruction ... and finally respect for each other's cultures, traditions and
beliefs." 117 This view is rooted on the implicit potential of equating human
security with international security in triggering the enforcement powers of the
UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This is perhaps a
natural reaction under the circumstances that state sovereignty is still the core of
international relations. 118
Friends of Human Security divert the focus from elaborating a legal
definition of the notion, and pursued for concrete collaboration on the basis of a
common understanding of the broad concept provided by the Commission on
Human Security, i.e. "to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that
enhance human freedom and human fulfillment." 119
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During this thematic debate, human security was characterized as a
framework to further the principles of the 1945 UN Charter but the concept still
suffers from lack of concise definition. But it is important to note that the new
security discourse elevated the human rights goals of the UN Charter to a new
level.
In 201 0, the Secretary General of the UN submitted a report on Human
Security. 120 The report provides an update on developments related to the
advancement of human security since the 2005 World Summit. The Secretary
General noted the following in the Human Security Report:
Threats such as natural disasters, violent conflicts and their impact on
civilians, as well as food, health, financial and economic crises, tend to
acquire transnational dimensions that move beyond traditional notions of
security. While national security remains pivotal to peace and stability,
there is growing recognition of the need for an expanded paradigm of
•
121
secunty.
The Secretary General went on and made reference to triangular
relationships between security, development and human rights and further
asserted that
[G]uarantee of national security no longer lies in military power alone.
Essential to addressing security threats are also healthy political, social,
environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together
reduce the likelihood of conflicts, help overcome the obstacles to
development and promote human freedoms for all. 122
The Secretary General of the UN identified three common components
that encompass the principles of human security. These are:
(1) the recognition that human security is in response to current and
emerging threats; (2) the recognition that protection and empowerment of
120
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people form the basis and the purpose of security, and (3) the employment
of people-centered, comprehensive, context-specific and preventive
· to ensure human secunty.
· ID
strategies
Human security is based on a fundamental

understanding that

Governments retain the primary role for ensuring the survival, livelihood and
dignity of their citizens. Otherwise no agreement existed on the definition and
scope of Human Security in the UN or within any regional organization. Some
countries expressed their concern not to confuse "Human Security" with the
attempts to use the "Responsibility to Protect" to justify intervention in domestic
affairs between governments and their peoples. 124
The African Union defined human security as:
the security of the individual in terms of satisfaction of his/her basic
needs. It also includes the creation of social, economic, political,
environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival and
dignity of the individual, the protection of and respect for human rights,
good governance and the guarantee for each individual of opportunities
and choices for his/her full development. 125
There is no consensus yet on the definition of the concept of human
security. The vague definition is due to the fact that the phrase has brought
together activists of varying issues, and a narrowing of the definition would likely
126
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"clear criteria for specifying what is, and what is not, a security problem ... an
expanded definition of security will lose its intellectual coherence." 127
The establishments of the International Criminal Court, International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, and the conclusion ofthe Agreement of the antipersonnel land mine ban
treaty are notable outcomes principally attributed to the human security agenda. 128
The human security concept is already one of the important peace and
security agendas of the UN and is likely to become of increasing importance. We
have seen the ongoing demands of asymmetric conflict and terrorism, the nonmilitary sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and
ecological fields, and growing concerns about energy and the environment. 129 The
small arms proliferation, poverty and disease have indeed become threats to the
international security. 130 Disease and disaster kill many more people every month
than armed conflict or terrorists do in a year, a decade, or even a centuryY 1 As
the Worldwatch Institute writes,
All of the wars of the twentieth century are estimated to have resulted in
the deaths of an average of 1.1 million combatants and civilians per year.
But at present, communicable diseases are killing fourteen times that
number of people annually. 132
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We have also experienced extraordinary popular movements for
democracy in Africa and the Arab world. 133 The recent wave of public uprisings
against dictatorial and repressive regimes in North Africa and the Middle East
added a new dimension to the debate on the nature and utility of international law
and international institutions due to the demands from some quarters for
international intervention against authoritarian regimes.It has indeed caused
dilemma on the international community as to how to react to the specific
situations in each country. The United Nations Security Council has dealt with
each situation on ad hoc basis. These events, including the recent uprisings in
Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Libya, have provided additional impetus that
the fundamentals of the human security framework may become more rather than
less important. For example, the UN Security Council determined that the
situation in Libya, i.e.the widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian
population in Libya, constitutes a threat to international peace and security. 134
These developments provoked a discussion on the scope of the UN
responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security, i.e. whether
its function includes dealing with massive episodes of violence and abuse of
human rights within the borders of states

in other words a broad commitment to

justice, law, and order.
The concept of international security which was for long synonymous with
the defense of territory from external attack has now evolved to embrace the
notion of human security. The two policy discourses are likely to operate
133
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alongside one another. 135 What is perhaps more important is the potential added
value that this framework can contribute to existing multilateral framework and
national actions. Though the notion of rigid state sovereignty enshrined under the
UN Charter seems less sacrosanct today than in 1945 136 , it still remains to be a
challenge in the security mandates of the UN. However, as articulated by UN
former Secretary General Kofi Annan, 'state frontiers ... should no longer be seen
as a watertight protection for war criminals or mass murderers'. 137 One should
not, however, lose sight of the critical power of the UN Security Council to
determine the existence of any threat to international peace and security and to
authorize use force to respond broadly to threats against international security.
However, at a practical level, the framework has not displaced traditional
notions of security. States continue to be the primary actors in the international
system, and they assess their security requirements in terms of power. 138It is,
therefore, imperative that the concept of international security should be framed
within an expanded context including human security.
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CHAPTER2
AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
MECHANISM
2.1 General Background
The genesis of the UN security mechanism, and perhaps the reframing of
the organizational structure of the world community, started when the demise of
the League of Nations became evident following the start of the Second World
War. 1

United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union took the leading

initiative for the establishment of the

'United Nations Organization' _2

Subsequently China joined them upon the issuance of the Moscow Declaration on
General Security on October 30, 1943. This Declaration was perhaps the first
formal recognition by the four countries on the necessity of establishing a general
international organization for the maintenance of international peace and
.

secunty.

3

The US proposals entitled, "Tentative Proposals for a General
International Organization" were accepted as the basis for discussion at the
Dumbarton Oaks Conference, where the UN project was generally agreed. 4
These proposals contemplated the establishment of a multi-purpose organization
whose principal purpose would be the maintenance of international peace and

1
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security. 5 Similarly, the Soviet Union's Memorandum dispatched at the
Conference advanced the idea that the new global organization should be security
centered. 6 The primary focus on the issue of security was geared towards
remedying the defects of the League of Nations system. 7 That is why White
characterized this important initiative as the second attempt at collective security
after the failed collective security schemes of the League ofNations. 8
Forty-seven states that adhered to the 1941 "Declarations by United
Nations"9 and four other states, i.e. Argentina, Denmark, Belarussian Soviet
Socialist Republic and the Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic, were invited to
attend the founding Conference of the UN in San Francisco. 10 Except Poland, all
the invited countries attended the Conference held from 25 April to 26 June 1945.
The composition of the negotiating countries suggests that the negotiation
of the founding instrument started as a continuation of the wartime alliance
against the axis powers. 11 It should be added that it was indeed a post-war
planning, as a reaction to the devastation of the Second World War, 12 to establish

5

Id.
Simma, Supra note I at 5 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY,
Second Edition, vol. 1(2002), 5.
7
Malcolm N. Shaw, INTERNATIONAL LAW, Cambridge University Press (1991), 748
8
N.D. White, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, Manchester University
Press, (1996), 171
9
The "Declarations by United Nations" was a statement signed on January I, 1942 at the AngloAmerican Arcadia conference held in Washington DC. The Declaration subscribed the principles
of the 1941 Atlantic Charter. The signatories also committed to employ their full economic and
military resources against the Axis Powers. They further pledged not to make separate armistice
or peace agreements with the enemy. It is important to note that the United Nations received its
designation from this Declaration.
10
Oscar Schachter, The UN Legal Order: An Overview, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, Cambridge University Press, ( 1997), I 052
11
John H. Barton, Disarmament, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW,
Volume I (1992), 1072
12
Antonio Cassese, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD, Oxford University Press
(1986), 68

6

38

a wider and permanent system of general security that would help overcome the
biggest challenges the world had experienced during the Second World War.
The necessity of guaranteeing a more secured world peace and the need
for collective action were at the center of the discussion in the entire exercise of
designing the new global peace organization. 13 Issues related to the maintenance
of international peace and security, especially the central role of the Security
Council and the voting formula of the Security Council, were among those issues
top on the agenda in the course of the negotiation. Cassese compared the outcome
of the negotiation, i.e. the new collective security system, with the 1815 Concert
of Europe, where the big powers considered the assumption of control over
international security affairs as necessary. 14
The series of negotiations held in four phases eventually led to the
adoption of the UN Charter at the San Francisco Conference on 2 June 1945. 15
The US participation and perhaps its leadership in the entire negotiation process
was crucial in the reorganization of the new global framework.
The preamble of the Charter articulated the factors that led to the
formation of the UN. The determination of the Peoples of the United Nations "to
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime
has brought untold sorrow to mankind" is top among the list of factors. 16 And this
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is perhaps the principal raison d'etre for its formation. It also fits the historical
context under which the Charter was negotiated. 17
The principal purpose of the UN is the maintenance of international peace
and security. 18 According to the International Court of Justice, the primacy is
ascribed to its centrality to the fulfillment of the other purposes of the
organization, i.e. promoting friendly relations, achievement of economic, social,
cultural, and humanitarian goals and respect for human rights, and to serve as a
center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common
ends. 19 High are the stakes in ensuring the effectiveness of the UN in the
maintenance of international peace and security. It is indeed a determining factor
for the very existence of a global legal order. 20
The Charter envisaged two subsidiary purposes for the achievement of the
maintenance of international peace and security. These are the use of effective
collective measures and "the adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
situations, which might lead to a breach of the peace".

21

The Charter explicitly

attaches a caveat that the latter subsidiary purpose should be taken "in conformity
with the principle of justice and international law".
This led some scholars to assert that collective measures could be taken in
disregard to the principles of justice and international law so long as it is deemed
expedient. 22 On the contrary, Oscar argued that the same limitation does apply to
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collective measures. 23 His argument is based on the assertion that international
law is an implicit normative basis of the Charter. 24
Other scholars such as Singh looked at the issue from a different angle.
While agreeing that collective measures are not unlimited in scope, the
proponents of this view attach the limitation to proportionality to the maintenance
of international peace and security objectives. 25 A similar but quite a general view
is the one articulated by Arechaga. He contends that the collective measures are
limited only by the duty to act in accordance with the purpose and principles of
the Charter. 26
The underlying principles of the Charter include sovereign equality of
member states; the duty to settle international disputes by peaceful means without
endangering international peace and security, and justice; 27 the duty to refrain
from the threat or use of force inconsistent with the purposes of the UN ;28 the
duty to provide every assistance to the UN for any action it takes in accordance
with the Charter, and the duty to refrain from giving any assistance to any states
against which the UN is taking preventive or enforcement action/9 and Nonintervention in domestic affairs.
The incorporation of the principle of prohibition of use or threat of use of
force in the UN Charter distinguishes the UN from its predecessor, i.e. the League
23
24
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ofNations. The Covenant of the League ofNations does not substantively outlaw
war. Article 11 of the Covenant only used a vague language declaring that any
war or threat of War was a matter of concern to the whole League. 30It should also
be noted that principles such as the principle of non-intervention, which indeed
constitute one of the most significant tenets of the 'Westphalian model', 31 do not
"prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII". 32
Article 24 of the UN Charter confers on the UN Security Council a
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. 33
The Security Council is entrusted with both recommendatory and mandatory
enforcement powers to discharge its responsibility. Under Chapter VI of the
Charter, the Council is given recommendatory power to encourage the pacific
settlement of disputes while under Chapter VII the Council is entrusted with both
recommendatory and enforcement powers to maintain or restore international
peace and security. The rationale behind conferring primary responsibility on this
important domain is to 'ensure prompt and effective action'. 34
The Security Council's voting formula was the result of a compromise
mainly between two extreme positions. While the United States and United
Kingdom argued that the veto power is incompatible with the fundamental
principles of the UN, Soviet Union resisted any procedure that would lead it to
submission

to

majority

decisions
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questions

of

essential

importance? 5Eventually a compromise formula was adopted. The five leading
nations of the military alliance that defeated the Axis powers became permanent
members of the Security Council with a veto power. 36 Five years later, the
General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the United for Peace Resolution
reaffirming the duty of the permanent members of the Security Council "to seek
unanimity and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto". 37
Actions of the Security Council are activated when the Security Council
determines the existence of threats to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression. 38 Such determination is very complex and does not enjoy immunity
from politicization. The danger that such determinations may be dominated by
overriding political considerations is perhaps a notable factor for the complexity
of the decision making process. 39
The traditional definition of 'threat to the peace' refers to a declaration of
war, or intervention or of other hostile intent by one state against the other. 40 Over
the past decades the concept of threat to the peace further developed through the
decisions of the Security Council to include intra-state violence and breaches of
fundamental international laws. 41 The recent resolutions of the Security Council
on the situation in the Sudan are notable in this regard. In its resolutions, the
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Council decided that the situation in the Sudan continues to constitute a threat to
international peace and security. 42
The concept of 'threat to the peace' is equally applicable to interstate
conflicts. During the 1998-2000 armed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the
Security Council determined that "the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea
constitutes a threat to peace and security". 43
The concept of breach of peace is, however, applicable only to inter-state
uses of force. 44 The Security Council used the term "breach of the peace" for fullscale attack of one state by another. 45 The practice of the Council suggests that
resort to use of force is activated when it is determined that the situation
constitutes breach of the peace. 46 In its sixty-four year history, the Security
Council made such determination only in very limited occasions. These include
the 1950 armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea,
the 1982 Argentina's invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands, the Iran-Iraq
war, and the 1990 Iraq's invasion ofKuwait. 47 Thus far there is no single occasion
where the Council considered a situation in Africa as breach of the peace.
Pursuant to Article 25 of the Charter, decisions of the Security Council are
binding on member states. 48 However there have been divergent views regarding
the scope of this provision. On the one hand countries such as the United
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Kingdom contended that the scope is limited to Chapter VII enforcement action of
the Security Council. 49 Others advocate a broader interpretation of Article 25.
According to the proponents of the latter view, the scope of the provision is not
confined to the Council's Chapter VII enforcement action. 50 The International
Court of Justice supported this view. In its 1971 Namibia Advisory opinion, the
court justified this position by arguing that any attempt to narrow the scope of
Article 25 "would be to deprive this principal organ of its essential functions and
powers under the Charter".

51

Though the primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace
and security rests upon the Security Council, the International Court of Justice in
the Expenses of the Organization Advisory opinion pronounced that "the
responsibility conferred is 'primary' not exclusive". 52 It is within this context that
the Charteralso confers upon the UN General Assembly important responsibilities
on matters of international peace and security. These include the power, (1) to
discuss and make recommendations on the general principles of cooperation in
the maintenance of international peace and security, including disarmament; 53 (2)
to discuss any question relating to international peace and security and, except
where a dispute or situation is currently being discussed by the Security Council,
make recommendations on it; 54 (3) to recommend measures for the peaceful
settlement of any situation that might impair friendly relations among nations; 55
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(4) to call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to
endanger international peace and security, 56 and (5) to elect non-permanent
members of the Security Council upon the Council's recommendations.
Nevertheless these recommendatory powers of the General Assembly are
not unlimited. First and foremost, the General Assembly is prohibited from
making any recommendation on any dispute or situation on which the Security
Council is exercising the functions assigned to it in the Charter. 57 The second
limitation is perhaps related to any question that calls for action. If the General
Assembly is seized with an issue of this nature, it is required to refer it to the
Security Council. 58 The International Court of Justice in the Expenses case
interpreted the term 'action' to mean only enforcement action, which falls under
the Chapter VII powers of the Security Council. 59
Article 18 of the UN Charter qualified Recommendations of the General
Assembly with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security as
'important question', subjecting it to a two-third majority vote of the members
. 60
present and votmg.
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2.2 The UN Security Mechanisms
The UN Charter has put in place various mechanisms for the achievement
of the primary purpose of the UN, i.e. maintenance of international peace and
security. There have also developed additional mechanisms such as peacekeeping
over the course of time. These mechanisms are usually categorized under four
general headings; namely, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, Peace-enforcement, and
Peace-building. 61

2.2.1 Peacemaking
According to the Charter, one of the distinct responsibilities of the UN is
to assist parties to international disputes to settle their differences through
peaceful means. 62 Peacemaking is an important mechanism that is directly related
with this important responsibility of the UN. It is aimed at achieving UN's
principal objective of maintaining international peace and security. 63
As articulated by Charlesworth, the notion of collective security underpins
the dispute resolution regime contemplated in the UN Charter. 64 Chapter VI sets
out the framework for the pacific settlement of disputes, a principle that emerged
after the Second World War. 65 The Security Council, General Assembly and the
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Secretary-General are competent to support states in the peaceful resolution of
disputes. 66
The obligation to resort to pacific settlement of disputes is imposed on
parties involved in any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
international peace and security. 67 The reference to "parties" here suggests that
the obligation is not limited to states. It could arguably extend to any non-state
entity provided that the dispute is likely to endanger international peace and
security.
The determination as to whether the continuance of the dispute is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security appears to be left for
the decision of the parties. However this does not prevent the Security Council
from investigating and making such determination. 68
The Security Council is entrusted with power to recommend appropriate
procedures or methods of adjustment at any stage of the dispute if it determines
that it is likely to endanger international peace and security. 69 Its power extends to
recommending appropriate terms of settlement if it deems that the continuance of
the dispute is in fact likely to endanger international peace and security. 70 In
practice, however, the Security Council also makes such recommendation simply
out of political considerations without any finding that the dispute is likely to
endanger international peace and security. 71 This is just one example of how
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much the Council's decision-making process could be politically driven. Because
of the competing political interests among members of the Council and the
Council's excessive deference to the wishes of the disputant parties, the
performance of the Security Counci 1 in the peacemaking domain is a dismal
one. 72
The powers of the General Assembly derive from Chapter IV of the
Charter. Article 10 entitles the General Assembly to discuss any question within
the scope of the Charter and, except where a dispute or situation is currently being
discussed by the Security Council, make recommendations to members of the UN
or to the Security Council. 73 It is evident here that the primacy of the Security
Council is preserved when it comes to the issue of peace and security. Article 14
of the Charter is more specific entrusting the General Assembly with a power to
recommend measures for the peaceful settlement of any situation that might
impair friendly relations among nations. 74 Unlike the Security Council whose
power, at least in theory, is confined to issues of peace and security, the power of
the General Assembly in this domain is apparently broader in that it extends to
any situation which is likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations
among nations. 75
Fact-finding is an important component of the peacemaking mechanism.
The 1991 General Assembly Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in
the field of the Maintenance of International Peace and Security defined fact-
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finding as "any activity designed to obtain detailed knowledge of the relevant
facts of any dispute or situation which the competent United Nations organs need
in order to exercise effectively their functions in relation to the maintenance of
international peace and security". 76 The Declaration recognized the importance of
fact-finding in strengthening the role of the UN in the maintenance of
international peace and security and promoting the peaceful settlement of
.
77
d1sputes.

Both the Security Council and the General Assembly have established
subsidiary organs mandated to undertake fact-finding missions on different
occasions. 78 In the recent Eritrea-Djibouti border dispute, the Security Council
requested the Secretary-General of the UN to send a fact-finding mission at the
border between Djibouti and Eritrea. 79
The UN Secretary-General also has an important role to play in
peacemaking. His power derive from Article 99 which empowers him to bring to
the attention of the Security Council any matter which he deems may threaten
international peace and security. 80Moreover the Charter under Article 98 requires
the Secretary General to perform any functions entrusted to him by the Security
Council or General Assembly. 81 Theses include request for the Secretary-General
to offer his good offices and to send fact-finding missions. For example, in the
Djibouti-Eritrea border dispute, which we noted above, the Security Council
76
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instructed the Secretary-General to send a fact-finding mission to the borders of
the two countries. 82

2.2.2 Peace-Enforcement
Enforcement action is the exclusive jurisdiction of the Security
Council. The International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the
Expenses of the Organization affirmed that the Security Council is the only organ

that can require enforcement by coercive action. 83 The enforcement actions could
either be military or non-military.

a. Non-Military Enforcement Actions
Non-military enforcement actions are those actions the Security Council is
mandated to take pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter. These include the
imposition of diplomatic, economic and communication embargoes provided that
there is a consensus among the permanent members of the Council. 84 These
measures are applied only when the Security Council determines that there is a
threat to international peace and security, or a breach of the peace or act of
aggression. 85
The Council occasionally resorted to these measures. 86 The typical
measures include economic embargoes including trade and financial embargoes. 87
Severing communications and diplomatic embargoes have also been imposed in
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certain occasions. 88 The non-military enforcement measures are not limited to the
aforementioned measures. The language of Article 41 suggests that the Security
Council could take any type of non-military punitive measures not listed under
Article 41. 89 The establishment of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter are worth mentioning here. 90
Non-military enforcement measures have been increasingly resorted to
following the end of the Cold War, which reinvigorated the UN Security
Mechanism. 91 • Yoshiro Matsui articulated the UN activism in the post-Cold War
period as follow:
The Gulf War symbolizes the UN activism after the end of the Cold War.
The Security Council adopted many resolutions under Chapter VII of the
Charter during and after the Gulf War, without being disturbed by the veto
of its permanent members and this fact is highly appreciated ... as
illustrating a 'rebirth' of the United Nation's collective security. 92
Schachter saw the end of the Cold War as one that 'raised more hopes for
a more effective international legal order' and reinvigorated the enforcement
powers of the Security Counci1. 93 The 1993 Security Council financial, diplomatic
and air transport embargoes against Libya in relation to the bombing of the
PanAm Flight 103 over Lockerbie, 94 the 1992 Security Council authorization of
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the deployment of the UN Operation in Somalia, 95 and the establishment of the
International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia in 1993 96 and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 97 are worth noting in this regard.

b. Military-Enforcement Action
This involves the use of armed force authorized under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter. The resort to armed force is made when the Security Council
considers that the non-military enforcement measures 'would be inadequate or
have proved to be inadequate' .98 Article 42 sets the underlying principle on the use
of force. It provides that the Security Council 'may take such action by air, sea, or
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security' .99 The Charter further articulated three directives on the use of force: (1)
prohibition of use or threat of use of force; (2) right of self-defense upon armed
attack; and (3) the UN Security Council's legal monopoly on the use of force.
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The general idea of the use of force is not so unique for the UN. Its
predecessor, i.e. the League of Nations, for example deployed an international
force on the occasion of Saar Territory Plebiscite in 1935. 101 What makes it
different at least theoretically is the newly devised framework that would allow
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future military action through the employment of standing forces under the
auspices of the UN. 102
Article 51 of the UN Charter preserves the rights of individual or
collective self-defense for states until the UN Security Council takes measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security. 103 Beside the reporting
obligations to the Security Council, the most important caveat is that the selfdefense measure shall not in any way prevent the actions of the Security Council
to maintain or restore international peace and security. 104
However, the fact that the armed forces contemplated under Article 43
have not yet been made available to the Security Council constrained the Council
from authorizing military action. 105 Nonetheless, on some occasions the Council
authorized member states to use their troops to take military measures. 106For
example, in 2008 the Security Council authorized states, regional and
international organizations to
take part actively in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off
the coast of Somalia ... by deploying naval vessels and military aircraft and
through seizure and disposition of boats, vessels, arms and other related
. . of piracy
.
.
eqmpment
used.m the commissiOn
.... 107
The practical implementation of such authorizations pretty much depends
on the nature of the problem and more importantly on the political will of those
states that could afford to take the contemplated military measures. This situation
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raised charges of double standard in the practical implementation of the
i".
. 108
en1orcement
measure, wh"1ch.1s uncertam.

More importantly, the Cold War effectively prevented the UN from
assuming an activist role in maintaining international peace and security. 109 The
obstructive use of the veto power in the Security Council significantly prevented
the implementation of Article 43 and resort to enforcement measures. 110
Consequently, Chapter VII was little used during the Cold War era. 111
The collective security system embodied under the UN Charter was rather
largely taken over by what White designated as "a-balance-of-power system
based on collective defensive alliances". 112

The underlying philosophical

differences between the two systems lie on the means pursued to secure the
stability of the global security system and the principal motives of states for their
action.
Collective security seeks stability through the general observance of law,
while the balance of power system seeks it through the curbing of excessive
power. 113 In the balance of power system, states act out of their national interests.
But state's action under the collective security scheme is presumptively
undertaken for the benefit of all states to restore or maintain international peace
. 114
and secunty.
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Therefore the military sanction contemplated under Chapter VII within the
framework of Article 43 has become a dead letter because of the lack of
implementation of Article 43 of the Charter. 115 This is mainly attributed to the
prevailing international political climate since the earliest day of the UN, 116
especially the political rift among the permanent members of the Security
Council, eroding the confidence and reliance of the international community on
the UN security system. 117
The issue was however on the agenda of the UN since the aftermath of its
establishment. The US Deputy Permanent Representative to the Military Staff
Committee, Herschel V. Johnson, made a forceful statement on June 4, 1947
expressing his concern that the Security Council will be unable to fulfill its
responsibilities as the enforcement organ of the UN until the Article 43 special
agreements are signed. 118 Few years later the General Assembly of the UN took
an optimistic view through the adoption of the United for Peace Resolution in
1950. The Resolution pointed out that the UN still has "at its disposal means for
maintaining international peace and security" pending the conclusion of the
Article 43 Special Agreements.
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In 1992, former UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali tabled an agenda tor
peace, advocating a more forceful method for applying Charter principles to
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future hostilities. 120 He suggested the establishment of a permanent body that
would be capable of quickly responding to threats to international peace. 121 This
is the body that was envisioned under Article 43 of the UN Charter, but never saw
the light of the day. Such arrangement is also believed serve as a deterrent to
future threats to peace.

2.2.3 Peacekeeping
The peacekeeping system is not contemplated in any specific provision of
the Charter. 122 It rather evolved in response to the political environment during
the Cold War era. 123 The 1950 landmark resolution of the General Assembly,
known as the Uniting for Peace Resolution, asserted that the General Assembly
could still take action if the Security Council fails to act, owing to the negative
vote of a permanent member, in a case where there appears to be a threat to the
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. 124 Accordingly, the General
Assembly may immediately consider the matter with a view to recommending to
Members for collective measures to maintain or restore international peace and
security. 125
0

Following the adoption ofthis resolution, the Security Council itself relied
upon the resolution to call emergency meeting of the General Assembly when
lack of unanimity of its permanent members prevented it from exercising its
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primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. 126
The 1960 Security Council resolution on the question of Congo is noteworthy
here. 127
The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was the first armed UN
peacekeeping force mandated by the General Assembly of the UN to secure and
supervise cessation of hostilities, and to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian
and Israeli forces. 128 Since 1948, there have been a total of 69 UN peacekeeping
operations around the globe. 129
Even if authorizing peacekeeping operation is not explicitly referred as the
power of the General Assembly under the Charter, the International Court of
Justice recognized the power of the Assembly to organize peacekeeping
operations by means of recommendations to states or to the Security Council, or
to both. 130The court based its argument on Articles 11 (2) and 35. While Article
11 (2) entrusted the General Assembly with the power to discuss and make
recommendations on any questions relating to the maintenance of international
peace and security, Article 35 gives the same power to the Assembly on specific
cases brought to the attention of the General Assembly. 131 It should be noted here
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that the General Assembly could not deploy peacekeeping force without the
consent of the host country. 132
Though initially inaugurated by the General Assembly 133 , the Security
Council has subsequently endorsed the practice of UN peacekeeping operations
and now peacekeeping operations are principally authorized by the Security
Council. 134
The scope of its mandate is determined on account of the nature of the
specific conflict and the specific challenges it presents.

135

During the Cold War

era, the mandates of the peacekeeping operations were limited to maintaining
ceasefires, serving as a buffer and stabilizing situations on the ground, with a
view to facilitating the peaceful resolution of the conflict at the political level. 136
Over the years, this traditional mission expanded to include 'complex
multidimensional' undertakings necessary for laying out the foundations for
sustainable peace and effective implementation of comprehensive peace
agreements. The expanded enterprises include building institutions of governance,
human rights monitoring, security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration of former combatants. 137
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With changes in the nature of conflicts especially after the end of the Cold
War, 138 the UN peacekeeping, which was originally employed for dealing with
inter-state conflicts, has been increasingly applied to intra-state conflicts. The
mandate has also been extended to include protecting humanitarian operations
during continuing warfare, protecting civilian populations and pressing the parties
to achieve national reconciliation. 139 The 1992 United Nations Operation in
Somalia is notable in this regard. 140
Though peacekeeping had encountered challenges followed by reflection
and adaptation to the evolving demands for complex operations, it has become
UN's most successful "standard bearers" over the course of time. 141 It is now a
key UN security mechanism to manage complex crises that pose a threat to
international peace and security. 142 Nevertheless the UN has not yet been
successful in setting a generally accepted standard for the setting up of any new
peacekeeping forces. 143
Though the legitimacy of peacekeeping operations is not questioned, there
IS

still substantial disagreement on the specific legal basis of this entrenched

activity. 144 It is interesting to note that even the UN resolutions authorizing
peacekeeping operations did not make specific reference to any provisions of the
138
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Charter until recently where reference to Chapter VII were made when the
deployments were authorized into volatile post-conflict setting where the state is
not in a position to maintain security and public order. 145
The second Secretary-General of the UN, Dag Hammarskjold, referred it
as a "Chapter Six and a Half' operation placing it between the two broad UN
security mechanisms, i.e. Pacific Settlement of Disputes and Collective
Enforcement Action. 146
The position of the UN Secretariat on the subject is reflected in the official
document of the UN entitled, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Operations:
Principles and Guidelines,' published in 2008. It makes a general assertion that
the legal basis of such measure, i.e. establishing peacekeeping operation, is found
in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter. 147

The document further

contends that 'linking United Nations peacekeeping with a particular Chapter of
the Charter can be misleading for the purpose of operational planning, training
and mandate implementation' . 148 It appears that the Secretariat attempted to avoid
the legal issue reducing it into a mere operational one.
At this juncture it is important to point out the role of the SecretaryGeneral in the system of peacekeeping. The Security Council exercised its power
under Article 99 on a number of occasions to assign the Secretary-General for the
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organization and administration of UN peacekeeping operations of varwus
kinds. 149
In conclusion, the system of peacekeeping is not a peace enforcement
operation as envisaged under Article 42. 150Rather it is a peacekeeping operation
carried out with the consent and cooperation of the parties to the conflict and later
developed as an entrenched UN activity in lieu of the peace enforcement
contemplated under Article 42. 151

2.2.4 Peace building
Peace building is basically a post-conflict measure aimed at solidifying
peace and building trust and interaction among former foes with a view to
avoiding a relapse into conflict. 152 To use the language of former UN SecretaryGeneral Boutros Ghali, peace building measures are aimed at establishing
structures to 'strengthen and solidify peace' . 153 Peace building measures include
demilitarization, small arms control, institutional reform, improved police and
judicial systems, human rights monitoring, electoral reform and social and

. deve Iopment activities.
. . . t54
economic
In the foregoing discussion, we already highlighted the extension of
peacekeeping forces' mandate to include some of these peace-building activities.
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Under those circumstances, the UN already has an entree to undertake the peacebuilding activity. This makes the task of the UN much easier. But this is not
always true. If no peacekeeping operation is on the ground, the situation is more
difficult as peace-building measures require the consent of the concerned parties.
In 2005, the UN General Assembly and the Security Council concurrently
established Peace-building Commission as an intergovernmental advisory
body. 155 The main purposes of the Commission include bringing together all
actors to marshal resources; suggesting and advising on integrated strategies for
post conflict building and recovery; focusing on the required reconstruction and
institution-building efforts for recovery from conflict, and improving the
coordination of all relevant actors. 156 As articulated in the introductory paragraphs
of the founding resolution, 'achieving sustainable peace' is at the center of laying
out the coordinated and integrated approach towards peace building. 157
The Commission has a Standing Organizational Committee whose
membership is drawn from permanent and non permanent members of the
Security Council, the members of Economic and Social council, top providers of
UN assessed and voluntary contributions, top providers of military personnel and
civilian police to UN Missions, and Members elected based on considerations of
regional representation and experience in post-conflict recovery. 158
It is interesting to note that the system requires participation of almost all

concerned parties in country specific meetings of the Commission. These include
155
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the country under consideration, states engaged in the post-conflict process relief
efforts and/or political dialogue, relevant regional and sub-regional organizations,
the major financial, troop and civilian police contributors, Senior UN
representative in the field and relevant regional and international financial
institutions. 159 The resolution further reqmres invitation of the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund and other institutional donors at these meetings. 160

2.3 The Place of regional security mechanisms under the UN Charter
The Charter of the United Nations sets the underlying legal framework for
the global-regional security cooperation. Of particular significance are Chapter
VIII, Article 2(4), Article 24 and Article 103 ofthe Charter. 161
The Charter explicitly confers primary responsibility to the UN Security
Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, 162 which the
Security Council jealously guards. Almost all of the Council's resolutions relating
to international peace and security consistently reiterate this principle.
Accordingly, the actions of regional organizations are required to remam
consistent with this principle in all cases. 163 This is what Berman and Sams
characterized as basically a subsidiary role of regional organizations in the

.
. 1 peace and secunty.
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Chapter VIII of the Charter addresses the anomaly under the regime of the
League of Nations whereby regional organizations were not accorded any role in
the area of peace and security. 165 According to the Secretary General of the UN,
the raison d'etre of Chapter VIII is, indeed, "to ensure that global and regional
collective security is mutually complementary" and to optimize the total
endeavors of the international community for securing peace. 166
Chapter VIII of the Charter provides the framework for a decentralized
enforcement system, endorsing the legitimacy of regional arrangements provided
that the arrangements or their activities are consistent with the UN Charter. 167
Hence, one may contend that the UN recognizes concurrent as well as residual
responsibility of the regional organizations in the maintenance of international
peace and security provided that their founding treaty permits them. 168 Moore
supported this view arguing, "[r]egional organizations may exercise concurrent
jurisdiction, at least in the absence of United Nations action terminating regional
. . d. .

JUflS lCtlon.

,169

Chapter VIII also encourages regional organizations to peacefully settle
disputes amongst their members. 170 It devolves enforcement powers, allocated to
the Security Council under Chapter VII, on regional organizations through
delegated authority. As such, the UN Charter explicitly prohibits regional

165

Ademola, Supra note 161 at 59
U.N. Doc. A/611150, The Secretary-General, Report ofthe UN Secretary General on regionalglobal security partnership: Challenges and Opportunities, Para. 80
167
U.N. Charter art. 52(1)
168
For example, the Charter of the UN under Article 52 provides that pacific settlement should be
pursued through regional arrangements before disputes are referred to the Security Council.
169
John Norton Moore, THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, DOCUMENTS ON
REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 355 ( 1997)
170
U.N. Charter art. 52(2)
166

65

organizations from taking enforcement action without the authorization of the
Security Council. 171
Nevertheless the post-Cold War Era has witnessed a trend where regional
organizations claim legal competence for enforcement actions on the basis of their
founding treaties, without deference to the Security Council. 172

The African

Union (AU) is not an exception in this regard. The Director of the Peace and
Security Department of the AU Commission, in response to this issue, argued that
the Union is not an arm of the UN and hence the Union will not wait for UN to
authorize actions. 173 This argument may be justified taking into account the new
grounds for AU intervention, i.e. war crimes, genocide and crime against
humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order. 174 Accordingly it is
contended that whether the AU seeks authorization or not would not make a
difference since the grounds for intervention under the AU are beyond the
purview of the Security Council. 175
The legality of AU's enforcement actions should also be considered in
light of the UN Charter. With regard to AU, it is contended that practice of the
UN Security Council in delegating enforcement functions

to regional

organizations, including the AU/OAU for addressing regional crises and the fact
that the AU/OAU actions in this area enjoyed close support from the UN would
171
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mean that these actions have been deemed consistent with the UN Charter 176and
that AU's right to intervention in cases of international crimes is not conditioned
on the determination of threats and breaches of international peace and security.
In fact, if the situation presents danger to international peace and security, the
issue falls under the domain of the Security Council, in which case any
enforcement action by the Security Council will require authorization from the
Security Council.
It is important to note that the adoption of this approach by the AU was

not aimed at usurping the competence of the Security Council but was a
demonstration of their concern that the Council should not abrogate its primary
responsibility for maintaining international peace and stability when it comes to
Africa.
The UN-regional organizations relations during the Cold War era was
characterized as competitive primarily because of the suspiCIOn and fierce
competition between the Eastern and Western blocs 177 . The end of Cold War and
the ensuing proliferation of regional conflicts created a fertile ground for
cooperation between the UN and regional organizations. 178

Moreover, it

increased the security responsibilities of the UN, 179 which, in turn, has burdened
regional organizations with more responsibilities in the prevention, resolution and
management of conflicts. Boutros Ghali, in his Agenda for Peace, argued that
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regional organizations could more easily work together with the United
Nations. 180 He further argued that regional action 'as a matter of decentralization,
delegation and cooperation with United Nations efforts could not only lighten the
burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation,
consensus and democratization in international affairs.' 181
There is a general view, also endorsed by the Security Council, that
"regional organizations are well positioned to understand the root causes of many
conflicts closer to home and to influence the prevention or resolution, owing to
their knowledge of the region." 182 This represents a shift from a global security
management to regional actors. AU's decision to send AU force to Somalia
illustrates the contours of this emerging regional focus.
Meetings thus far convened at different levels (i.e. Security Council,
General Assembly and Secretariats of the UN and regional organizations) over the
subject matter resulted in the development of agreed upon guidelines that govern
the cooperation between the UN and regional organizations. 183 These include:
the supremacy of the Charter in governing the partnership, the
primary responsibility of the Council in international peace and
security, the need for consistency and impartiality by both the
United Nations and all partner organizations, the need for
flexibility and pragmatism, and the need for the partnership to
reflect comparative advantage of all, developing an effective
division of labor in ... operational collaboration. 184
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UN and regional organizations have shared responsibilities within the
framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. However, a de facto division of
labor emerged over the course of time. Former UN Secretary General Boutros
Ghali believed that regional organizations pursue the political aspects of the
problem, i.e. peacemaking, while the role of the UN is focused on peacekeeping
operations. 185

There is now even a very interesting trend with regard to

peacekeeping operations whereby the de facto division of labor is such that
regional organizations pursue rapid deployment while UN deploys the blue
helmet forces. 186
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Chapter 3
The African Union Regional Security Mechanism
This Chapter exarnmes norms and institutions developed under the
auspices of the African Union (AU), dealing with security challenges on the
African continent. It especially focuses on the possibilities these norms and
institutions offer to the UN in the discharge of its mandate in the maintenance of
international peace and security, in the face of the 21st century security challenges
facing the African continent.
The concept of collective security was first introduced in Africa in early
60s when the Great African leader, Dr. K warne Nkrurnah, proposed the
establishment of an African High Command as part of his initiative to form an
African Union governrnent. 1 Drawing lessons from the circumstances that led into
the deployment of UN Peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Dr. Nkrurnah advocated for management of African security by Africans
thernselves. 2
The African countries apparently moved to a new era taking charge of the
regional security issues when they adopted the OAU Mechanism of Conflict
Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993. 3 This may arguably be a result
of political maturity on the part of African nations.
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The OAU mechanism was put in place to address the challenges posed by
armed conflicts in Africa.

4

Its aim was not limited to developing an institutional

mechanism of collective African action for conflict management, but also to
effectively coping with the significant increase in intemal conflicts as compared
to inter State conflicts. 5
As stressed in the Declaration on the Establishment, within the OAU, of a
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, adopted by the
29th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the

OAU, held in Cairo, from 28 to 30 June 1993, conflicts have brought about death
and human suffering, engendered hate and divided nations and families,
and forced millions of people into a drifting life as refugees and internally
displaced persons. 6
OAU's approach which it pursued as a principle was to take the first
initiative in approaching the UN to deploy a peace operation in response to an
emergency in the continent. 7 In case UN is unresponsive, the OAU resorts to
preliminary action while continuing its efforts to elicit a positive response from
the UN. 8
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The adoption of this Mechanism not only uplifted OAU's political
significance but also enabled the organization to engage in a number of conflict
situations in the Continent. 9 Nevertheless, OAU is criticized for its failure to help
with a number of conflict situations, including the genocide in Rwanda, the civil
war in Liberia, the crisis in Burundi or the conflict in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC). 10 The nature and complexity of the conf1icts in Africa, revealed the
limitations of the Mechanism, especially its limitation to providing for the
deployment of peacekeeping operations. The efforts deployed in this regard also
formed part of the plans to transform the OAU into the AU.
In September 1999, the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi requested
the 41h extraordinary session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and
Government in Sirte, Libya to discuss the formation of a 'United States of
Africa'. 11 The OAU Assembly, which under the theme "strengthening OAU
capacity to enable it to meet the challenges of the new millennium," 12 endorsed
the request, and adopted the Sirte Declaration, which inter alia called for the
establishment of a new continental organization. 13
About a year later, the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government
adopted the founding instrument ofthe African Union, i.e. the Constitutive Act of
the African Union.

9

14

The African Union (AU) replaced its predecessor, the
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Organization of African Unity (OAU) on July 9, 2002, upon its formal launching
as an umbrella organization for the African continent. 15 This period perhaps
marked the end of the OAU, i.e. the organization that had united African nations
on the Pan-Africanist ideals since 1963. 16
In designing the Constitutive Act, the African nations made efforts to
adapt the structures and resources of the continent to the prevailing situation and
to the new challenges resulting from the changes that had taken place in the
international system.

17

The preparatory documents for the AU Constitutive Act

suggest that the AU Constitutive Act was a response to the changes taking place
globally.
An important centerpiece of the OAU's reform was in the area of conflict
prevention, management and resolution that culminated in the foundation of a
more permanent legal and institutional framework. 18 AU now represents "a
continental mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution." 19 It
occupies a central position in the international security architecture; and becomes
an indispensable pillar of multilateralism. 20
The founding instrument of AU, i.e. the Constitutive Act of the African
Union, acknowledges the scourge of conflicts in the continent as a major
15

Nsongurua J. Udombana, The Institutional Structure of the Afi·ican Union: A Legal Analysis,
CAL. W. INT'L L.J., 72 (2002)
16
Corinne A. A. Packer and Donald Rukare , Current Development: The New
African Union and Its Constitutive Act, 96 A.J.I.L. 365, 366
17
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20
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impediment to the socio-economic development of Africa. 21 As such, the Act
provides the promotion of peace, security and stability on the African Continent
as one of the major objectives of the Union. 22 This demonstrates that peace and
security is a central concern for African leaders, for this is a prerequisite for the
development ofthe continent and the well-being of its peoples.
The AU Constitutive Act recognized the primary jurisdiction of the UN in
the maintenance of international peace and seeurity. 23 Concerning local disputes,
prior to referral to the Security Council, members of regional organizations, such
as the AU, need to exhaust the available remedies in the regional system. 24
Article 52(2) of the UN Charter supports this view. 25
Despite AU's positive move in designing Africa's security architecture,
the AU Assembly surprisingly failed to incorporate within the founding
instrument of the AU an organ responsible for the maintenance of regional peace
and security? 6 It was in July 2001 that the AU Assembly adopted a declaration
incorporating the 1993 OAU Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management
and Resolution as an organ of AU. The Assembly particularly noted that the
Mechanism was an organ within the OAU that constituted an integral part of the

21

Constitutive Act of the African Union
1d. Art. 3(t)
23
See Article 3(e) ofthe Constitutive Act ofthe African Union. The provision provides that one of
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of the Charter of the United Nations.
24
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26
Udombana, Supra note 15 at 122
22

74

declared objectives and principles of the AU, thus reaching a decision to
incorporate it as one of the organs of the AU.
The OAU Heads of State and Government in its 2000 Solemn Declaration
on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation, agreed
on fundamental principles to govern cooperation in security among member
states.

27

This was followed by the adoption of the Protocol Relating to the
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union
(hereinafter referred to as PSC protocol) that formally established Peace and
Security Council (PSC) as an organ primarily responsible for the maintenance of
regional peace and security. 28 The PSC Protocol entered into force on 26
December 2003. 29
In the words of Jegede, the adoption of the PSC Protocol in 2002 "marked
the peace and security architecture of the African Union (AU)."30 Africa perhaps
reinvigorated the regional security mechanism with the adoption of the PSC
Protocol.
The PSC Protocol, while acknowledging the positive contributions by the
OAU conflict prevention mechanism, reflected upon many sources of potential
instability and uncertainty that remain, and committed to address those through
the PSC mechanism.

27
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About a year later, the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of
the African Union was adopted. 31 The Protocol formally listed the PSC as a
standing organ ofthe AU, replacing the OAU Central Organ. 32 The Protocol also
broaden the scope of intervention power by the Union by adopting an amendment
to Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act to extend the grounds of intervention to
include 'a serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability to the
member state of the Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security
Council. ,3 3 However, the Protocol on the Amendment of the Constitutive Act of
the African Union has not yet entered into force. 34 Only 28 member states had
deposited instruments of ratification as of August 27, 2014, and the Protocol has
not yet entered into force. 35
The vital tasks of the peace and security architecture of the AU include:
anticipation and prevention of conflicts; promotion and implementation of peacebuilding; post-conflict reconstruction; coordination and harmonization of
continental efforts in the tight against terrorism; and the promotion and
encouragement of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, human
rights and fundamental freedoms. 36
Different organs of the AU, including the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government and the Executive Council, have important roles in the peace and

31
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33
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security structure of the AU. The Assembly, which is the supreme organ of the
AU, is entrusted with the powers of 'managing conflicts' and 'restoringpeace'
under the ConstitutiveAct of the African Union. 37 The Assembly delegated its
power to the AU Executive Council, which is composed of the Foreign Ministers
of member states ofthe African Union. 38
The Chairperson of the AU Commission

IS

entrusted with important

responsibilities in the area of peace and security. The AU Constitutive Act and the
PSC Protocol specifically define the role of the Chairperson with regard to
conflict prevention and resolution including the maintenance of peace, security
and stability on the continent. These include taking his/her own initiative to use
regional mechanisms to prevent potential conflicts, resolve actual conflicts,
promote peace building, and post conflict reconstruction. 39
The Chairperson of the AU Commission is also mandated to bring any
matter that is relevant for the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa
to the attention of the AU Peace and Security Council or the Panel of the Wise. 40
The PSC Protocol requires the Chairperson to use the information gathered under
the Protocol's 'early warning system' to advise the AU Peace and Security Council
on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend

37

See Article 9(g) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union
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the best course of action. 41 Moreover, the Chairperson is responsible for ensuring
the implementation and the follow up of decisions of the PSC. 42
The Chairperson indeed has a role in the selection of members of the
Panel of the Wise. The PSC Protocol entrusted the Chairperson with the power to
select members of the Panel of the Wise. 43
Another important aspect of the Chairperson's role in the area of peace
and security is the use of his/her good offices to prevent potential conflicts,
resolve

actual
.

reconstructiOn.

conflicts

and

promote

peace-building

and

post-conflict

44

The Chairperson of the AU Commission is further entrusted with
additional responsibilities by the various organs of the AU from time to time.
Noteworthy is the 2004 Decision of the Assembly of the Heads of State and
Government of the AU, which instructed the Chairperson to take the necessary
measures to operationalize all aspects of the PSC Protocol including in particular
the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the African
Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee, the Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in the areas
of peace and security, and to report to the Executive Council and the Assembly on
the progress made in this direction. 45

41

Id at Article 12(5)
Id at Article I 0(3)
43
Id at Article 11 (2)
44 ld.
45
Assembly/ AU/2 (III), AU Assembly Decision On The Operationalization Of The Protocol
Relating To The Establishment Of The Peace And Security Council Of The African Union, 6-8
July 2004
42

78

However, the primary responsibility for the maintenance of regional peace
and security rests on the PSC.

3.1 The Five Pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture
The AU Constitutive Act and Protocol on the Establishment of the
Peace and Security Council provide the basis for the African Peace and
Security Architecture. 46

The five main pillars comprise the Peace and

Security Council, the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force (ASF),
the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), and the African Peace
Facility. 47

The

African

Union

actively

pursued the

development,

operationalization and institutionalization of these pillar structures. 48
3.1.1 Peace and Security Council
The adoption of the PSC Protocol marked a turning point, strengthening
the

powers

of

the

AU

m

matters

of

conflict

prevention

and

resolution. 49 Subsequent to the election of the PSC members in March 2004, the
PSC was officially launched on 25 May 2004, ending the legacy of the OAU
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism that had been in
place since 1993. 50
The Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is the key pillar of the
African peace and security architecture, is a standing decision-making organ for
46
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1

the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in the continent. 5 It is a
legitimate mandating authority under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 52It is also
responsible for facilitating timely and efficient response to cont1ict and crisis
situations in Africa. 53 Its powers and responsibilities are defined by the PSC
Protocol. 54
Under

Article 2

(1)

of the

PSC Protocol,

PSC

IS

defined

as

"a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and
efficeint response to conflict and crisissituations in Africa". The objectives of the
Peace and Security Council include the anticipating and pre-empting of armed
conflicts, preventing massive violations of fundamental human rights, promotion
and encouragement of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law,
human rights, the respect for the sanctity of human life and international
humanitarian law. 55 The PSC protocol establishes an organic link between
conflict prevention, on the one hand, and good governance, rule of law, protection
of human rights and freedoms, and respect for the sanctity of human life, on the
othcr. 56
In order to achieve these objectives, the PSC is entrusted with broad
mandates that include early warning, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace

51
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building, and post-conflict reconstruction functions.

57

In January 2007, the AU

Assembly adopted a decision calling upon the PSC "to pursue its efforts, with
special emphasis on conflict prevention, by examining potential conflict situations
before they degenerate into conflicts." 58 There is a growing tendency of placing
particular emphasis on conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction
activities. 59
The PSC

IS

an inevitable product of a political compromise among

member states. 60 This organ, which is analogous to the UN Security Council, is
composed of fifteen member states elected by the Assembly of the Heads of State
and Government of AU on the basis of criteria enumerated under Article 5(2) of
the PSC Protocol. 61 These include; the commitment of member states to uphold
the principles of the African Union; contribution to the maintenance of peace and
security; capacity and commitment to shoulder the responsibility; and, respect for
constitutional governance, rule of law and human rights.

Additionally, the

Protocol puts in place a periodic review mechanism whereby the AU Assembly
will evaluate fulfillment of the criteria and take appropriate action accordingly.

62

Though the Protocol has not specified possible actions by the Assembly, one may
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plausibly argue that it could extend up to removal from the Council membership.
This provision is yet to be tested.
Though all members have equal rights, there are two classes of
membership in the PSC. Ten members are elected for a term of two years while
five are elected for three years. This modality is triggered by the need to ensure
continuity in the Council. 63
AU departed significantly from the OAU practice both in terms of
organization and mandate. One of its major departures is the recognition of the
AU's right of intervention in a member state. 64 The ambiguity surrounding
humanitarian intervention appears to have prompted AU to include provisions in
the Constitutive Act that provide for the possibility of AU intervention in certain
grave circumstances.

These circumstances include war crimes, genocide and

crime against humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order.

65

In the words of Dejo, this shift apparently 'redresses the statutory
inhibitions of its predecessor during threatening conflicts or incidents. ' 66 The
1994 genocide that resulted in the death of over half a million Tutsis and
moderate Hutu Rwandese in just 100 days and the massive human rights
violations in Darfur, Sudan, are but only two recent events in Africa that signify
the relevance of AU's right of intervention against genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes inside states.
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Neither the Constitutive Act nor the PSC Protocol defines the listed
grounds for intervention. The decision, rather, is left to the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government of the AU. 67

The Assembly is expected to resort to

relevant international conventions and instruments in defining these crimes,
although the Protocol doesn't specifically identify the relevant conventions. 68
Interventions by the PSC in the maintenance of regional peace and
security take different forms. For instance, in 2005 the PSC suspended Togo from
participating in the activities of all the organs of the AU 'until such a time when
constitutional legality is restored'. 69
The PSC is guided by principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act, the UN
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 70 Shared principles with
the UN include peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts, respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, and non-interference in the
internal affairs of member states. The AU Constitutive Act also provides for
humanitarian intervention, consisting of, the use of force by states or states to preerupt or halt gross human rights violations leading to massive loss of lives,
without the consent of the target state.
As of October 27, 2014, PSC has already met 463 times, to address the
security challenges facing the continent. 71 Since its launch in 2004, PSC has been

67
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called upon to undertake peacekeeping missions to the Darfur region of western
Sudan and Somalia. 72

3.1.2 Panel of the Wise
The Panel of the Wise is another pillar for continental architecture of
peace and security in Africa. The Panel was inaugurated on 18 December 2007. 73
It is established to assist the PSC and the Chairperson of the AU Commission
particularly in the areas of conflict prevention. 74
The setting up of the Panel of the Wise 'reflects the long-held notion of an
African solution to African problems.' 75 Proponents of this notion have premised
their arguments on the values and practices from different settings of Africa on
. preventwn
. an d reso 1utwn.
. 76
con fl 1ct
Gounden, Pillay and Mbugua defined this notion as follows:
African solutionsto African conflicts' means that Africans should not only
design theiragendas for peace and security: they should also own the
processes for creatingsuch agendas and their implementation. Further,
only through analysisand evaluation, understanding and development of
an 'African identity' can African solutions to African conf1icts emerge. 77
The establishment of the Panel is, therefore, a renaissance of African
values in addressing its contemporary challenges.
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The Panel is mandated to advise the PSC and the Chairperson of the
Commission on all issues pertaining to the promotion, and maintenance of peace,
security and stability in Africa. 78 It is indeed entrusted a broader power to
undertake appropriate action, either at the request of the PSC/the Chairperson of
the AU Commission or on its own initiative, to "support the efforts of the Peace
and Security Council and those of the Chairperson of the Commission for the
prevention of conflicts, and to pronounce itself on issues relating to the promotion
and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa." 79
The Panel may also conduct shuttle diplomacy between parties unwilling
to engage in formal talks; assist and advice mediation teams engaged in formal
negotiations; and develop and recommend ideas and proposals that can contribute
to promoting peace, security and stability on the continent. 80 As the advisory body
of the PSC, the Panel's work is presumptively guided by the principles
enumerated under Article 4 of the PSC protocol as the guiding principles of the
PSC.
The Panel is composed of five highly respected personalities from various
segments of society who have made outstanding contributions to peace, security
and development on the African continent. 81 The Chairperson of the AU
Commission is entrusted with the power to select the members on the basis of
regional representation. 82

However, the Chairperson is required to make
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80
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consultations with the member states concerned prior to the selection of the
members. 83 The reference to consultation with concerned member states, though
not defined in the instrument, should be interpreted in light of the regional
representation requirement for the selection of the Panel members. The
Chairperson should, therefore, consult with the countries of each region regarding
the selection of the member from the respective region.
Each term ofthe members is limited to three years. 84 The political clout of
the members of the Panel and the respect they command might provide the panel
more leverage in discharging its security mandate.
Some scholars argue that there is a potential overlap in the interaction of
the Panel and Special envoys/representatives with the PSC and the Chairperson of
the Commission. 85 Despite the potential overlap, one should not, however, lose
sight of the ad-hoc nature of special envoys while the Panel is a permanent
institution with a broader mandate.
The Panel meets as often as the circumstances may require. 86The Panel
may also meet at any time upon the request of the PSC or the Chairperson of the

. . 87
Au Comm1sswn.
The effectiveness of the panel is criticized on account of its limited
number of membership considering the level and spontaneity of conflicts and
crises in Africa. For example, Jegede suggested broadening the Panel's
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membership arguing that doing so "will offer an opportunity for more influence
over conflict and crisis situations in Africa. " 88

3.1.3 African Standby Force
In 2002, the late Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, tabled an
initiative on the establishment of a single African army. 89 The framework
document for the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) was adopted
by the Third Session of African Chiefs of Defense Staff held in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, on 15-16 May 2003. 90 A year later, the AU Assembly of Heads of State
and Government approved the Policy Framework Document, on the establishment
ofthe African Standby Force (ASF). 91
ASF is envisioned as a tool to support the PSC in discharging "its
responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and
intervention pursuant to article 4 (h) and U) of the Constitutive Act."92 As
Majinge noted, ASF would "give teeth to the Council's peacekeeping efforts." 93
The PSC Protocol provides for its composition, mandate,chain of
command, training, and role of AU member states in providingtroops and all
94
forms of assistance and support. In addition to its functions in the context of

preventive deployment and peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament
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and demobilization, the ASF is also designed to provide humanitarian assistance
to address the challenges of the civilian population in conflict areas. 95
The ASF is designed with a view to operate in six possible mission
scenanos:
(1) providing military advice to a political misswn, (2) AU observer
mission co-deployment with a UN peacekeeping mission, (3) a standalone AU observer mission, (4) a traditional peacekeeping or preventative
deployment mission, (5) complex multidimensional peace operations, and
(6) peace enforcement or what the ASF Framework document refers to as
.
.
. .
96
mterventwn misswns.
The detailed tasks of ASF and its modus operandi are, however,
determined by the PSC on a case by case basis for each authorized mission. 97
ASF is composed of 'standbymultidisciplinary contingents, with civilian
and military components intheir countries of origin and ready for rapid
deployment at appropriatenotice. ' 98 It is, therefore, conceived along the lines of
the UN "standby arrangement" where a state assumes the responsibility to train
and equip contingents for peacekeeping operations for eventual deployment. 99 AU
has set up a Peace Fund to provide the necessary financial resources for the peace
support mission including that of the ASF. 100
The June 2008 Memorandum of Understanding between the AUand the
African Regional Economic Communities was entered to make the ASF
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operational on the basis of the Policy Framework on the Establishment of the
African Standby Force. 101 The Memorandum reflects the commonunderstanding
of the AU and the RECs that the latter serve as a crucial building block for the
operationalization of the Africa Peace and Security Architecture. 102
The Policy Framework on the Establishment of the African Standby Force
and Military Staff Committee provides for the establishment of five regional
brigades to constitute the African Standby Force. ASF comprise five regional
brigades; namely, Economic Community of Central African States Standby
Brigade, Eastern African Standby Brigade, Northern African Regional Capability,
Southern African Development Community Brigade and ECOWAS Standby
Force. 103
A brigade is "the first level of military command where multiple arms and
services are grouped under one HQ [Headquarter]."

104

Although some of these

regional brigades are established under the auspices of regional economic
communities like ECOW AS, SADC and the Economic Community of Central
African States (ECCAS), ASF peace operations are under the political control of
the AU. 105
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3.1.4 The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)
CEWS is an important pillar of the African Peace and Security
Architecture. It is envisaged under Article 12( 1) of the PSC Protocol, which
provides the following:
In order to facilitate the antiCipation and prevention of conflicts, a
Continental Early Warning System to be known as the Early Warning
106
System shall be established.
A fundamental responsibility

IS,

therefore, bestowed upon the CEWS

through the collection and analysis of data and information. Based on a closer
reading of the PSC Protocol, CEWS functions could be summarized as
information collection, information sharing, information analysis, coordination
and harmonization.
This

early

Union and other

warning

pillars

system

of the

helps

the

key

institutions ofthe

peace and security architecture to

properly

discharge their responsibilities in the areas of maintenance of peace and
•

secunty.

107

The PSC Protocol further provides the following regarding the framework
ofthe Continental Early Warning System:
The Early Warning System shall consist of:
a. an observation and monitoring centre, to be known as "The Situation
Room", located at the Conflict Management Directorate of the Union and
responsible for data collection and analysis on the basis of an appropriate
early warning indicators module; and
b. observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms to be
linked directly through appropriate means of communications to the
Situation Room, and which shall collect and process data at their level
and transmit the same to the Situation Room. 108
106
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In July 2003, the AU Assembly invited the AU Commission to prepare a
Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of the Early Warning
System provided for under the PSC. 109 After series of consultations, the
Commission developed a draft Road-map for the operationalization of the
Continental Early Warning System in July 2005. In its

gth

Ordinary Session of

29-30 January 2007, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU
finally endorsed the "Framework for the Operationalisation of the Continental
Early Warning System" that was initially approved by the Executive Council of
the African Union.
As summarized under the CEWS Handbook, the purpose of the CEWS is
"the provision of timely advice on potential conflicts and threats to peace and
security to enable the development of appropriate response strategies to a number
of principle users at the AU: the Chairperson of the Commission, the PSC and
other Departments within the Commission. Others include various organs
and structures of the AU, namely the Pan-African Parliament, the Panel of the
Wise and the African Commission on Human and People's Rights."

110

3.1.5 The Peace Fund
Article 21 of the PSC Protocol established the Peace Fund to provide
"financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities
related to peace and security". 111 The Peace Fund is one of the important pillars
that make up the African Peace and Security Architecture(APSA).

109
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The Peace Fund is made up of financial appropriations from the regular
AU budget; voluntary contributions from Member States, international partners
and other sources such as the private sector, civil society and individuals; as well
as through fund-raising activities. 112 Article 21.3 of the Protocol Relating to the
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union requires
the Chairperson of the AU Commission to raise and accept voluntary
contributions from sources outside Africa, in conformity with the AU's objectives
and principles. The Peace Fund has become operational and receives funds for all
. D
... 1!3
Peace an ds ecunty epartment activities.

The Trust Fund, which is envisaged to be established within the broader
Peace Fund, has not yet become operational. 114 This Trust Fund was anticipated to
serve as a standing reserve for special projects in case of emergencies and
unforeseen priorities. 115
The contribution of African states to the Peace Fund between 20082011 was only 2%. 116 The remaining 98% of the funding came from international
donors. 117 This means that international donors provided 98 percent of the
funding, making it difficult to institute African solutions to African problems.
Given the challenges of sustainable funding for the AU, the Chairperson
of the AU Commission brought to the attention of the Assembly of the Heads of
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State and Government of the African Union about the urgent need to explore
alternative means of financing in order to address the various socio-economic
challenges facing the African Continent.ll8
In July 2011, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the
African Union requested the AU Commission to expeditiously set up a High
Level Panel on Alternative Sources of Financing the Union.
At the May 2013 summit of the African Union the High-Level Panel on
Alternative Sources of Funding the African Union, chaired by Former Nigerian
President OlusegunObasanjo submitted their report, which included two
innovative fundraising measures: a $1 0 levy on air travel and a $2 levy on hotel
accommodations. 119 Although the proposals have received criticism from several
African leaders for the potential negative impact on the tourism industry,
the report was approved by the heads of state and was sent to finance ministers for
feedback at the January 2014 meetings. Even if these proposals are eventually
adopted, they are unlikely to resolve larger fund-raising challenges.

3.2 Other important pillars of the AU Security Mechanism
The African Union endeavored to further strengthen the continental
security mechanism by taking further measures, 120 such as the adoption of a
Common Defense and Security Policy, and, later on, the AU Non-aggression and
118
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Common Defense Pact, which seeks to define a framework under which the
Union intervenes or authorizes intervention in preventing or addressing situations
of aggression in conformity with the AU Constitutive Act, the PSC Protocol and
the Common Africa Defense and Security policy. 121 AU also designed various
mechanisms to address the many security challenges of the continent, including
for terrorism, border problems, nuclear weapons proliferation, and coup d'etat.
The following part provides an overview of these security mechanisms pursued
by the AU.

3.2.1 Common African Defense and Security Policy
The AU Constitutive Act provides that the union shall function in
accordance with the principles of the 'establishment of a common defense policy
for the African Continent'.

122

In July 2002, the AU Assembly of Heads of State

and Government requested the AU Chairman to establish a group of experts to
examine and to make recommendation on all aspects related to the establishment
of a common African defense and security policy. 123
A year later, i.e. in July 2003, the Draft Framework for a Common African
Defense and Security Policy was submitted for consideration by the Assembly. 124
After a preliminary debate over the draft, the Assembly requested the AU
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Commission to conduct further consultations with all stakeholders and finalize the
Common African Defense and Security Policy for its consideration.

125

On February 28, 2004, the AU Assembly adopted a Common Defense and
Security Policy. 126 The Assembly further endorsed the proposal by the African
States Ministers of Defense and Security to establish, within the framework of
Article 14.2 of the Constitutive Act ofthe AU, a specialized Technical Committee
comprising Ministers responsible for Defense and Security of the AU, to work
with the Peace and Security Council, in the implementation of the Common
African Defense and Security Policy and in addressing the complex issues of
127
. on th e contment.
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The Declaration on a Common African Defense and Security Policy is a
proactive Declaration "based on the notion of human security rather than the
narrow approach which perceives security solely as state security." 128 The
Declaration provides for an interventionist policy to the security challenges of
Africa. It also encourages "the conclusion and ratification of non-aggression pacts
between and among African States and the harmonization of such agreements." 129

3.2.2 African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact
On January 31, 2005, the AU Assembly adopted the AU Non-aggression
and Common Defense Pact. 130 The Pact gives due recognition to the gravity of the
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impact of interstate and intra-state conflicts on peace, security, stability, and
socio-economic development in the African continent. 131
The AU Non-aggression and Common Defense Pact defines aggression
and seeks to define a framework under which AU intervenes or authorizes
intervention in preventing or addressing situations of aggression in conformity
with the AU Constitutive Act, the PSC Protocol and the Common Africa Defense

. po 1.1cy. 132
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3.2.3 Prevention and Combating of Terrorism
AU recognized terrorism as a security challenge both to the African
continent, and the international community at large. 133 Accordingly, AU has
placed emphasis on the importance of a global approach in pursuance of the fight
against international terrorism. 134
Nevertheless, given the increasing threat posed by international terrorism
on the security situation and the socio-economic development of the African
continent, AU adopted various measures towards the prevention and combating of
terrorism. 135
These include the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of
Terrorism adopted in July 1999 in Algiers, Algeria, and the Protocol thereto, as
well as the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in
Africa (2002).
131
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The AU Commission also elaborated a Model Law, following the Member
States experts meeting held in Algiers, in December 2010. 136 The Model law is
designed to guide member states to streamline and strengthen their national
legislations to overcome this security challenge in the African continent. 137 The
AU Commission is further entrusted with the responsibility to provide technical
assistance to member states by availing the expertise required, including through
the establishment of standby team of experts. 138
Another innovative approach AU pursued to facilitate an enhanced and
coordinated response to the terrorism threat was the establishment of the African
Centre on the Research and Study on Terrorism (ACRST).
AU also adopted various decisions condemning the acts of terrorism
committed in the African soil. For example, in July 20 I 0, the AU Assembly
adopted a decision condemning the terrorist attack perpetrated by Al Shabab
terrorists on July 11, 20 I 0 killing and injuring innocent civilians in Kampala,
Uganda. 139 The Assembly further expressed serious concern over the worsening
of the scourge of terrorism and the threat posed by this situation to peace, security
. . . A~. 140
an d stab11tty m mea.
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In January 2012, the AU Assembly expressed deep concern at the spate of
terrorist attacks in different parts of Africa, in particular, in Nigeria. 141 The AU
Assembly also anticipates the emerging linkages among terrorist groups, as well
as between terrorist groups and criminal networks. 142 One typical example is the
growing maritime piracy in the Mediterranean Sea, a major corridor for
international sea trade, the follow-up on the decisions of the AU regarding the
prohibition of the payment of ransom to terrorist groups, and the convening, in
Algiers, Algeria, on 15 and 16 December 2010, of a meeting of experts from
Member States to consider and adopt the draft African Model Law on the
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, prepared by the Commission. 143

3.2.4 African Solidarity Initiative
AU launched the African Solidarity Initiative, on July 13,2012. 144 It is an
effort towards post-conflict reconstruction and development in order to
consolidate peace where it has been achieved. 145 The African Solidarity Initiative
is premised with the notion that African countries should complement the support
of international development partners by directly taking part in offering assistance
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in post-conflict reconstruction and development of AU member states emerging
from conflicts. 146
The African Solidarity Initiative is a culmination of the AU Policy on
Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development (AU PCRD) that was adopted by
the Executive Council of the AU during its 9111 Ordinary Session held in Banjul,
The Gambia, from 25 June to 2 July 2006.

147

The AU PCRD Policy was intended

to serve as a guide for the development of comprehensive policies and strategies
that seek to consolidate peace, promote sustainable development and pave the
way for growth and regeneration in countries and regions emerging from
conflict. 148 Subsequent to the adoption of the policy, AU sent out missions to a
number of African countries that emerged out of conflict with a view to
evaluating their needs and facilitating the launching of the African Solidarity
Initiative. 149

3.2.5 AU Border Program (AUBP)
AU has recognized the border problem in Africa as a security challenge
for the continent. The border problem in Africa is the legacy of colonialism in the
past two centuries. In June 2007, the AU Executive Council adopted the
Declaration on the AU Border Programme (AUBP) with the overall objective of
preventing conflicts and deepening integration on the continent. 150 The border
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program (a.k.a. AU Border Programme) was eventually launched in 2010.

151

The

AUBP revolves around three main axes, namely: delimitation and demarcation of
African borders where such an exercise has not yet taken place, development of
cross border cooperation, and capacity building.

152

With regard to cross-border

cooperation, the AU is working on a Draft Convention on Cross-border
Cooperation. 153
In view of the many challenges the African continent encounter, the AU
Assembly set a new deadline for the completion of the demarcation of all African
borders by 2017. 154 Note that the initial deadline set by the Memorandum of
Understanding on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and
Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) of July 2002, was 2012. 155
This program is perhaps designed to address one of the root causes of
interstate conflicts in Africa, i.e. border disputes. However this new deadline does
not appear to be realistic taking into account the magnitude of the border
problems in the continent. And yet, AU should be commended for designing this
innovative approach to address the problem in a special and targeted manner.

3.2.6 Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA)
In January 2005, AU Assembly endorsed the establishment of the
Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA). 156 CISSA is
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designed to address Africa's myriad security, stability and developmental
problems. 157 The Committee is structured under the Office of the Chairperson of
the African Union Commission who shall be the recipient of reports from the
1'8

CISSA Secretariat or other CISSA structures. )

3.2.7 AU Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention
In January 2008, the Assembly of the Union adopted an AU Plan of
Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention. A year later, the Heads of State
and Government adopted a decision on the threat of drug trafficking in Africa,
which recognizes that this phenomenon was becoming a major challenge to
security and governance in Africa. 159

3.2.8 The African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
The African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) of
1996 is another essential tool for the continent's collective security. The Treaty
bans the testing, manufacturing, stockpiling, acquisition or possession of nuclear

°

explosives in Africa. 16 Following the entry into force of the Treaty on 15 July
2009, the AU Commission convened the first meeting of the State Parties on 4
November 2010. 161 This was followed by the establishment of the African
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Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), which is primarily established to
ensure States Parties' compliance with their undertakings. 162
The Treaty of Pelindaba that established AFCONE mandates AFCONE, to
collate States Parties annual reports, review the application of peaceful nuclear
activities and safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency, bring into
effect the complaints procedure, encourage regional and sub-regional cooperation,
as well as promote international cooperation with extra-zonal States for the
peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology. 163 AFCONE has a
Secretariat based in Pretoria, South Africa. 164
Equally important are the various decisions and instruments pertaining to
landmines, in particular the May 1997 Kempton Park Plan of Action on a
Landmine Free Africa, as well as to small arms and light weapons. In this respect,
it is important to point out the ongoing process towards the adoption of an African
Union Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking
of Small Arms and Light Weapons. 165

3.3 African Sub-regional Organizations
A proliferation of internal conflicts m the wake of the Cold War era
coupled with the relative disengagement of the developed world from Africa led
African sub-regional organizations to assume unprecedented role in conflict
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management. 166 AU formally recognizes eight regional economic communities
within the African Continent. These are the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD); the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOW AS); the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC); the
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); the Common Market
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA);
the Eastern Africa Community (EAC); and the Community of Sahel-Saharan
States (CEN-SAD). 167
Though most of these Regional Economic communities were originally
established for economic purposes, a number of them have progressively included
peace and security mandates in their objectives. Given the regional dimension of
conflicts in Africa and their impacts on the neighboring states, they have a
legitimate and compelling interest to broaden their mandates to include peace and
security initiatives. 168

3.3.1 ECOW AS Security Mechanism
A. Background
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was
founded on May 28, 1975 with the principal objective of achieving an
"accelerated and sustained economic development of Member States" in West
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Africa. 169 It was originally premised with the belief that regional cooperation and
an inward looking approach could accelerate the economic viability of West
African nations. 170 Out of the 55 African nations, 15 West African States are
currently members ofECOWAS. 171
Though security was an important Issue, the ECOW AS treaty did not
originally contain an explicit provision that provides for a structured intervention
in cont1icts.

172

Despite what its forefathers anticipated, ECOWAS spent a

considerable part of its existence on resolving crises in Sierra Leone, Liberia and
Guinea Bissau and other troubled spots. 173 It has now become the most prominent
sub-regional organizations engaged in peace enforcement operations in its
member states. 174

B. The 1978 ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression
Given the distressing events in the sub-region, ECOW AS soon realized
that peace and stability are critical factors to achieve the anticipated economic
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development and progress in Western Africa. 175 More so, ECOWAS member
states came to realize that internal conflicts are indeed security threats to the sub•

region.

176

Accordingly, the ECOWAS member states adopted the Protocol on NonAggression to the ECOW AS Treaty on April 22, 1978. The Protocol constitutes
an integral part ofthe ECOWAS Treaty.
Under this Protocol, ECOW AS member states pledged allegiance to the
U.N. Charter's prohibitions on cross-border attacks. The Protocol further
confirmed the signatories' adherence to Art 2( 4) of the UN Charter of refraining
from the threat or use of force and Art 3 (3) of the OAU Charter, respect of the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. 177

C. The 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance of Defense
On May 29, 1981 ECOW AS member states adopted the Protocol on
Mutual

Assistance

in Defense.

The Protocol explicitly recognized the

interdependence of economic progress and security. In this regard, it specifically
noted that "economic progress cannot be achieved unless the conditions for the
necessary security are ensured in all Member States of the Community." 178 This
Protocol offered a framework for a collective response to external aggression, and
in cases of inter-state and intra-state conflicts.
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Articles 13 of the 1981 Protocol anticipates the establishment of a standby
armed force which is referred to as the Allied Armed Forces ofthe Community. It
provides that any ECOW AS military intervention would be undertaken by the
Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC). 179 Article 18.2 explicitly
provides that no intervention by the AAFC will be authorized if the conflict is and
remains purely internal. 180 Though this force has never been created, the principle
of collective action embodied in the Treaty remains intact. 181
Under Article 2 of the Protocol on Mutual Assistance of Defense,
ECOW AS member states recognized armed threat or aggression directed against
.
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ECOW AS member States expressed their resolve to provide mutual aid and
assistance for defense against any such armed threat or aggression. 183
The Protocol further authorized member states to take appropriate
measures under two circumstances. One is in case of armed conflict between two
or several Member States if the peaceful settlement procedure under the 1978 Non
Aggression Protocol proves ineffective. 184 The second circumstance that warrants
appropriate measure is internal armed conflict fueled by external support and
likely to endanger the community's security and peace.
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D. ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture
ECOW AS peace and security architecture was initially launched as an ad
hoc security mechanism in an effort to respond to the December 1989 crisis in
Liberia. 186 The Liberian crisis, which started in 1989, was, therefore, a turning
point for ECOW AS to take a lead in the maintenance of regional peace and
security. 187 Following the eruption of the crisis, ECOW AS devised ad hoc
security mechanism to address the crisis. 188 In May 1990, ECOWAS established a
Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) entrusted with the responsibility of
bringing a peaceful resolution to the crisis. 189
Thereafter, ECOW AS developed a significant military security dimension
with the establishment of ECOMOG as a response to the Liberian crisis.
ECOMOG was specifically mandated to conduct a military operation for the
purpose of monitoring the ceasefire between the rebels and the government, clear
the Liberian capital of all threats of attack and establish and maintain law and
order.

190

This decision of creating a military force was justified by the prevailing

human rights abuses, the threat of large scale refugees and general regional
destabilization.
Counci1.
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ECOWAS did so without first consulting the U.N. Security

This perhaps constitutes a departure from the typical trajectory.
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ECOWAS also took other measures that provided robust legal foundation
to the regional peacekeeping. 193 These include the adoption of the 1991
Declaration of Political Principles sought to protect human rights. The
Declaration bestowed each ECOW AS citizen with the "inalienable right to
participate by means of free and democratic processes in the framing of the
.
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Given the lessons learned from its peacekeeping operations, ECOW AS
revised its founding Treaty in 1993. 195 Under this treaty member states undertook
"to work to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of
peace, stability and security within the region." 196 ECOW AS, through the
revision, codified ECOMOG as a regional peacekeeping force.
The revised ECOW AS Treaty conferred the Community with the
responsibility of preventing and settling regional conflicts. It recognized the
following as its fundamental principles in relation to the maintenance of regional
.
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peace, stability and security through the promotion and strengthening of good
neighborliness 198 ; peaceful settlement of disputes among Member States, active
Co-operation between neighboring countries and promotion of a peaceful
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environment as a prerequisite for economic development

199

•

The promotion and

consolidation of a democratic system of governance is also recognized as one of
the fundamental principles under Article 4 ofthe revised treaty.
Under Article 58 of the ECOWAS revised Treaty, member states
undertake "to work to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the
maintenance of peace, stability and security within the region." 200 In this regard,
the revised treaty envisaged the establishment and strengthening of "appropriate
mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra-State and inter-State
conflicts." 201 These include the maintenance of periodic and regular consultations
between national border administration authorities; establishment of Joint
Commissions; resort to methods of peaceful settlement of disputes including
reconciliation, mediation and good offices; the establishment of regional peace
and security observation system and peacekeeping; and provision of assistance to
Member States for the observation of democratic elections. 202
On October 31,

1998 ECOW AS member states authorized the

establishment of a Framework that would regulate ECOW AS/ECOMOG
enforcement operations. 203 The Framework envisaged the creation of an
ECOW AS Mediation and Security Council that would have the necessary
standing to authorize intervention actions, including military intervention? 04
Paragraph 46 of the Framework provides for military intervention by ECOW AS

199
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201
202
203
204

Id, Article 4(t)
Id, Article 58(1)
Id, Article 58(2)
!d. Article 58
V~n As, Supra note 173 at 337
!d.

109

in situations of internal conflicts that are maintained and sustained from within a
Member Country.
This was followed by the adoption of the Protocol on the Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security m
1999. This is perhaps the most important legal instrument in the domain of
security within ECOWAS. 205 This Protocol established a "mechanism for
collective security and peace to be known as "Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security" for ECOW AS. 206 And it
provides the legal framework for regulating collective security in the West Africa

. 207
su b-regwn.
While negotiating this Protocol, ECOW AS defense ministers who
convened in Banjul, Gambia in 1998 considered the reluctance of the Security
Council to sanction UN peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau
and decided to retain autonomy on the decision to intervene. 208
Article I of the Protocol provides for the establishment of a mechanism for
collective security and peace to be known as the Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention,

Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. 209 The

objectives of the Mechanism are to prevent, manage and resolve internal and
inter-state conflicts under the conditions provided in Art 46 of the Framework.
205
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As articulated in the preamble of the Protocol, the underlying reasons for
the adoption of the Protocol was the concern of ECOWAS member states "about
the proliferation of conflicts which constitute a threat to the peace and security in
the African continent" and their spillover effects undermining efforts of
ECOW AS member states "to improve the living standards" of the peoples of the

. 210
sub -region.
Article 3 sets out the objectives of the Mechanism. These include the
prevention, management and resolution of internal and inter-State conflicts;
strengthening cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention, early-warning,
peace-keeping operations, the control of cross-border crime, international
terrorism and proliferation of small arms and anti-personnel mines; maintenance
and consolidation of peace, security and stability within the Community;
promoting close cooperation between Member States in the areas of preventive
diplomacy and peace-keeping; constituting and deploying a civilian and military
force to maintain or restore peace within the sub-region, whenever the need
arises; and setting up an appropriate framework for the rational and equitable
management of natural resources shared by neighboring Member States which
may be causes of frequent inter-State cont1icts. 211

E. ECOWAS organs with the regional peace and security mandate
The Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security identified the Authority, the Mediation

210
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and Security Council (MSC) and the ECOW AS Executive Secretariat as
institutions of the ECOW AS security mechanism. 212 It further provides that the
Authority could establish other institution as required. The Protocol under Article
17 also established the Defense and Security Commission, the Council of Elders,
and the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as organs of
ECOWAS in charge of assisting the Mediation and Security Council. 213

i.

The Authority
ECOW AS Authority is "the Mechanism's highest decision making

body" 214 , and it is composed of heads of state and government of all ECOWAS
member states. 215 ECOW AS Authority has been entrusted with the "powers to act
on all matters concerning cont1ict prevention, management and resolution, peacekeeping, security, humanitarian support, peace-building, control of cross-border
crime, proliferation of small arms, as well as all other matters covered by the
provisions of this Mechanism."

216

It has an exclusive mandate to decide 'on the

expediency of military force' ?17 ECOW AS Authority operates under the
consensus rule envisaged in the ECOWAS Treaty.

ii.

Mediation and Security Council
The ECOW AS Mediation and Security Council is composed of nine

ECOW AS member states, out of which seven are elected by the Authority and the
212
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remaining two are the current chairman and the immediate past chairman of the
. 218
authonty.

The Council is a key organ that is entrusted with the power to take
decisions on issues of peace and security in the sub-region on behalf of the
Authority." 219 In fact, the Authority under Article 7 of the Protocol has provided
the Council a broader mandate to take, on its behalf, "appropriate decisions for
the implementation of the provisions of' the ECOW AS security Mechanism.

220

The Council is further entrusted with a broader power of implementing all the
provisions of this Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. 221
Article 7 of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security enumerates
specific functions of the Council in the implementation of the Protocol. These
include the power to decide on all matters relating to peace and security; decide
and implement all policies for conflict prevention, management and resolution,
peace-keeping and security; authorize all forms of intervention and decide
particularly on the deployment of political and military missions; approve
mandates and terms of reference for such missions; review the mandates and
terms of reference periodically, on the basis of evolving situations; on the

218

See Article 8 of the ECOW AS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security
219
1d,Article 10
220
Id, Article 7
221
ld, Article I 0

113

recommendation of the Executive Secretary, appoint the Special Representative of
the Executive Secretary and the Force Commander.

iii.

222

Executive Secretariat
The ECOW AS Executive Secretary is mandated to "initiate actions for

conflict prevention, management, resolution, peace-keeping and security in the
sub-region." 223 These actions include "fact-finding, mediation, facilitation,
negotiation and reconciliation of parties in conf1ict."

iv.

224

Defense and Security Commission
The ECOW AS Defense and Security Commission has important advisory

function to the Council. It assists the Council in 'formulating the mandate of the
Peace-keeping Force; defining the terms of reference for the Force; appointing the
Force Commander; determining the composition of the Contingents. ' 225

v.

Council of Elders
The Council of Elders is composed of eminent personalities from various

segments of society. The list of the eminent personalities is approved by the
Mediation and Security Council at the level of the Heads of State and
Government. 226 The members of the Council of Elders could, on behalf of
ECOW AS, "use their good offices and experience to play the role of mediators,

222
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conciliators and facilitators" when the need arises? 27 The Council plays important
role offering advisory function to the Council regarding military support missions
authorized by the Council. 228

vi.

ECOMOG
ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was originally created as an ad

hoc force with the task of arranging and supervising a cease-fire to be followed by
the establishment of a sustainable interim government leading to democratic
elections within a period of 12 months. 229 It eventually evolved as one of the
ECOWAS organs in charge of assisting the Peace and Security Council. 230 It is
composed of "several Stand-by multi-purpose modules (civilian and military) in
their countries of origin and ready for immediate deployment. " 231 It is now one of
the key bodies for the enforcement of military support missions ofECOWAS.
ECOMOG is comparable to the UN Standby force anticipated under
Article 43 of the UN Charter. The ECOWAS Standby Force is composed of
contingents earmarked from national armed forces of ECOW AS member states
for deployment in ECOWAS peace support operations as the need arises? 32
Article 22 of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security provides the
following as missions of ECOMOG: Observation and Monitoring; peace-keeping
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and restoration of peace; Humanitarian intervention in support of humanitarian
disaster; Enforcement of sanctions, including embargo ;Preventive deployment;
Peace-building, disarmament and demobilization; Policing activities, including
the control of fraud and organized crime; Any other operations as may be
mandated by the Mediation and Security Council. 233
Like the other African regional and sub-regional organizations, ECOW AS
has had to overcome a number of challenges to strengthen the sub-regional
security arrangement. In its initial years, ECOW AS had encountered challenges in
its aspirations to evolve into a sub-regional security community. This was perhaps
one manifestation of the colonial legacy, primarily driven by France through
coordinating the Francophone West African nations.

234

The Francophone states,

which constitute the majority in West Africa, were concerned about the
Anglophone Nigeria's economic and military dominance in the sub-region and its
leverage within ECOWAS. 235 That was perhaps the driving force behind the
conclusion of the 1977 Exclusive Mutual Non-aggression and Defense Pact
(ANAD) among the Francophone West African nations? 36 More so, they were
initially reluctant to move along with the ECOWAS more inclusive regional
security mechanism. 237 The West African Anglophone states perceived the
foregoing exclusive arrangement among the Francophone states as a threat to
regional unity. Coupled with the initial reluctance of the Francophone nations to
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move along with the ECOW AS more inclusive regional security arrangement, the
sub-regional security arrangement was not an easy venture for ECOW AS in the
early 1980s. 238

3.3.2 SADC Security Mechanism
A. Background
The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) was founded by
the Treaty of Southern Africa Development Community signed on August 17,
1992?39 Currently SADC has fifteen Southern African States as its members.
These are: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 240
SADC's predecessor, i.e. Southern African Development Coordinating
Conference (SADCC), which came into existence in April 1980 by the nine
Southern African countries, 241 had the underlying objective of coordinating and
harmonizing economic cooperation within its member states with a view to
improving the quality of life of the peoples of the region?

42

SADCC adopted the

slogan "Southern Africa - towards economic liberation" and pursued the goal of
reducing economic dependence from Apartheid South Africa and dismantling the
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Apartheid reg1me m South Africa. 243 SADCC activities were based on a
Memorandum of Agreement between Member States until the Declaration and
Treaty ofthe SADC was signed on August 17, 1992.

244

According to the SADC Treaty, one of the key objectives of SADC is to
'promote and defend peace and security" in the region?

45

Solidarity, Peace,

Security and Peaceful settlement of disputes are indeed adopted as principles
governing the acts ofSADC and its member states. 246 As Coleman put it, SADC is
"the most appropriate regional framework for conducting peace enforcement
operations in Southern Africa." 247
However, the Treaty did not provide specific mechanisms to achieve this
important objective of the organization, except generally providing that SADC
shall "create appropriate institutions and mechanisms for the mobilization of
requisite resources for the implementation of programmes and operations of
SADC and its institutions". 248
The abolition of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 shifted the focus of the
Southern African states demanding reorientation in the existing sub-regional
security architecture in the Southern Africa. 249 Note that SADC and its
predecessor, the Southern African Development Coordination Council (SADCC),
viewed the apartheid in South Africa as the principal security threat for the sub243

C.Ng'ong'ola, , The Legal Framework for Regional Integration in the Southern African
Development Community, UNIVERSITY OF BOTSWANA LA JOURNAL, vol. 8 (December
2008),4
244
Van As, Supra note 173 at 331
245
See Article 5(l)(c) ofthe Treaty ofthe Southern Africa Development Community
246
See Article 4 of the Treaty of the Southern Africa Development Community
247
Coleman, Supra note 234 at 167
248

249

See Article 5(2)(c) ofthe Treaty of the Southern Africa Development Community
McCoubrey, Supra note 166 at 146

118

region? 50 With the abolition of apartheid, it, therefore, became evident that a new
mechanism for the maintenance and strengthening of regional peace and security
was needed. 2'1
)
The SADC Foreign and Defense Ministers Summit, which convened in
January 1996, defined the sub-regional defense and security architecture through
proposing a SADC Organ of Politics, Defense and Security (OPDS) as a principal
. mec hamsm.
. 252
secunty

On June 28, 1996, SADC member states adopted a

Communique to create the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
Cooperation (OPDS)? 53
Five years later, i.e. on August 14, 2001, the Protocol on Politics, Defence
and Security Cooperation was adopted by SADC Summit, and the Protocol
recognized OPDS as the principal security mechanism for the Southern Africa
sub-region.

254

The Protocol provides explicit recognition to the critical importance

of peace and security in creating conducive atmosphere for regional co-operation
and integration. 255
This Protocol was designed in the aftermath of the intervention by Angola,
Namibia and Zimbabwe in the war and political crises in the Democratic Republic
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of Congo (DRC). 256 The Protocol entered into force on 2 March 2004. 257 This
new security mechanism has an extended mandate to deal not only with regional
collective security but also to help SADC Member States establish and safeguard
the democratic order in the Southern Africa region. 258
In 2008, SADC articulated its vision that it is one of "a common future, a
future within a regional community that will ensure economic wellbeing,
improvement of the standards of living and quality of life, freedom and social
justice and peace and security for the peoples of Southern Africa." 259
While recognizing that security matters transcend national and regional
boundaries, SADC sets out a procedure whereby co-operation agreement on
defense, security and political matters between SADC member states and nonState Parties, and between SADC member states and organizations take effect in
the SADC member states. Any such cooperative agreements are subject to
approval by SADC Summit. 260
The SADC security regime giVes due recognition to the pnmary
responsibility of the United Nations Security Council in the maintenance of
international peace and security. 261

Likewise, the SADC Protocol on Politics,

Defence and Security Cooperation provide primacy to the security regime of the
African Union? 62
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Under Article 11, sub paragraph 4 (c) of the Protocol, it is explicitly
required that "[ t]he exercise of the right to individual or collective self-defence
shall be immediately reported to the UNSC ... "

263

This is in tandem with Article 54

of the UN Charter. But the Protocol makes no explicit reference about the
requisite prior authorization for enforcement actions stipulated under Article
53(1) of the Charter of the United Nations. 264
The UN has not defined the geographical scope of regional arrangements.
SADC could, therefore, be considered as a regional arrangement envisaged under
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. This view is supported by McCOurbey and
Morris, who argued in favor of a broader interpretation of the concept under
Chapter VIII. 265

B. Key components of SADC Security Regime

Summit ofthe Heads of State or Government

i.

The SADC Summit, which is composed of the Heads of State or
Government of all SADC member states, is the supreme policy making institution
of SADC responsible for "overall policy direction and control of the functions of
SADC."

266

The Summit is led by a Troika, which consists ofthe Chairperson, the

incoming chairperson, and the Outgoing Chairperson. 267 The Summit is entrusted
with the power to select the Troika members of OPDS.

263
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ii.

Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDS)
OPDS is ceded powers and responsibilities of the Summit for the political

and security dimensions of SADC integration. 268 It operates at the summit level,
269
This organ may be
and function independently of other SADC structures.

ranked slightly below the Summit, but above SADC Council of Ministers, in the
revised hierarchy of SADC institutions. 270 Like the Summit, OPDS also operates
on a Troika basis. The only caveat is that the Troika members of the Summit
could not be selected to simultaneously be members of the OPDS. 271
OPDS is entrusted with a responsibility to develop a common sub-regional
foreign policy, sub-regional defense and security cooperation, protection against
instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intrastate conflict,
interstate conflict and aggression, conf1ict mediation and resolution, and the
development of peace support capacity. 272
The Protocol sets out the conditions where OPDS will have jurisdiction to
intervene. The first condition is the existence of significant interstate conf1ict
between State Parties or between State Parties and Non-State Parties. The second
condition is the existence of significant intra-state conflict in a State Party. 273
OPDS is required to obtain the consent of the disputant parties to pursue its
peacemaking efforts for both interstate and intrastate conf1icts. 274 The Protocol
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also anticipates the possibility of SADC's involvement in mediating a significant
interstate or intrastate conflict that occurs outside the region in consultation with
the United Nations Security Council and the African Continental organization.

275

The activities of OPDS are guided by a business plan, called a Strategic
Indicative Plan tor the Organ (SIP0). 276 SIPA II was launched on November 20,
2012? 77 It covers five key sectors of Politics, Defence, State Security, Public

. an d p o1Ice.
. 278
Secunty
The Protocol provides for an elaborate structure of the OPDS. These are
the Chairperson, the Troika, a Ministerial Committee, an Inter-State Defense and
Security Committee, and other substructures that may be established by either of
the Ministerial Committees? 79 The Organ is supported by the Directorate for
Politics, Defense and Security Affairs based at the SADC Secretariat in
Gaborone.

iii.

Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee (/SPDC)
The Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) is established

with the mandate to enhance peace and security among SADC member states. 280
ISDPC is tasked with functions necessary to achieve the objectives of OPDS
relating to defense and security. 281 ISPDS comprises ministers responsible for

275
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See

defense, public security and state security from each of SADC member states?

82

It has a fairly elaborate substructure, especially the Defense Subcommittee and a

range of sub-subcommittees on functional areas of cooperation.

iv.

283

SADC Brigade
The SADC Brigade is another key component of SADC's security regime.

It was launched in August 2008, and is composed of the military, police and

civilian members from SADC member states. 284 The Brigade supports regional
peace operations under the African Standby Force Policy Framework of the
African Union. 285 The SADC Brigade is constituted under the Protocol Relating
to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union
which require all regional economic communities, including SADC, to have
standby peace keeping forces.
The primary function of the SADC Brigade is to participate in missions as
envisaged in Article

13

of the

"mandate" of the Peace and

Security

Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the
African Union 286 , which includes:
observation and monitoring mtsswns; other types of peace support
missions; intervention in a Member State in respect of grave
circumstances or at the request of a Member State in order to restore peace
and security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive
Act; preventive deployment in order to prevent (i) a dispute or a conflict
from escalating, (ii) an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to
282
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neighboring areas or States, and (iii) the resurgence of violence after
parties to a conflict have reached an agreement; peace-building, including
post-conflict disarmament and demobilization; humanitarian assistance to
alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support
efforts to address major natural disasters; and
any other functions as
287
may be mandated by the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly.
As part of its peace support capacity building, SADC has set up a regional
peacekeeping training center in Zimbabwe to train the SADC Brigade.
The first test of peacekeeping for SADC came in 1997 during the DRC
conflict when the Kabila government was challenged by rebels advancing from
the eastern part of the country. 288 SADC also encountered challenges emanating
from the military unrest in Lesotho following the election disputes which
culminated with unrest within the country and the renewed fighting in Angola
after the breakdown of the Lusaka Peace Accord between National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (UNIT A) and the government of Dos Santos. 289
Unfortunately SADC member states were not able to agree on a united position to
respond to these crises.
Since its establishment, the SADC Brigade has not been deployed to
undertake peacemaking, peacekeeping, or recovery mission? 90 SADC's February
2013 decision to deploy peacekeeping force in the Democratic republic of Congo
could be considered as a paradigm shift in the peacekeeping history of SADC.
The Extraordinary SADC Summit meeting that was held in Maputo decided to put
together and deploy a force of 4000 SADC troops to address the ongoing conflict
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in the eastern parts of the DRC. Such mandate to "enforce the peace" rather than
just try and keep peace in DRC is a radical deviation and fundamental change
from the established international norm. SADC Secretary General elaborated the
scope of the mandate saying that SADC troops could "engage with whoever is
trying to destabilize the situation in the eastern part ofCongo." 291
SADC has the material resources available to it to play a major security
and peace support role in the Southern Africa sub-region.

292

In the words of

McCourbey, what really has adversely impacted on the works of SADC include
the fierce competition among member states, issues relating to leadership and
ultimate authority. 293

3.3.3. IGAD Security Mechanism
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was established in
1996 to serve as a forum for expanded cooperation among the East African subregion nations. 294 It is one of Africa's youngest sub-regional organizations,
founded in 1996 to supersede the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and
Development (IGADD), which was founded in 1986 by the then drought at1licted
eastern African countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and
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Uganda? 95 IGAD has been designated as one of the pillars of the African
Economic Community (AEC) in terms of the AEC Treaty? 96
Given the recurring and severe droughts and other natural disasters
between 1974 and 1984 in Eastern Africa Sub-region, the above six countries of
the Sub-region took the initiative to establish IGADD, of course with the
assistance and support of the United Nations.

297

This important development was

a kind of a paradigm shift for a sub-region which had known more conflict that
cooperation. 298 JGAD itself acknowledged in its presentation that "politics in the
Horn of Africa has been shaped by seeds of violence due to the historical and
political factors that goes back to the Colonial boundary arrangements and the
new dynamics during post Cold war era."

299

One could, therefore, plausibly argue that the pressure from donors and
international organizations such as the United Nations played a paramount role in
this attempt for a sub-regional cooperative framework.
IGADD was primarily established to provide coordinated efforts to
manage drought and development across the Eastern Africa sub-region with a
focus on food security. 300 Around the beginning of 1995, IGADD member states
realized that addressing the basic economic, social, environmental and
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humanitarian problems was not possible in the region if peace and security could
not be ensured. 301 Note that the Eastern Africa Sub-region, which is commonly
referred to as the Hom of Africa, is known for its being a cont1ict-ridden sub
. m
. Af.
regwn
nca. 302
Lionel Cliffe accurately observed that the Horn of Africa encountered with
the same arbitrariness of borders inherited from colonial rule and with the
inevitably resulting problems of state making and nation building among
disparate peoples and in contested territory where there were cultural links
where there were cultural links with people across those borders. These
features, found throughout Africa and other ex-colonial territories were
intensified by factors specific to the Horn, each of which further enhanced
the likelihood of internal and inter-state conflict: an ethnically
homogenous state Somalia, whose nationalism embraced Somali
neighboring minorities; Ethiopia with a territory that resulted from
resistance to European colonialism but also from becoming an empire;
Sudan straddling the cultural divide between Africa South of the Sahara
and the North." 303
This reality remains true even today.
Though the Horn of Africa is not the best area for testing sub-regional
security cooperation, the Hom states came a long way to collectively address the
security challenges of the sub-region. 304 Accordingly IGADD member states,
which by then had reached seven with Eritrea as a new member of
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IGADD, 305 convened an Extraordinary Summit on April 18, 1995 in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia and signed a Declaration to revitalize and expand IGADD's mandate. 306
After series of negotiations and consultations among member states, the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted the Agreement Establishing
the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on March 21, 1996,
amending the IGADD Charter. 307 It was, therefore, in 1996 that IGADD evolved
into IGAD, with a much broader mandate and ambitious objectives to cooperate
in socio-economic, political and environmental fields.

308

In adopting the IGAD Establishing Agreement, the member states were
"[i]nspired by the noble purpose of promoting peace, security and stability, and
eliminating the sources of conflict as well as preventing and resolving conflicts in
the sub-region". 309 IGAD member states also gave due recognition that the
preservation of peace security and stability are "essential prerequisites for
economic development and social progress." 310
Under the establishment agreement, the member states expressed their
commitment to the following principles:
"sovereign equality of all Member States; Non-interference in the internal
affairs of Member States; The peaceful settlement of inter- and intra-State
conflicts through dialogue; Maintenance of regional peace, stability and
security; Mutual and equitable sharing of benefits accruing from
cooperation under this Agreement; Recognition, promotion and protection
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of human and people's rights in accordance with the provisions of the
African Charter on Human and People's Rights." 311
According to Article 7(g) of the IGAD Agreement, IGAD's objective is to
'[p ]romote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the
sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter- and intra-State
conflicts through dialogue'. 312 In furtherance of this objective, IGAD member
states are required to act collectively for the preservation of peace, security and
stab1.l.1ty. 313
The IGAD Agreement requires IGAD member states to take the following
measures for the preservation of peace, security and stability in the sub-region:
a) take effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional cooperation peace and stability;
b) establish an effective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for
the pacific settlement of differences and disputes;
c) accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this subregional mechanism before they are referred to other regional or
international organizations? 14
It is important to note here that the foregoing measures are anticipated in
the context of the individual member states but not IGAD as an institution.
IGAD launched a project to build a Peace and Security Strategy for the
Hom of Africa in 2003. 315 In October 2003, the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government of IGAD endorsed a comprehensive regional Peace and Security
strategy and a 5-year implementation plan drawn by IGAD's Secretariat. 316 Both
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the strategy and the implementation plan consider the conflict prevention,
management and resolution programs as IGAD's priority area.

317

Accordingly it

envisaged the development of a Conflict Management, Resolution, and
Prevention strategy. The strategy also places emphasis on the primary
responsibility of member states to provide peace and security for their citizens.

318

The IGAD strategy has the objectives of developing, implementing and
sustaining a mechanism to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflicts in the
IGAD region. 319 These include facilitation of the development of appropriate
national-level mechanisms to promote national peace and security within the
context of common core values; appraisal of structures and mechanisms for
conflict early warning, management and resolution within the region and across
its boundaries; achievement of consensus on aims, principles and benchmarks for
the promotion of regional peace and security, and monitoring and supporting postcont1ict transitions. 320
Over the course of the development of IGAD's Peace and Security
Strategy

(IPSS),

the

preparatory

meetings

deliberated

on

what

Healy

characterized as "the most contentious cont1ict themes" in the region, i.e. border
demarcation, access to the sea for landlocked countries, transboundary water
resource management, cross-border cooperation and counter-terrorism. 321
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The IGAD Peace and Security Strategy (IPSS) auns at achieving
"sustainable peace and security for the attainment of economic integration and
development in the IGAD Region." The Strategy has identified four strategic
priorities: ( 1) Strengthening and streamlining conflict prevention, management
and resolution in the IGAD Region; (2) Strengthening preventive (track 2)
diplomacy in the IGAD Region; (3) Promoting cooperation to address emerging
common peace and security threats relating to terrorism, maritime security,
organized crime and security sector reform within the IGAD Region; and (4)
Enhancing cooperation in other areas incidental to peace and security including
management of trans-boundary water resources, and prevention management and
resolution of challenges relating to refugees and internally displaced persons. 322
IPSA is premised on the principles of respect tor international law, mutual
respect and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, rejection of
the use of force to resolve problems, equitable utilization of trans-boundary
resources, respect for territorial integrity and sovereign equality of states, and
respect for colonial borders. 323
The organs of IGAD, namely the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government, the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Ambassadors have
been charged with the responsibility for implementing the Peace and Security
mandates ofiGAD.
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government, which is the supreme
organ of IGAD, is entrusted with the responsibility to make policy, direct and

322
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control the functioning of IGAD. 324 The Assembly is specifically mandated to
provide guidelines and to monitor "political issues especially on conflict
prevention, management and resolution." 325 The Assembly operated under a
consensus rule. 326
IGAD Council of Ministers is composed of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
and one other focal Minister designated from each Member State.

327

The Council

is mandated to promote peace and security in the sub-region and to make
recommendations to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 328 The
Council is further tasked with the responsibility to follow up political and security
affairs, including conflict prevention, management and resolution as well as post
conflict peace building. 329 The Council generally operates under a consensus rule.
However, decisions are made by a qualified majority in case the Council fails to
reach an agreement by consensus? 30 What makes the Council's voting procedure
unique is the requisite secret ballot voting by the Counci1. 331
IGAD's Executive Secretary, who is the Chief Executive Officer of
!GAD's Secretariat, has a broad mandate to initiate measures aimed at promoting
the objectives of IGAD. The Executive Secretary is authorized to promote
cooperation with other organizations, such as the United Nations and African
Union, with a view to furthering !GAD's objectives. 332

324

See Article 9 ofthe Agreement Establishing Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
Id, Article 9(2)(c)
326
Id, Article 9(4)
327
ld, Article 10(1)
328
ld, Article I 0(2)(h)
329
ld, Article I 0(2)(h)
330
Id, Article I 0(5)
331 Id
325

332

Id, Article 13(a) & (b)

133

The IPPS architecture comprises of the following components to achieve
its goals:
•

lOAD Program of Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
(CPMR);

•

Protocol on the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
(CEWARN);

•

Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units (CEWERUs);

•

lOAD Civil Society Forum(IOAD-CSO Forum);

•

lOAD Inter-Parliamentary Union (IOAD-IPU);

•

lOAD Women's Desk;

•

lOAD Capacity Building Against Terrorism (ICPAT);

•

Policy Framework for the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIO);

•

Panel of the Wise; and

•

Mediation Support Unit (MSU).

333

The IPSA architecture fits within the broader frameworks of the United
Nations Charter and the Constitutive Act of the African Union, which imposed on
member states the obligation to participate in advancing international collective
security, as well as the lOAD Agreement.
The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (commonly
referred to as "CEWARN") is worth noting among the IPSA components.
CEWARN was established as an integral part of lOAD with the adoption of the
Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response

333
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Mechanism for IGAD Member States on January 9, 2002. CEWARN has both
early warning and response functions. 334
The early warning functions of CEWARN include receiving, processing
and analyzing information and reports from the national conflict early warning
and response mechanism (which are known as CEWERUs); bringing the
information to the attention of the IGAD secretariat; monitoring and coordinating
information collection and reporting; and promoting dialogue on information and
analysis. 335 The development of this early warning mechanism is perhaps one of
the most significant achievements ofiGAD. 336
With the launching of the revitalized IGAD, a consortium of donor
governments and international organizations initiated a development partnership
forum with a view to supporting IGAD's revitalization. This relationship is based
on

partnership

and

transcends

beyond

the

traditional

donor-recipient

relationship. 337 This partnership, known as the International Partnership Forum
(IPF) is currently comprised of Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Greece,

Germany,

Ireland, Italy,

Japan, Netherlands, Norway,

Sweden,

Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America, European Commission,
International Organization for Migration, United Nations Development Program,
and World Bank. 338
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Among the permanent UN Security Council members, China and Russia
are not part of the IPF. Though UNDP formally collaborates with IGAD through
the IPF, the United Nations Security Council is no part of the IPF.
Factors that adversely impact on the effectiveness of IGAD include the
intransigence of the parties involved in conflict/dispute; lack of leverage on the
disputant parties; competing interests among the members of the IGAD driven by
their respective national interests; the absence of a stable and consensual regional
power order; the disputed legitimacy of states and governments and the inability
of democratic processes to provide that legitimacy; limitations in terms of
motivating the disputant parties; financial constraints and resources. Unlike
SADC and ECOW AS, which have found their regional hegemons in South Africa
and Nigeria respectively, IGAD is characterized by the absence of a sub-regional
hegemon. 339 And this is perhaps another obstacle for IGAD in the discharge of its
security mandates.
There are instances where the disputing parties use IGAD to block
effective form of intervention to address the conflicts. Sudan's reluctance to
withdraw from the IGAD process is perhaps a typical example in this regard. 340
The eruption of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict in May 1998 subsequently removed
IGAD from its engagement in the Sudan peace process.
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Disagreement among member states over IGAD's policy towards Somalia,
which the Eritrean government characterized as "irresponsible", also led Eritrea to
suspend its IGAD membership. 342 Given Eritrea's consistent opposition to the
deployment of international peacekeepers in Somalia, Eritrea opposed IGAD's
involvement in the establishment and deployment of AMISOM force in
Somalia. 343
IGAD also suffers from senous financial constraints to discharge its
security mandate. While commenting on IGAD's involvement in Somalia, a
Somali political analyst once told the Voice of America that IGAD "cannot pay
even its own budget, let alone resolve the conflicts that are taking place in the
region. " 344
IGAD member states now "face security threats due to their geopolitical
positions, which now include the threats of piracy/maritime security, and
Terrorism due to religious extremism." 345 Therefore, the joint peace and conflict
prevention efforts of IGAD member states are crucial for the sub-regional security
and sustainable development of the countries in the sub-region.

3.4 Concluding Remarks
Article 52(1) of the UN Charter provides for the "existence of regional
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the
342
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maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional
action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are
consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations." The Charter
encourages regional institutions to give priority to finding peaceful solutions to
conflicts. However, the Charter reserves the right to authorize enforcement action
for the Security Council.
Article 53(1) state that "no enforcement action shall be taken under
regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the
Security Council ... " Thus, all enforcement actions by regional organizations
require the authorization of the UN Security Council, but even after such
authorization, these organizations are obliged to keep the Council informed of
their actions. This principle was largely adhered to for the first four decades of the
UN but was tested in the early 1990s when several regional and even sub-regional
organizations

undertook

military

action

without

an

explicit

UNSC

authorization. 346
The transformation of the OAU into the AU was the most notable
development in Africa because of its wider global implications. Having adopted a
comprehensive security regime, the AU, in collaboration with the RECs/RMs, is
now playing a more pivotal role in managing security in the continent.
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There is,

therefore, optimism that the norms and institutions developed under the AU are
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progressive than those obtained under its predecessor, the Organization of African
Unity. 348
Understandably, AU doesn't have the United Nations' level of resources,
institutional capacity, and experience in dealing with threats to international peace
and security. 349 It also faces the additional challenges of endemic poverty and
civil conflict among many of its member states. Estimates have pointed to a
combined economic loss of an estimated $300bn since 1990 by a number of
African countries affected by conflict.

350

Despite this reality, its proactive engagement in managing peace and
security on the continent has given it a high visibility leading to expectations that
are often not matched by its capacity. It has also gained experience in the area of
conflict prevention, management and resolution.
Since its transformation, AU has initiated four missions-the AU Mission
in Sudan (AMIS), the AU Observer Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the AU Task
Force in Burundi and UN/AU Hybrid Force to Darfur. 351 The Security Council
itself recognized the useful role AU has been playing in brokering peace
agreements,

conflict

prevention,

cns1s

management

and

post-conflict

stabilization. 352 This puts AU in a better position to take more responsibility in the
maintenance of regional peace and security.
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Over the past years, AU has also adopted several instruments designed to
facilitate the structural prevention of conflicts. These instruments relate to human
rights; elections, governance and the fight against corruption; ongoing
democratization processes on the continent; arms control and disarmament;
counter terrorism; border management; and the prevention and reduction of
interstate conflicts. These further represent a consolidated framework of
commonly accepted norms and principles, whose observance would considerably
reduce the risk of conflict and violence on the continent and consolidate peace
where it has been achieved.

353

Following a process of normative and institutional development, the
African sub-regional organizations are also now seen as critical providers of
security as a public good in their respective regions. Nowhere is this more notable
than in Africa where institutions that were established for economic integration
purposes are now deeply involved in managing security challenges in the
continent. However, these regional economic communities on which the African
Union relies upon also encounter tremendous challenges to effectively discharge
their security mandates. These include resource constraints, competing interests
among member states, and issues related to legitimacy.
The success of AU's and the African sub-regional security mechanisms, in
addition to other factors, also depends on their role within the new global security
regime and their relationship and coordination with the United Nations. AU itself

353
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generally considers the UN as its international partner. 354 AU as well as the RECs
also formally recognize the role of the UN Security Council as a primarily
responsible organ for the maintenance of international peace and security. Given
this reality, a proper coordination with the UN security mechanism in the
implementation of their security mandate could significantly contribute in
complementing the UN efforts in the maintenance of international peace and
security. Hence, the need for renewed efforts to endow the AU and the African
sub-regional organizations with the requisite resources and enhance their
decision-making process to enable them fully discharge their mandate in the area
of peace and security, and be effective partners of the UN and other international
stakeholders.
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CHAPTER4
SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS,
AFRICAN UNION AND AFRICAN SUB-REGIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS

The forefathers of the UN Charter anticipated the importance of the
relationship with regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace
and security. 1 Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides the framework for
cooperation between the UN and regional organizations in the maintenance of
international peace and security. At the heart of Chapter VIII is the need to
complement the international legitimacy and legality of the UN with the
advantages embedded in regionalism.
Given the primary responsibility entrusted to the UN Security Council in
the maintenance of international peace and security, the UN, in principle, is
expected to assume a leadership role in ensuring regional peace and security in
Africa. Such a hierarchal division is formally endorsed by the regional and subregional organizations in Africa. The Director of the Political Department of AU's
predecessor, OAU, for example, noted:
We see a pyramidal relationship between the OAU, the UN, and subregional organizations- the UN is at the top, the OAU in the middle and
the sub-regional organizations at the bottom . . . The first to engage [a
crisis] is the sub-region, but the sub-region needs the OAU's continental
endorsement, and the OAU then takes it to the UN ... The OAU is a
continental organization, and therefore has more responsibilities of getting

1

See Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter
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the international community's attention. Our role
2
international community.

IS

to mobilize the

Should regional organizations decide to apply coercive measures, they
must obtain the prior authorization of the UN Security Council. 3 However, during
the Cold War years, regional organizations occasionally sought

UN Security

Council endorsement for their initiatives, but overall they had little meaningful
engagement with the Security Council and vice versa.

4

Strategic partnership with regional organizations was considered as a
crucial first step in designing a global security architecture that reflected the
changing dynamics of the international system, especially in the post-Cold War
period. Given these changing dynamics of the international system, the former
two UN Secretary-Generals, i.e. Boutros Ghali and Kofi Annan, set the stage for
the evolving partnership between the UN and regional organizations. 5 They put
forward proposals for a greater contribution by regional organizations with regard
to issues of the maintenance of international peace and security. 6 Moreover, both
recognized the need to develop a complementary relationship between the UN
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and regional organization with a view to addressing the gap in the post-Cold War
era international system. 7
Following the submission of UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali's
report entitled "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and
Peacekeeping" on June 23, 1992, there began a redefinition of the role of regional
organizations in the maintenance of peace and security. 8 In March 1994, the
Special Committee on the Charter of the UN and the Strengthening of the role of
the organization approved a Declaration on the Enhancement of Cooperation
between the UN and Regional Arrangements or Agencies in the Maintenance of
international peace and security. 9
Equally important is the recognition the UN Security Council has given
to the well suited position of regional organizations "to understand the root causes
of armed conflicts owing to their knowledge of the region which can be a benefit
for their efforts to influence the prevention or resolution of these conflicts." 10 The
Declaration reaffirms that:
The Members of the United Nations entering into such [regional]
arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to
achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional
arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the
Security Council; . . . Regional arrangements or agencies can, in their
7
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fields of competence and in accordance with the Charter, make important
contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security,
including, where appropriate, through the peaceful settlement of disputes,
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conf1ict peace
bUl"ld"mg. II
The current Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, has furthered this
approach to work with regional organizations in the area of peace and security. In
his first report on the relationship between the UN and regional organizations in
2008, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon called upon the United Nations Security
Council to properly define the role of regional organizations and streamline the
strategic partnership between the UN and AU. 12 The Secretary General kept on
pressing this call in his subsequent reports. 13 The October 14, 2010 report
especially emphasized on the importance of "a revitalized and evolving
interpretation of Chapter VIII ofthe Charter ofthe United Nations". 14

4.1 UN-AU Cooperation
The security situation in Africa has been one of the agenda items of the
UN since October 31, 1956 when the UN Security Council considered the grave

11
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situation created against Egypt. 15 The African continent currently dominates the
agenda of the UNSC. 16 For example, about 26 of the 4 7 matters considered by the
UN Security Council in 2013 directly concern Africa. 17 Yet Africa remains the
most vulnerable continent in terms of security.
The UN-AU cooperation

IS,

therefore, extremely important for the

maintenance of peace and security in Africa and perhaps for ensuring global
security. The history of their cooperation goes back to the mid 1960's, i.e. two
years after the establishment of AU's predecessor, the Organization of African
Unity.
The cooperative arrangement started with the conclusion of a
Cooperative Agreement with the Economic Commission for Africa, a regional
arm of the United Nations, on November 15, 1965. Its focus, however, was
limited to "cooperation in the accomplishment of their common objectives for the
economic and social development."

18

The UN-AU partnership in the maintenance

of peace and security, which started with its predecessor the Organization of
African Unity, has evolved over the past decade through the testing of new
arrangements in Somalia and Sudan. 19
Over the past four decades the UN Security Council and General
Assembly Resolutions systematically have also been building on the cooperation
15
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between the two organizations. The issue has received particular focus in the postCold War era during which the proliferation of conflicts has become acute in
Africa.
For example, the UN Security Council held a debate on March 28, 2007
under the agenda item, "Relationship between the United Nations and regional
organizations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international
peace and security."

20

During the debate, many agreed on the importance of

enhancing and properly streamlining partnership with AU, including through
capacity-building support. 21

Generally speaking, the need to strengthen the

cooperation and build the capacity of AU is deeply embedded in the Security
Council resolutions.
The PSC Establishment Protocol also devotes an article that specifically
deals with the relationship between AU and UN. 22 The Protocol identifies areas
as well as channels of cooperation with international organizations in general and
the UN in particular. It envisages cooperation with the UN in a number of areas
including

early

.

warmng,

23

conflict

prevention,

20

peace
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peace

S/PV.5649, Relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular
the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security, March 28, 2007
21 !d.
22
See Article 17 ofthe PSC Protocol
23
Art. 12 (2)(c) ofthe Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of
the African Union requires the AU Commission to collaborate with the UN to facilitate the
effective functioning of the Early Warning System.
24
Article 13(4) of the PSC Protocol requires the Africa Standby Force, where appropriate, to
cooperate with the UN and its agencies in undertaking its functions enumerated under Article
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support, 25 arms control and disarmament26 , international terrorism, and capacity
building. 27
Subsequent to the AU launching, the AU Assembly of Heads of State
and Government also expressed its determination to address the scourge of
conflicts in Africa in a collective, comprehensive and decisive manner, within the
framework of the AU and its relevant Organs, and with the full support of the
wider international community. 28
The January 9, 2012 report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission
on the Partnership between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace
and Security outlines the Commission's vision on the strategic partnership
between the AU and the UN system in the area of peace and security. 29 This
vision of AU-UN partnership was subsequently endorsed by the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government. 30 A strong African Union capable of securing
peace and stability on the continent is perhaps in the best interests not only of
Africa but also ofthe international community as a whole. 31
The role of the UN Security Council as an organ with primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security is duly
25
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26
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recognized under article 17 of the African Union Protocol establishing AU's
Peace and Security Council. The Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and
Security Council of the AU provides that the PSC would complement the UN in
the maintenance of regional peace and security. AU considers the UN as its
international partner. 32 UN also views AU as its strategic partner. 33
This is the starting point for cooperation between the two organizations
with a common objective of maintenance of peace and security. AU is currently
establishing itself as a major regional player, and it has been involved with UN
planning and has become increasingly involved in the provision of troops for
peacekeeping missions in Africa. 34
As an immediate reaction to the formal launching of the African Union
on July 9, 2002, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution
regarding cooperation between the UN and AU. 35 The Resolution acknowledged
the need for continuing and closer cooperation between the United Nations
system and African Union in peace, security and the fight against international
terrorism. 36
In September 2005, the UN Security Council adopted an important
Declaration on strengthening the effectiveness of the Security Council's role in
32
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33
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conflict prevention, particularly in Africa. 37 Among other things, the Declaration
calls for "the strengthening of cooperation and communication between the
United Nations and regional or sub-regional organizations or arrangements, in
accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter." 38
Besides cooperating with AU in its operations on the African continent,
UN has taken special interest in capacity building of the AU. While urging the
international community to develop the capacities of the African regional and
sub-regional organizations, including the AU Standby Force, the foregoing
Declaration endorsed the UN Secretary General's proposal to establish a ten-year
capacity building program for AU. 39
The subsequent signing of the Ten year action plan on November 16,
2006 is a significant step forward to streamline the cooperation between the UN
and AU. Such cooperation would advance the principal purposes of both the UN
and AU, i.e. maintenance of peace and security.
The Ten year plan was negotiated in light of the significant expansion of
AU's efforts in political, peace and security matters. 40 It provides a framework for
the evolving UN Ten Year Capacity Building Program for the AU. 41

This

cooperative framework is based on African Union priorities and United Nations
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comparative advantage. 42 Through this cooperative framework, UN endorsed
AU's motto, i.e. "African solutions to African problems."

43

Under the Action Plan, UN and AU expressed their commitment to work
together on issues of peace and human security, human rights, post-conflict
reconstruction and regional integration. 44 Generally speaking, this 10-year plan is
a strategic framework aimed at enhancing cooperation between the two
organizations and to enhance UN system-wide engagement with the AU, its
regional and sub-regional organizations, to meet the challenges facing the African
continent, focusing initially on peace and security, with a particular emphasis on
conflict prevention, mediation and good offices, peacekeeping and peace
building. 45 Another noteworthy feature in the cooperation framework is the clear
acknowledgment that the UN-AU cooperation is important not just for the
stability of Africa, but also for the important role in ensuring international peace
and security.
As a response to this UN-AU cooperation framework, the UN took
measures to expand its regional consultation mechanism to include the AU
Commission and the UN Headquarter departments dealing with political affairs
and peacekeeping operations

46

.

The UN Security Council indeed adopted other

mechanisms of consultation suggested by the Secretary General of the UN,
including inviting regional organizations to participate in the Council's public and
42
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private meetings and encouragmg regional organizations to convey their
perspectives and analysis to the Security Council pnor to examination of
47
.
ll y re levant 1ssue.
.
reg10na

Under the foregoing cooperative framework, UN also supports the
development of the African Solidarity Initiative in mobilizing resources for postconflict

reconstruction

and

48

development. The

UN

Secretariat

provides

mentoring, advice, operational and planning support and long-term capacity
building support to the AU Commission for AU's peace support operations such
as AMISOM. 49
This capacity building initiative helps to boost AU's capability in the
discharge of its mandate to maintain regional peace and security. Obviously, this
would contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.
Moreover it would ease the burden of the UN in the discharge of its security
mandates in Africa.
An enhanced and innovative partnership is required in order to meet the

21st security challenges of the African continent. This view is supported by the
AU which recently warned against the 'deceptive comfort that status quo
offers. ' 50 The AU Commission Chairperson in his January 2012 report on the
Partnership between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and
Security pointed out that most of the security challenges of the African continent
47
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"can only be addressed more successfully in partnership with the international
community, in particular the United Nations system." 51
The Assembly of the Head of States and Governments of the AU
outlined the underpinning principles of cooperation with the UN, for the
promotion of sustainable peace, security and stability in the African continent.
These principles are support to African ownership and priority setting;
consultative decision making; division of labor and sharing of responsibilities;
and effective use of the respective comparative advantages of the two
organizations. 52

4.1.1 Spheres of Cooperation
A. UN-AU Cooperation in Peacekeeping
Given the vulnerability of the African continent to conflict and crisis and
the important role of AU in the maintenance of regional peace and security, UN
has embarked on cooperation with AU in the area of peace keeping, which has
taken shape over the years. As is the case with other regional organizations, UNAU partnership in peacekeeping has always come as a result of development of
particular circumstances on the ground. 53 The case studies under Chapter 5 of this
paper demonstrate this reality.
The scope of cooperation m peacekeeping involves the provisiOn of
support to AU m planning, development and management of ongoing

51
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peacekeeping operations and the provision of institutional support to the AU
Commission for the operationalization of the Africa Standby Force (ASF). 54 The
cooperation arrangements in the area of peacekeeping include the peacekeeping
operation in Burundi, Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
the Sudan and the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), which took
over from the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). 55 The joint AU-UN hybrid missions
in Darfur marks an attempt to depart from the previous form of cooperation
between the UN and AU where the AU deploy first and the UN eventually took
over full responsibility for the mission. 56
On April 16, 2008 the high level meeting of the UN Security Council
adopted a resolution welcoming the proposal of the UN Secretary General to
establish the UN-AU Panel to consider in depth the modalities of how to support
peacekeeping efforts undertaken by regional organizations mandated by the
Security Council with a view to enhancing the predictability, sustainability and
flexibility of financing of United Nations mandated peace operations undertaken
by the African Union. 57
The repmi of the Panel emphasized the importance of the partnership
between the UN and regional organizations, arguing that the complexity of
modern peacekeeping means that no single organization is able to address the
54
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challenges involved on its own. The report stressed the need for equitable
burden-sharing between the UN and the AU, which is faced with the challenge of
responding to crisis even as it is developing the capacities to do so. In this respect,
the Panel stressed the need for a shared strategic vision, if the UN and the AU are
to exercise their respective advantages: the AU's ability to provide a rapid
response and the UN capacity for sustained operation. Such a vision, it was
stressed, would also reduce the likelihood of duplication of effort and
organizations working at cross purposes. 58
Given the complexity of modern peacekeeping, the Panel recognized
that no single organization is able to address the security challenges involved on
its own.

59

The Panel accordingly suggested the need for equitable burden-sharing

and shared strategic vision between the UN and the AU, based on their respective
comparative advantage.

UN has a comparative advantage in its capacity for

sustained operation; while AU's comparative advantage is its ability to provide a
rapid response. 60
The Panel recommended two new financial mechanisms. The first, based
on UN- assessed funding, is designed to support specific AU-led peace operations
mandated by the UNSC, on a case-by-case basis. The second mechanism is a
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voluntary funded multi-donor trust fund, which would focus on comprehensive
capacity-building for institution building and conflict prevention and resolution.

61

Regarding peace-keeping operations undertaken by African Union or
under its authority and with the consent of the United Nations, AU advocates for
UN funding through assessed contributions which presumably ensure predictable,
and sustainable funding for AU-led peace support operations. 62 Though the UN
Security Council recognized "the importance of supporting and improving in a
sustained way the resource base and capacity of the African Union," 63 it took a
position that "regional organizations have the responsibility in securing human,
financial, logistical and other resources for their organizations, including through
obtaining contributions by their members and soliciting contributions from donors
to fund their operations, and recognizing the challenges in accessing United
Nations assessed contributions for funding regional organizations." 64
Yet Africa continues to face serious challenges in the area of peace and
security. 65 It is important to note that while the United Nations has undertaken
various types of peacekeeping partnerships with the African Union and its
subregional organizations, the form of this partnership has always come as a
result of the specitlc political and security circumstances of a given conflict. 66
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On 22 October 2010, the Security Council adopted a presidential
statement expressing the Council's determination to continue working towards a
more predictable and sustainable solution to the challenges of securing
sustainable, predictable and flexible

financing for AU-led

peacekeeping

operation. 67

B. UN-AU Cooperation in Conflict Prevention
Another area of cooperation between UN and AU involves the
prevention, mitigation and reduction of conflict. While conflict management
remains the core function of both the UN and AU, a relatively growing
recognition has been given over the past years to strengthening collective efforts
for conflict prevention. 68 Hence conflict prevention increasingly becomes central
to the AU-UN partnership. 69 The involvement of the UN, AU and African
regional economic communities in the joint preventive diplomacy and
peacemaking activities in Mali,

Madagascar,

Sudan and

Burkina Faso

demonstrate this trend of the partnership. 70
Mediation is an important component of the conflict prevention scheme,
where UN and AU launched a partnership. This partnership:;4s premised on Article
52 of the Charter of the United Nations which requires the UN Security Council
to encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through
regional arrangements. This has been primarily done through close cooperation
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between the UN Secretariat and AU Commission, in which the UN Secretariat
provide help to the AU Commission to build AU's institutional mediation
capacity. 71
AU and UN also embarked on partnership in mediation efforts in
specific conflict situations. The AU-UN mediation partnership in Kenya in 2008
is noteworthy in this regard. When AU established the Panel of eminent African
Personalities to mediate in the post-electoral conflict in Kenya, the UN supported
AU's mediation effort by stat1ing the Secretariat of the Panel. This was perhaps a
successful mediation effort from which valuable lessons should be drawn. Though
such partnership could improve the quality of peacemaking in Africa, it is still a
work in progress and much has to be done to reach its full potential.
Noteworthy is the common guidelines for mediation in Africa that UN
and AU Secretariat have been working on. The guidelines are based on shared
values and provide broad principles of cooperation aimed at clarifying roles and
strengthening cooperation between the two organizations when undertaking joint
mediation efforts. 72 The success of these efforts to make the mediation partnership
more coherent ultimately depends on the degree to which this approach is adopted
at the strategic level and supported by Member States. 73
As rightly observed by the UN Secretary General, "[t]he mediation
partnership between the two organizations has often taken place in an ad hoc
fashion

and

more needs to

be done to
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improve cooperation at the

conceptualization, planning and implementation stages of peace processes and in
translating early warning into effective action through enhanced response
capabilities." 74

C. UN-AU Cooperation in Disarmament
UN-AU cooperation on regional disarmament goes back to January 1, 1986 when
the UN established the United Nations Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Africa
(UNREC) in Lome, Togo as part of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs. 75 The UN
established the Regional Office at the request of AU's predecessor, i.e. the Organization of
African Unity (OAU). 76
The UNREC is responsible to provide substantive support for "initiatives and other
efforts of member states of the African region towards the realization of measures of peace,
am1s limitation, and disarmament in the region, in co-operation with the Organization of
African Unity, as well as co-ordinate the implementation of regional activities in Africa under
the World Disarmament campaign."77 Following the establishment of the AU, UNREC was
further mandated to cooperate with AU to coordinate the implementation of regional
activities in Africa leading to peace, arms control and disannament.78
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In 2012, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the UN,
UNOAU and the World Bank launched a one year program to develop AU's
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration capacity. 79 The UN, through the
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, provides
support to AU to develop an African common strategy to control small arms and
light weapons. 80

D. UN-AU Cooperation on Counter-terrorism
Terrorism constitutes one of the most serious threats to international
peace and security. 81 The suppression of acts of international terrorism is,
therefore, considered as an essential element for the maintenance of international
peace and security. 82 AU's position that the primary responsibility for combating
and ensuring global cooperation against terrorism rests on the UN is in tandem
with the position taken by the General Assembly of the United Nations. 83
Today, the international community has recognized that addressing the
root causes of terrorism is key to effectively preventing and combating terrorism.
The United Nations in its recent resolution adopted on 17 December 2013 noted
the following:
terrorism will not be defeated by military force, law enforcement
measures, and intelligence operations alone ... [Security Council
underlined] the need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of
79
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terrorism, as outlined in Pillar I of the United Nations Global CounterTerrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288) including, but not limited to, the need
to strengthen efforts for the successful prevention and peaceful resolution
of prolonged conflict, and the need to promote the rule of law, the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance,
tolerance, inclusiveness to offer a viable alternative to those who could be
susceptible to terrorist recruitment and to radicalization leading to
violence. 84
African concerns over the combating and eradication of the scourge of
terrorism have a long history. The African nations adopted a Comprehensive
counterterrorism Convention two years prior to the 9/11 terrorist attack. The
Convention is known as "The OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating
ofTerrorism", and it was adopted on July 1, 1999 in Algiers, Algeria. 85 The treaty
entered in to force subsequent to the 9111 terrorist attack, i.e. 6 December 2002.

86

The 9111 terrorist attack provided a new vigor and momentum to fight global
terrorism at the internationallevel. 87
However the importance of Africa in the global counterterrorism
campaign was not duly recognized in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks against the United States. The perceptional shift evolved only after the US
security officials focused on the history of AI quaeda in Africa, and the history of
other terrorist groups operating and transitioning through Africa. 88 As rightly
pointed out by Wani,
terrorism could spread in Africa for several reasons, notable among them
the growth of radical Islam in several parts of the continent; the existence
84
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of so-called failed states ... ; proximity to the Middle East and the Arab
World, where many terrorist groups thrive; the general inability of states
in Africa to sufficiently secure their vast borders; and the movement
across the continent of potential terrorists from other regions. Also are
concern are the abject poverty and repressive political environments that
leave many young Africans desperate, frustrated and potentially
vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist elements.
The UN recognized the importance of coordination at the regional, subregional and international levels in order to strengthen the response to
international terrorism, which is considered as a global threat to international
.

secunty.

89

The Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management and Resolution of the Organization of African Unity adopted a
Communique, which among other things, expressed Africa's unreserved support
to the UN Security Council Resolution 1373, i.e. the landmark resolution of the
UN Security Council to combat global terrorism in all its forms and

°

manifestations. 9 Furthermore, the AU High level Intergovernmental Meeting
subsequently adopted a Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of
Terrorism in Africa as a response to the landmark resolution of the UN Security
Council 1373 (2001) following the 9111 terrorist attack in New York. The Plan of
Action is premised on the need to strengthen the capacity of African states
through intergovernmental cooperation and coordination. 91 The Plan of Action
parallels the key provisions of the UN Security Council Resolution 13 73 (200 1). 92
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Interestingly, there is an overall convergence in the priorities identified
by the UN and AU in preventing and combating terrorism. These priorities could
be broadly categorized as Counterterrorism legislation, Operational Mechanisms
and Capacity building.
The cooperation between the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee
Executive Directorate with African Center for the Study and Research on
Terrorism of AU is worth mentioning in this regard. The AU Center has made
important contribution by participating in the works of the UN Counter-Terrorism
Committee Executive Directorate, including through contributions to workshops
organized by the Directorate and field visits held on behalf of the Security
Council Committee. 93
However, neither the UN system nor the AU has managed to
communicate successfully the respective priorities of each to the other. Bridging
this gap is a priority not only for the UN but also for the AU.

4.1.2 Modalities of Cooperation
The existing modalities of cooperation between the AU and UN include
regular meetings, regular consultations 94 , informal consultations, 95 inviting the

93
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UN to attend the deliberations of the PSC 96 , undertaking joint miSSions,

97

mandating or designating AU to act on behalf of the UN, through the
establishment of liaison otTices, the appointment of Joint AU/UN Special Envoy,
and annual address of the UN Secretary General at the opening session of the AU
Summit.
Over the last years, senior officials of the African Union have been
invited to brief the Security Council and the UN Secretary General special
representatives and envoys have also been invited to brief the Peace and Security
Council. These briefings have focused on issues of common interest, including
the situations in Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Madagascar, Somalia and the Sudan, the
activities of the Lord's Resistance Army and thematic issues relating to
peacebuilding, the prevention of genocide and sexual violence in conflict
situations. 98

A. Joint Consultation Mechanism
The relationship between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace
and Security Council is at the core of the overall strategic partnership between the
two organizations. 99 The UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security
Council designed a joint consultative mechanism, whereby they conduct annual
consultative meetings.
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The launching of a joint annual consultative meeting between the two
organs of the UN and AU is an important step forward to forge cooperation
between the two organizations in the maintenance of international peace and
security. This partnership is premised on the importance of effective cooperation
between the two organs for successful collective action. 100
This annual joint consultative mechanism provides the forum for the
UNSC and AUPSC to discuss on key peace and security issues of mutual interest
and to explore ways to enhance their cooperation. 101
The first joint consultative meeting was held on June 16, 2007. Thus far
they conducted eight joint consultative meetings. 102 During the inaugural meeting,
the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council undertook to
develop a stronger and structured relationship, including between their subsidiary
bodies, and to hold joint annual meetings either in Addis Ababa or New York.
They also encouraged close consultations between the two organs as decisions are
being prepared on issues affecting peace and security in Africa. 103
During the joint consultative meetings, the two organs assess their
cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention and resolution, peacekeeping and
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peace building, including the maintenance of constitutional order and the
promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Africa. 104
While these consultations represent a significant step in the right
direction, they are yet to translate into a common understanding ofthe foundation
of the cooperation between these two organs. 105

B. Cooperation between the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission
A close working relationship between the UN Secretariat and the AU
Commission is important to enhance cooperation between the UN Security
Council and AU Peace and Security Council. And it operates on two levels, i.e. at
a political level and at the level of capacity building.

106

Within the framework of

the 10-year capacity building program, the UN Secretariat and AU Commission
initiated consultative desk-to-desk meetings on the prevention and management of
conflicts in Africa. The desk-to-desk meetings bring together the desk officers of
the two organizations in the area of peace and security to discuss and exchange
information and ideas on country-specific and thematic issues of common
interest. 107
With authorization from the UN, the desk-to-desk meeting has
subsequently been broadened to include relevant officers from the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High
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Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the

United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Office to the African
Union (UNOAU) and United Nations field missions. 108 There is also a field level
consultation and coordination between AU Liaison Offices and Field Missions in
conflict and post-conflict zones routinely with their UN counterparts.

109

Moreover, UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council put
in place regular teleconferences between the United Nations Secretariat and the
African Union Commission as a consultation mechanism to enhance coordination
and consultation at the desk level. 110
According to the Secretary General of the UN, "[t]he desk-to-desk
meetings have provided the United Nations, the African Union and the regional
economic communities with a mechanism for cooperation and information
sharing, and have led to joint initiatives on country situations and cross-cutting
issues of mutual interest." 111 Those cross cutting issues include unconstitutional
change of government, election-related disputes and political violence.
The establishment of the United Nations Office to the African Union
(UNO AU) in 2010 is a significant step in the right direction to foster closer
cooperation and greater coordination between the UN Secretariat and AU
Commission. UNOAU represents the Political Affairs Department, Peacekeeping
Operations Department and the Depmiment of Field Support of the UN
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Secretariat at the AU Headquarter in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 112 Within the
framework of the 10-year capacity-building program for AU, UNOAU co-chairs
the peace and security cluster, coordinating the support of the entire UN system to
. th e area o f'·peace an d secunty.
. 113
Au m
The UN Secretariat also provides mentoring and advisory services to the
AU Commission through the United Nations Office to African Union (UNOAU).
For example, UNOAU provides continuous advice and mentoring to the AU
Commission for the realization of AMANI Africa Calendar. 114 The technical
support provided by UNOAU and the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations for the elaboration of AU Security Sector Reform (SSR) and AU's
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) agenda are also worth
mentioning here. 115
In 201 0, the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union
(AU) Commission launched a Joint Task Force on peace and security with the
objective of enhancing the strategic partnership on issues of common interest
between the two organizations.

116

The establishment of the Joint Task force,

which meets twice a year, has offered the opportunity for both the UN and AU to
discuss cooperation in various conflict situations in Africa. 117 Given the mandates
of the Task Force, it will have an important role to play in providing political and
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strategic guidance, including through assistance to the UN Security Council and
AU Peace and Security Council to strengthen their partnership and cooperation.

C. Mini-summits or High-level Meetings
Mini-summits or High-level Meetings are also important avenues of
cooperation between the UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security
Co unci I. They are organized to strengthen the regular exchanges between the UN
Secretariat and the AU Commission and garner coherent regional and
international support to address maJor conflicts and crisis in the African
continent.l18 The two Councils involve member states and sub-regional
organizations in Africa in the Mini-summits and High-level Meetings. 119

D. AU and UN Security Council Reform
Most of the African nations were under colonial yoke when the UN
Charter was adopted. Among the African nations, only Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia
and the Union of South Africa were the founding members of the United
Nations.

120

Though Africa represents more than one billion people, no single

African state is a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
AU recognizes the important role the UN has been playing in the
promotion of peace and security in Africa. About 26 of the 4 7 matters considered
by the UN Security Council in 2013 directly concern Africa. 121 As stated above,
the African continent is the only region that does not have a permanent seat on the
118
119
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UN Security Council. AU is, therefore, determined to correct the historical
injustices against Africa through the Security Council reform.

122

This is perhaps

the premise for African nations in advancing African Common position regarding
the reform of the Security Council. 123
Africa has been able to speak cohesively with one voice regarding the
UN Security Reform. It established a committee of ten that articulates and
coordinates African position on the subject and with a view to building more
alliances in support of African position. The AU Commission facilitates the
activities of the African Permanent Representatives of the Committee of Ten to
the UN in the intergovernmental negotiations on UN Security Council reform and
related consultations.
AU advocates for a comprehensive reform of the United Nations System
that "takes into account the principles, objectives and ideals ofthe United Nations
Chmier for a fairer world based on universalism, equity and regional balance." 124
Accordingly AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government took a position that
Africa should be allocated two permanent seats in the UN Security Council with
all the privileges, including the right of veto, and five (5) non-permanent seats on
the Security Council. 125
Africa's non representation as a permanent member in the UN Security
Council violates the founding principles of the UN Charter. Africa's
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representation as a permanent member of the UN Security Council is important in
many ways. It helps the Security Council to be representative and even for its
legitimacy.

4.2 Cooperation between UN, AU and Regional Economic Communities
The AU and the RECs share the goal of a peaceful Africa.

126

AU

Constitutive Act considers RECs as the "implementing arms" of the AU's goal of
peaceful and prosperous Africa. 127 They are perhaps considered as the key
building blocks for economic integration and key actors in ensuring political
stability in their respective geographical areas. The Protocol on the Establishment
of the Peace and Security Council ofthe AU outlines the relationship between AU
and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The Protocol recognized RECs
as part of the overall security architecture of the AU. 128
The operational modalities of their relationship is defined by the January
2008 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperation in the area of peace
and security between the African Union, Regional Economic Communities and
the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa
and Northern Africa. 129 The MOU defines the scope and mechanisms of
cooperation between AU and RECs. 130
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The MOU is premised on the need for strengthening and deepening their
cooperation and enhancing their capacity to collectively address the scourge of
cont1icts and ensure the maintenance of peace, security and stability of the
continent. 131 Under the MOU the signatories committed to institutionalize their
cooperation with a view to achieving their shared goal of ridding the African
continent of the scourge of cont1icts and laying the foundation for sustainable
. an d stab.l.
peace, secunty
1 1ty. 132
Under Article Vl(l) of the MOU, AU is recognized as the regional
organization with primary responsibility to maintain and promote peace, security
and stability in Africa. 133 Equally important is the recognition given to the
contributions RECs could make towards the promotion and maintenance of peace,
security and stability in the continent. 134 The development and implementation of
the Africa Peace and Security Architecture perhaps depends up on the cooperation
and commitment of RECs. 135
The guiding principles of the Cooperation between AU and the RECs
are adherence to the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity, and comparative
advantage.

136

The MOU also identifies areas of cooperation including the

following: the operationalization and functioning of the African Peace and
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Security Architecture (including the continental early warnmg system and the
African Standby Force); the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts;
Post conflict reconstruction and development; arms control and disarmament;
counter-terrorism; the prevention and combating of transnational organized crime;
border management; capacity building and any other shared priorities and
common interest. 137 AU and RECs also cooperate in exchange of information,
exchange of experience and joint need assessment in the regions. 138
The modalities of cooperation between AU and the RECs include
exchange of information, meetings including regular annual meeting between the
Chairperson of the AU Commission and the Chief Executives of the RECs,
regular consultations, institutional presence through establishing RECs liaison
offices at the AU, joint activities and field coordination. 139
RECs are encouraged to anticipate and prevent conflicts, to undertake
peacemaking and peace building efforts to resolve conflicts, including through the
deployment of peace support missions. 140 RECs are not only required to make
their involvement in the maintenance of international peace and security in
conformity with the objectives of the AU Peace and Security Council
Establishment Protocol but also to continuously inform the Chairperson of the
Commission about their activities in this regard. 141
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In the area of deployment of peace support missions, RECs assume the
responsibility to make available the regional brigades, which they are operating
for deployment outside of their territorial jurisdiction upon request by the AU
.
Peace an d Secunty

counc1'1 . 142

Kai identified the following as weaknesses of the RECs in the discharge
of their security mandates: reluctance of member states on the political level to
empower the RECs to discharge their security mandates given competing interests
and varied priorities of member states; reluctance of member states to provide
sufficient funds for the RECs; Overlap of Membership and Mandates in the
RECs; the limitation some of the RECs encounter because of the prevailing crises
especially in North Africa and the Sahel Saharan states and the gaps in the
experience of RECs in terms of their exposure to activities related to the
maintenance of regional peace and security. 143
The MOU also defines the relationship between the RECs and AU, on
the one hand, and the UN on the other hand. Not only AU and RECs undertook to
harmonize their views at the forums of the UN but also they agreed to mobilize
the support of the UN in the objectives AU and RECs set out under the MOU.

144

AU assumes a leadership role in coordinating this cooperation with the UN. 145
This partnership involves the UN, AU and the regional economic
communities,

including

ECOW AS,

the

Southern

African

Development

Community (SADC) and IGAD. Operationally, the United Nations has previously
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worked closely with the African Union and the regional economic communities in
mediation processes, including in Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya,
Madagascar, Somalia, the Sudan/Darfur and the Sudan/South Sudan. Cooperation
is still ongoing in many ofthese situations. 146
Regarding

relations

with

ECOWAS,

ECOWAS

member

states

reaffirmed their commitment to the principles enshrined in the UN Charter and
the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.

147

Given the primary

responsibility given to the UN Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security, ECOW AS has duly recognized this role of the
UN. There can be no doubt that legally ECOMOG would require Security
Council authorization for any non-consensual enforcement action by reference to
article 53(1) ofthe UN Charter.
The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conf1ict Prevention,
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security of ECOWAS not only
explicitly requires ECOW AS to cooperate with the UN and the African
continental organization, 148 but also require the Chairman of the Mediation and
Security Council to submit report to the AU and the UN. 149
The UN has collaborated with ECOW AS predominantly in the area of
peacekeeping. 150 ECOWAS missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1990 and

146
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1997 respectively served as precursory efforts to UN subsequent missions in both
countries. 151
For example, the UN-ECOWAS cooperation in the Liberian crisis was
the first peace-keeping mission undertaken by the United Nations in cooperation
with a peace-keeping mission already set up by another organization, in this case
ECOWAS. 152 ECOWAS and the UN had a division of labor. Whereas the UN
assumed the role of monitoring and verifying the implementation of the
ECOWAS sponsored peace Agreement, known as the Cotonou Agreement signed
between the Liberian warring factions, ECOWAS assumed the primary
responsibility of supervising the implementation of the military provisions of the
Cotonou Agreement. 153
ECOWAS discharged its mandate through ECOMOG, the ECOSOC
Monitoring Group established by ECOSOC m 1990 to help restore peace and
security in Liberia. The UN, on the other hand, discharged this important mandate
through the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), which was established
by the UN Security Council in September 1993. Interestingly, ECOW AS assumed
a leadership role in the peace process in Liberia.
When the violence escalated in Liberia, ECOW AS once again deployed
a Nigerian-led force in Liberia (ECOMIL) in August 2003 until the UN Mission
in Liberia (UNMIL) took over the mission in September 2003. 154 AU supported
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ECOWAS in the Liberian peace process, including by appointing AU Special
Envoy in Liberia.
Subsequent to ECOW AS intervention in Liberian crisis, the UN Security
Council welcomed the ECOWAS effort towards the resolution of conflict in
Liberia and further called upon ECOWAS to provide assistance in the
implementation of the Peace Accord, known as the Yamoussokuru IV Accord.

155

ECOWAS also imposed an arms embargo on Liberia that would support
ECOW AS in discharging its security mandate.
Ajayi identified the following as challenges confronted in the
cooperation between UN and ECOW AS in the areas of their peacekeeping:
Difficulties that confronted the UN co-operation in Liberia and Sierra
Leone included lack of clear mandates, disparities in logistics and
remuneration, and divergent approaches to issues such as sanctions, and
elections. As such, even though there were some useful consultations
between the UN Security Council and ECOW AS, the above factors
created a disconnect between the political decisions that were made and
their implementation in the field. 156
Regarding SADC, the Department of Political Affairs of the UN
established a liaison team with SADC at its Headquarter in Gaborone with a view
to enhancing UN cooperation with SADC in the areas of conflict prevention,
mediation and elections. 157 The signing of the Framework for Cooperation on
September 21, 201 0 between UN and SADC provide a defined framework for
cooperation on these areas. 158 The Framework is aimed at strengthening and
155
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drawing upon the capacities of both the UN and SADC, including SADC's
knowledge and understanding of the region and the mediation, peacemaking and
peacebuilding experience of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). 159 The
UN considers the signing of the Framework as "the first step towards a very
valuable partnership." 160
lOAD has played a leading role in the Somali and Southern Sudan peace
processes. After UN forces finally withdrew from Somalia in 1995, IGAD took
the initiative to convene a peace and reconciliation conference that eventually led
to the signing of a Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities in the Horn of Africa. 161
lOAD is the focal point of all engagements directed at Somalia and also
participates in the International Contact Group meetings on Somalia. 162 The
International Contact Group in which the UN participates is used as a platform for
cooperation between IGAD and the UN.
lOAD has also been at the lead ofthe Somali and Southern Sudan Peace
processes. 163 lOAD led the talks that created the Somalia's Transitional Federal
Government in 2004. IGAD also spearheaded the efforts that brought about the
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that paved the way for the
independence of South Sudan.
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CHAPTERS
CASE STUDIES: UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

Of the many challenges facing Africa, the quest for peace and security is
undoubtedly the most pressing. Over the past two decades, the continent has
witnessed a number of long-term, severe and, in some cases, inter-related crises
and violent conflicts. African states are grappling with several difficult security
challenges. While interstate wars and liberation struggle dominated the 1970s and
1980s, the subsequent decades have been characterized by intra-state violence.

1

The security dynamics in Africa has especially transformed over the past
decade? The crisis in the Darfur region of the Sudan, the recent crisis in Southern
Sudan, the terrorist threats in Sahel region and Somalia, and the ongoing crisis in
Somalia, the

ongoing crisis

in Burkina Faso,

the

less-than-transparent

governments and ongoing uncertainty in Sierra Leone, and Angola, the maritime
piracy in West Africa and Somalia, and the multi-state conflict in Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) are just some examples.
The AU Commission identified the following as contemporary security
challenges of the African continent: Governance related intrastate conflict;
Terrorism; Maritime piracy; border problems and climate change resulting
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3

migration which ends up to be a security challenge. Transnational organized
crime groups also exploit the spaces created by such insecurities and engage in
activities detrimental both to human and international security. Such activities
include drugs, arms, and human trafficking, cyber crime, money laundering, and
other activities that feed into the creation of financing opportunities for terrorists
and other violent groups.

4

The UN Security Council recently determined that the unprecedented
extent of the Ebola outbreak in Africa constitutes a threat to international peace
and security. 5 This perhaps demonstrates the increasing emphasis given to human
security by the UN Security Council.

5.1 Contemporary Security Challenges

The following provides a general overview of the contemporary security
challenges of the African continent.

5.1.1 Terrorism as a security challenge
Terrorism constitutes one of the most senous threats to international
peace and security. 6 The growing threat of terrorism in Africa also continues to
pose a serious challenge to the consolidation of peace and security on the

3

United Nations-African Union partnership Security Council Meeting, 12 January 2012, available
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continent. The Chairperson of the AU Commission in her September 2, 2014
report on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa stated the following
regarding the growing challenges of terrorism in Africa:
Over the past decade, the threat of terrorism in Africa has assumed greater
proportions. Regions that previously did not perceive the seriousness of
the threat, or were considered to be immune from terrorism, have been
targeted by terrorists. During the same period, the threat of terrorism has
spread from North and East Africa to Western and Central Africa covering
the Sahel, which expands from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea and
Indian Ocean. 7
The UN Security Council also recognized terrorism as an important
element in an increasing number of conflict situations in Africa 8 and that
countering incitement to terrorism, motivated by extremism and intolerance, and
addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, can complement
conflict prevention efforts,
The terrorist threat m Africa is a complex one, with growmg links
between terrorism and transnational organized crime. This is further compounded
by the fact that the continent is increasingly becoming a transit route for the
global narcotics trade, with its potential devastating impact on societies and state
structures, as well as by the proliferation ofweapons. 9
The AU Commission identified five categories of terrorist threats on the
African continent; namely,
(i) terrorist attacks on African interests; (ii) terrorist attacks on Western
and other foreign interests; (iii) use of African territories as safe havens;
7

PSC/ AHG/2(CDL V), Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Terrorism and Violent
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(iv) use of Africa as a terrorist breeding ground and source of recruitment
and financing; and (v) Africa as a transit point for terrorists and
fund-raising tied to other illicit activities. 10

5.1.2 Border Disputes and Conflicts
Another source of concern relates to border disputes and conflicts. The
artificial and poorly demarcated borders of many African countries during the
colonial era are considered the most potent source of conflict and political
instability for the African continent. 11
Since African countries gained independence, the borders have been a
recurrent source of conflicts and disputes in the continent. It is estimated that less
than a quarter of African borders have been properly delimited and demarcated.
This situation gives rise to "undefined zones" within which the application of
national sovereignty poses problems. In these zones, a local dispute between two
communities can rapidly escalate and lead to inter-State tensions. When these
zones have natural resources, their management can prove to be difficult and be a
source of misunderstanding.

12

Given this porous nature of the African borders,

governance-related intrastate conflicts have also spilled over to entire regions, as
has been the case in the Great Lakes region, West Africa and the Horn of Africa. 13
As rightly articulated by Ikome, "Africa's colonial boundaries have
continued to manifest a disturbing lack of homogeneity and functional polities in
certain states, and, rather than contributing to peaceful relations, have remained a

10
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maJor source of inter-state conflict, apart from fostering the regionalisation of
intra-state conflict." 14

5.1.3 Maritime Piracy
There is a growing concern in Africa over the persistence and spread of
maritime piracy, which is an international crime pursuant to relevant international
instruments, including UN Security Council resolution 1918 (20 10). 15
The past decade has seen a rise in Maritime Piracy. 16 In Africa, the
pirate attacks are largely confined to the Gulf of Guinea, near Nigeria and the
Niger River delta, and Somalia's Gulf of Aden. 17 Though there was a significant
drop in maritime piracy in the Somalia's Gulf of Aden in 2013, 18 piracy is on the
rise in the Gulf of Guinea. 19 In 2013, pirate attacks in the Gulf of Guinea
increased by 33%?0 Most of these pirate attacks took place in Nigeria's Niger
Delta region. 21 However there have also been attacks in Benin, Cote d'lvoire,
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Ghana, Guinea and Togo? 2 Generally speaking, maritime security in West Africa
is precarious. 23 The acts of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea have been primarily
driven by political and social grievances. 24
Both UN and AU recognize maritime piracy as one of the security
challenges of the African continent. The UN Security Council in its resolutions
and Presidential Statements recognized maritime piracy in Africa as a threat to
international peace and security. 25 Since 2008 when maritime piracy in the
Somali's Gulf of Aden became a major global concern, the AU has advocated a
comprehensive approach towards combating piracy and armed robbery at sea. 26
Given the magnitude of the problem, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and
government adopted the 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Security Strategy
(2050 AIM Strategy), which is designed to address the serious concern at the
growing insecurity in the African maritime space. 27

5.1.4 Governance related intrastate conflicts
Governance

refers

to

'"the

exercise

of

political,

economic

andadministrative authority to manage nation's affairs (in the best interests of the
people) and thecomplex mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions
through which citizens and groupsarticulate their interests, exercise their rights
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and obligations and mediate their differences". 28 Governance related intrastate
conflict is one of the most important security challenges that African countries
currently face. 29
The AU Peace and Security Council in its Communique of 27 October
2014 spelt out governance related issues which according to the Council are

"potent triggers of violent conflicts in Africa". 30 These include marginalization,
human right abuses, refusal to accept electoral defeat, constitutional manipulation,
mismanagement and uneven distribution of resources, lack of socio-economic
opportunities and corruption. 31
Empirical data from conflict zones in Africa speak unequivocally to the
correlation between bad governance and political instability. The AU Peace and
Security Council in its 360th meeting held on 22 March 2013 acknowledged such
correlation as follows: "a number of African countries remain trapped in a vicious
cycle of conflict, linked to multiple factors, including governance deficit. " 32
Bad governance indeed leads to deteriorating human development
conditions, which reduce productivity and further weaken political institutions,
eventually weakening the state as an entity. This vicious cycle is also potentially a
source of tensions across groups and leading to conf1ict. 33
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Moreover, such weakened states are frequently unable to exercise a
monopoly of force within their own formal boundaries creating a situation which
Jackson characterized as "a situation where at a macro and micro level, the state
exists as an island of stability within a broader sea of instability beyond its
control. 34 Such situations offer fertile ground for exploitation by terrorists and
transnational organized criminals. 35
The emerging trend of election-related conflicts and violence, for
example, is a worrying development that ensued from bad governance. And such
development not only undermines the nascent democracies in several African
states but also could pose a threat to peace and security of the African continent.
As noted by the Panel of the Wise in its Report on Strengthening the
Role of the African Union in the Prevention, Management and Resolution of
Election-related Disputes and Violent Conflicts in Africa, election outcomes are
increasingly contested in Africa since the new wave of democratization in the
early 1990s.

36

This situation signals weaknesses in the governance of elections

and the rules of orderly political competition, which perhaps could potentially
lead to the recourse to armed rebellion to assert political claims and secessionist
demands. 37 The gravity of such tendency poses athreat to the viability of the
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democratic processes in the Continent, as well as to peace, security and stability
in Africa. 38
Mention should also be made of the uprisings in North Africa in the past
decade. The grievances that have driven the North Africa revolts have a universal
ring to them:

widespread dissatisfaction with authoritarian governments;

increasing income inequalities, high poverty levels, and declining living standards
for middle classes; and disproportionately high levels of youth unemployment,
leading to social alienation. Modern tools of mobilization, such as the social
media, have only contributed to sharpening the organizational tools of the new
groups and constituencies.
As stressed by the PSC ministerial meeting of 26 April 2011, the
uprisings in North Africa should be used as an opportunity for member States to
renew their commitment to the AU democratic and governance agenda, give
added momentum to the efforts deployed in this respect and implement the
political and socio- economic reforms which are called for in every particular
national situation. 39

5.1.5 Coups d'etat as another security challenge in Africa.
In 2008 only, there were three coups d'etat in Africa, i.e. in the Islamic
Republic of Mauritania on 6 August 2008, and in the Republic of Guinea on 23
December 2008, as well as the attempted coup d'etat in the Republic of Guinea
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Bissau on 5 August 2008. 40 The military Coup d'etat in Burkina Faso ousting
President BlaiseCompaore on October 30, 2014 is the latest coup in Africa.

41

According to AU, the resurgence of the scourge of coups d'etat on the Continent
constitutes not only a dangerous political downturn and a serious setback to the
democratic processes, but also a threat to peace, security and stability of the
Continent. 42

5.1.6 Climate change as a new threat
Climate change refers to "any change in climate over time, whether due
43

to natural variability or as a result of human activity". A new threat, relating to
climate change, is clouding the African horizon. There is a widespread consensus
that the African continent will be "the hardest hit as a consequence of the climate
change impacts."44
Although Africa has contributed least to global warming, the continent
is likely to suffer the most from the resulting consequences, whether they relate to
scarce water resources, damage to coastal infrastructure and cities, issues related
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to the decrease of food security for the general population and environmentallyinduced migration. 45
A comprehensive assessment by the Africa,

Climate

Change,

Environment and Security Dialogue Forum (ACCES) concluded that "Burundi,
Chad, the DRC, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria and Sudan
are the most vulnerable countries in Africa in the context of climate change and
security, and that the Sahel region (stretching from Dakar in the west to
Mogadishu in the east) is the most threatened region in the continent. "

46

It is

therefore clear that this phenomenon will impact negatively on the quest for peace
and security in the African continent.

47

5.1.7 Competing Use of trans boundary resources
Across much of Africa state politics is dominated by a combination of
the poverty of most people, t!erce competition for scarce resources and a key role
played by the state in allocation of those resources. 48 Given the scarcity of water in
Africa, the use of trans boundary resources, especially trans boundary rivers, is one
potential source of conflict in Africa. For example, river Nile that has almost onefifth of the African Nations as its co-riparians could potentially trigger conflict in
Africa. 49
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As population grows in the region and demands for water increase, this
situation cries out of equitable allocation of Nile water. On the technical side
through organs like the Nile Basin Initiative, there has been considerable progress
among the riparian states over more efficient use of the water. At the political
level, however, there are still major differences between the positions of Egypt
and Sudan, on the one hand, and the other eight riparian states, on the other. So
far, the situation has not resulted in conflict. It is important to take steps now to
insure there is no future conflict over Nile water usage and allocation. 50

5.1.8 Transnational Organized Crimes
According to UNODC, "Transnational cnme by definition involves
people in more than one country maintaining a system of operation and
communication that is effective enough to perform criminal transactions,
sometimes repeatedly." 51 Transnational crime is considered as one of the major
threats to human security, impeding social, economic, cultural and democratic
developments. 52
The spread of new security threats, such as transnational Organized
Crimes, have added to the concern for the mass of the people on the African
continent. 53 The June 2008 AU, Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation
in the area of peace and security between the African Union, the Regional
Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional
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Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa identified transnational
organized crime as one of security challenges of the African continent. The threat
and challenges are enormous given the existence of fragile states that would serve
as potential breeding grounds for transnational organized crimes.

54

According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), "alarm
bells are ringing about the volume of cocaine transiting the region (roughly 50
tons a year). West Africa ... has become a hub for cocaine trafficking ... worth
almost $2 billion a year. This is more than a drugs problem. It is a serious security
threat." 55
Today Transnational Organized Crime's (TOC) threat is characterized
by at least six trends. TOC groups are (1) increasingly global in reach; (2)
involved in multiple forms of criminal activity; (3) expanding their criminal
markets to include large-scale financial fraud and cyber crime; (4) willing to
protect illicit activities through violent and ruthless means; (5) linked to
international terrorist groups; and (6) devising novel organizational strategies to
deter capture. 56 For example, the serious threats posed by transnational organized
crime in the Sahel region are linked with terrorism. 57
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5.1.9 Ethnicity as a source of Security challenge
In many ways African security is ethnic related. 58 Ethnicity is "the
embodiment of values, institutions; and patterns of behavior, a composite whole
representing a people's historical experience, aspirations and world view." 59
Deprivation of ethnicity amounts to depriving the people of their sense of
direction or purpose. 60 Every African conflict virtually has some ethno-regional
dimension.

61

Deng succinctly explained the co-relation between ethnicity and
conflicts in Africa as follow:
In most African countries, the determination to preserve national unity
following independence provided the motivation behind one-party rule,
excessive centralization of power, oppressive authoritarian regimes, and
systematic violation of human rights and fundamental liberties. These in
turn have generated a reaction, manifested in heightened tension and the
demand for a second liberation. Managing ethnic diversity within the unity
of the colonial borders is a challenge that African states are reluctant to
face, but cannot wish away. 62

For example, the December 2013 civil war in Sudan that was ignited by
a political struggle between the South Sudan President SalvaKirr and his former
vice President RiekMachar eventually escalated into ethnic violence between their
respective ethnic groups, i.e. Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups respectively. 63
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The over two decade's long cont1ict m Somalia also has an ethnic
dimension manifested in the clan context.
The Darfur crisis in Sudan's western region that caused death to 300,000
people and displacement to 2.3 million people is rooted is an ethnic conflict
"pitting Sudan's Arab-dominated centre against the "Black-African" marginalized
majority at the periphery." 64
The thirty year war between Ethiopia and Eritrea had an ethnic
dimension. The 1994 Rwanda genocide was ignited when Hutus began
slaughtering the Tutsis in Rwanda.

5.2. Case Studies
The UN remains a major security influence in Africa. Of the current
sixteen missions worldwide, nine are in Africa. However these nine accounted for
$ 4,998,891,380 of the $7.06 billion earmarked for peacekeeping as a whole for
the Periods from July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015. 65 The current biggest
peacekeeping mission is in Democratic Republic of Congo with around 21,048
uniformed personnel, 3,680 civilian personnel and 483 UN volunteers. 66 This has
replaced Liberia, which had been previously the biggest mission. 67 Examining the
institutional experience of the UN in the area of its principal mandate to maintain
international peace and security is key in understanding the challenges,
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shortcomings as well as strengths of the UN security mechanism in Africa, and
perhaps to propose concrete suggestions that would make it more effective to
meet the security challenges of the 21st century in Africa. According, an attempt is
made hereunder to analyze selected case studies of conflict situations in Africa in
which the UN, AU and sub-regional security mechanisms took part.

5.2.1 The Case of Somalia
The problem in Somalia dates back to 1991 when its state structure
collapsed following the fall of President MuhammedSiadBarre. Since then, about
fifteen mediation efiorts have been undertaken to restore peace and order in
Somalia.

68

The fourteenth initiative, spearheaded by Intergovernmental Authority

for Development (IGAD), resulted in the establishment of the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) in 2004. 69 TFG is the legitimate government duly
recognized by the international community at large, including the UN and AU. 70
Many international actors, including UN, AU, the European Union,
Arab League, the International Contact Group on Somalia, and Intergovernmental
Authority for Development (IGAD), have been involved in international efforts to
avert the crisis in Somalia. The discussion here, however, is limited to UN, AU
and IGAD's involvement following the establishment of the TFG in 2004.
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A. The UN, AU, IGAD and Somalia
Following the breakdown of political order in Somalia in 1991, the UN
Security Council determined that the situation in Somalia constituted a threat to
international peace and security and accordingly imposed a chapter VII arms
embargo on Somalia in January 1992. 71 The UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM
I) was formed under Security Council Resolution 751 (1992) to monitor the March
1992 ceasefire and provide security for U.N. personnel and humanitarian
. 72
Supp 1IeS.

Prior to the adoption of the foregoing resolution by the UN Security
Council, Djibouti took the lead in the Somalia peace process by organizing two
conferences to help bring the warring Somali factions together in July and August
1991. 73 Sudan and Eritrea on the other hand proposed to send peacekeeping
troops to Somalia. 74 In 1992, IGADD and OAU designated Ethiopia as the main
coordinator of the Somali peace process. Such efforts by the regional
organizations, IGADD and OAU were overshadowed by the interventions of the
UN and the United States.
The deteriorating humanitarian situation led the UN Security Council to
adopt a resolution authorizing member states to employ all necessary means to
establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia
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under Chapter VII of the Charter. 75 This led to the establishment of Unified Task
Force (UNITAF), which was mandated to ensure the safe delivery of
humanitarian assistance in coordination with UNOSOM I.
On March 26, 1993, the Security Council decided on a prompt and
phased transition from UNIT AF to the expanded UN Operations in Somalia
(UNOSOM II)

76

with a view to undertaking a comprehensive and effective

.
77
d1sarmament program.
On June 6, 1993, the Security Council condemned the June 5th
unprovoked armed attack against the personnel of UNOSOM II. 78

This was

followed by the Council's invitation to the UN Secretary General "to
consult. .. with regional organizations in his efforts to reconcile the parties and
rebuild Somali political institutions." 79

On November 4, 1994, the Security

Council decided that continuation of UNOSOM II beyond March 1995 could not
be justified because the UN objectives in Somalia were being undermined by the
lack of sufficient cooperation from the Somali parties. 80

The mission was

eventually withdrawn in March 1995. 81 Paradoxically, the Council determined in
that same resolution "that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and
.

secunty.

.,82

Although the UN tended to abdicate its responsibility after the Security
Council decided to withdraw UNOSOM II in March 1995, it has not completely
75
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ignored the conflict situation in Somalia. However, its involvement is limited
especially if one compares it its involvement in the Sudan. The UN appears to
have modeled its level of involvement in the over two decade's long Somalia
crisis on that of the United States. 83
Subsequent to UNOSOM's departure, the UN Secretary General
established the United Nations Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS) on April
15,1995. Its mission is "to advance the cause of peace and reconciliation through
contacts with Somali leaders, civil organizations and the states and organizations
,.84

concerne d.

Subsequent

efforts

of the

Security

Council

focused

on

the

implementation of the arms embargo against Somalia. In 2002, the Council
established a panel of experts that was mandated to investigate violation of the
arms embargo. 85
Subsequent to this development, the slogan of African solutions to
African problems became popular.

86

!GAD also took the leadership in the

Somalia peace and reconciliation process under the auspices of IGAD. 87
After the establishment of the TFG in 2004, the Security Council
welcomed AU's continued support of reconciliation efforts in Somalia. 88

Both

the PSC and IGAD had been insisting on the urgency for deploying a peace
83
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support mission to seize the momentum and stabilize the situation. 89 The first
decision came from the IGAD Heads of State and Government on January 31
2005, in which it decided to deploy IGAD Peace Support Mission (IGASOM), to
be followed by an AU Peace Support Mission. 90 IGASOM's mandate was to
provide security support to the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia in
order to ensure its relocation to Somalia and guarantee the sustenance of the
outcome of the lOAD peace process. 91 IGAD also called upon the Security
Council to provide exemption to the arms embargo against Somalia for the sake
of facilitating the deployment. 92 The PSC, the Executive Council and the
Assembly of AU followed suit supporting the decision of IGAD. 93
Nonetheless, the implementation of these decisions was difficult until
recently due to the Security Council arms embargo against Somalia. 94 The initial
reaction from the Security Council was a statement issued in July 2005 that failed
to address the issue of arms embargo but simply urged the Transitional Federal
Institutions of Somalia to conclude a national security and stabilization plan. 95 A
month after fighting broke out in Somalia between the Alliance for the
Restoration of Peace and Counter-terrorism and the Sharia courts in February
2006, the Security Council issued a presidential statement, for the first time
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welcoming the possible deployment of IGASOM, to be followed by the AU Peace
Support Mission. 96 The Council finally gave the green light on its readiness to
consider the requested exemption to the arms embargo.
However the subsequent press statement issued on 31 May 2006 took
the Security Council back to its original position of insisting on strict compliance
with the arms embargo. Such a stance was simply absurd. And paradoxically, the
Security Council was insisting on the need for the Transitional Federal
Institutions of the TFG to continue working towards establishing effective
national governance in Somalia. 97 Under the circumstances, where the embargo
even extended to limiting the provision of training to the TFG, it was
incomprehensible to expect effective governance in Somalia.
Although long overdue, the UN Security Council eventually adopted
Resolution 1725, granting the requested exemption to arms embargo. 98

The

Resolution mandated IGASOM to undertake activities aimed at providing security
support and institutional capacity building for the Transitional Federal Institutions
and creating conducive conditions for dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia. 99
Alarmed by the growing precarious situation in Somalia, the TFG
invited Ethiopia to help. 100

Ethiopia's military intervention, at the express

invitation of the TFG, created a situation that, according to the PSC, "represents a
.
.
. ··101
new an d h Jstonc opportumty.
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When it became clear that IGAD would be unable to deploy IGASOM,
the PSC decided that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) would be
deployed for six months to contribute to the initial stabilization phase in
Somalia.

102

AMISOM is anticipated to have a total strength of 8,000 military

personnel and 270 police officers. 103
Accordingly, the PSC requested the UN and the Security Council to
provide all the support necessary for the deployment, including a review of
Resolution 1725 (2006).AU' s call for financial, logistical and technical support
for the deployment of AMISOM suggests the areas where AU requires the
assistance ofthe global community, including the Security Council of the UN.
In January 2007, AU urged the UN to lead the TFG initiative for an
inclusive inter-Somali dialogue, which the AU considered as critical endeavor for
sustainable peace in Somalia. 104 UN played an important role in the promotion of
an all-inclusive political process in Somalia which resulted in the signing of the
June 9, 2008 Agreement, under the auspices of the UN, between the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of
Somalia (ARS). 105
The PSC also urged the Security Council to consider authorizing a UN
operation in Somalia that would take over from AMISOM at the expiration of its
six-month mandate.This call triggered the adoption of Security Council
Resolution 1744 in February 2007. Under this resolution, the Council welcomed
102
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AU's intention to establish a m1sswn m Somalia (AMISOM) and authorized
member states of AU to establish the mission for a period of six-months.

106

AMISOM's mandate includes: supporting dialogue and reconciliation; providing
protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions; providing security for key
infrastructure; providing assistance in the implementation of the National Security
and Stabilization Plan; and, creating the necessary security conditions for the
provision of humanitarian assistance.

107

AU's original plan was to have AMISOM for an initial stabilization
phase, to be followed by an eventual deployment of a UN peacekeeping
mission.

108

The Security Council further requested the UN Secretary-General to
send a technical assessment team to report on the political and security situation
with the possibility of a UN peacekeeping operation following the AU
deployment. 109 Although the role of regional organizations in helping resolve the
situation is one among several factors that must be taken into account while
considering new UN peacekeeping operations, 110 the hesitation of the Security
Council to transform the AU mission to a UN operation largely suggests that the
Council prefers to follow a wait-and-see approach.
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The AU PSC in its Communique of June 29, 2008 once again called
upon the UN to deploy peacekeeping operation in Somalia that will support the
long-term stabilization and post-conflict restoration in Somalia. The response of
the Security Council was renewal of AMISOM's mandates for a further period of
six months on August 19, 2008.

111

Successive AU calls to the UN Security Council to provide greater
support to AMISOM and to fully assume its responsibilities towards Somalia and
its people through the deployment of a UN operation to take over AMISOM have
not born any fruit. 112 Though the UN technical and logistical support to AMISOM
was authorized on account of the council's expressed intent to deploy a United
Nations peacekeeping operation as a follow-on force to AMISOM at the right
time under the right conditions, 113 it has not been realized yet.
Given the security challenges presented by Somalia, the UN Secretary
General recommended the deployment of a multinational force with full military
capabilities instead of a UN peacekeeping mission.

114

Not only was the attempts

to raise such a multinational force a failure, but the UN Security Council also
refused to transform AMISOM in to a UN peacekeeping force or perhaps to
deploy its own peacekeeping force. 115 The UN Security Council, through its
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successive resolutions, responded by authorizing AU Member States to maintain
the mission in Somalia. 116
Despite AU's authorization of an increase in AMISOM's strength from
8,000 to 20,000 in October 2010, the UN Security Council authorized an increase
to only 12,000 troops. 117 This decision limited the scope of the UN logistical
support to AMISOM because the UN Security Council decided to provide a
logistical support package only for a maximum of 12,000 AMISOM uniformed
personnel. 118 This is just another example where the UN Security Council became
reluctant to fully endorse the recommendations of the AU Peace and Security
Council.
The establishment of the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
(UNSOA) to facilitate the delivery of the UN support to AMISOM elevated the
level of UN's engagement in the peace process in Somalia. 119It especially plays
an important role in facilitating the provision of logistical support to AMISOM.
However, given the seriousness of the security challenges on the ground, the UN
logistical support is inadequate to cover all the critical mission support
elements. 120
As of June 2007, the situation got more complicated by the proliferation
of acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea against vessels off against the coast of
Somalia. Under the circumstances, such reluctance of the UN may cast some
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doubt upon the even-handedness of the UN when it comes to a crisis in Africa, the
marginalized continent.
The TFG supported and facilitated AMISOM's deployment while the
insurgents advocated against it. This is indeed one of the challenges the mission
has had to encounter in its operation. AU has deployed forces in Somalia. AU
member states support the AU mission in different ways including through troop
contribution and the provision of logistics. Thus far Djibouti, Kenya, Sierra
Leone, Uganda, Ethiopia and Burundi that have contributed 22,126 uniformed
personnel. It took many years for the African nations to deliver their promise to
contribute such number of troops to AMISOM. It is currently operating under the
AU command. Resource and logistics constraints are among the major factors
that held back the African nations from delivering their promises. UN only
provides logistical support while the Europen Union funds payment for troop
allowance and other related expenses.
!GAD's decision for an imposition of targeted sanctions against all those
elements seeking to undermine the peace efforts in Somalia was endorsed by
AU. 121 This was followed by the UN Security Council's sanctions against Eritrea
on December 23, 2009. 122 The sanctions include arms embargo, travel restrictions
and a freeze on the assets of political and military leaders for, among other things,
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providing political, financial, and logistical support to armed groups engaged in
undermining peace and reconciliation in Somalia and regional stability.

123

Recognizing the imperative of political engagement in Somalia, the
Chairperson of the AU Commission appointed former President Jerry John
Rawlings of Ghana as the AU High Representative for Somalia to galvanize
international support and attention for Somalia, and the engagement of the
population in governance processes, in order to enhance the legitimacy of the
TFG.I24
In April 2010, AMISOM, the United Nations Political Office for
Somalia (UNPOS) and the IGAD Office of the Facilitator for Somalia signed a
memorandum of understanding to coordinate their efforts in Somalia. 125 The
Memorandum provides the framework for coordinating their activities in the
promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Somalia.
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Subsequent to the signing of the Memorandum, UN, AU and IGAD
convened two mini-summits regarding Somalia during the African Union
summits in Kampala in July 2010 and in Addis Ababa in January 2011. 127 The
second mini-summit was co-chaired by UN, AU and IGAD. 128 Following these
mini-summits, UN and AU developed a strategic concept for AMISOM in early
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2012, which was subsequently endorsed by the UN Security Council and AU
Peace and Security Council.

129

The AU's peacekeeping posture in Somalia points to the emergence of a
different peacekeeping doctrine; instead of waiting for a peace to keep, the AU
views peacekeeping as an opportunity to establish peace before keeping it. 130
Subsequent to the February, 27 2013 PSC's endorsement to enhance
AMISOM with a view to facilitating the recovery of the areas under the AIShabaab'scontrol and building the capacity of Somalia's national defense, public
safety institutions and civilians, AMISOM has been able to register positive gains
on the ground, signaling some optimism in the future of Somalia. However, as of
this writing, the situation still remains fragile. In this connection, the AU
Chairperson in her recent report on Somalia stated the following:
Despite the peace and security gains recorded in those areas recovered
from Al-Shabaab, the overall security situation in Somalia remains
volatile. Al-Shabaab continues to carry out a dual-track asymmetric
campaign focused on the conventional targeting of vulnerable AMISOM
and SNA defensive positions and emplacement of Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs) at AMISOM and SNA supply lines. On 21 February 2014,
a group of 9 Al-Shabaab militants launched a complex attack on Villa
Somalia. During the attack, 14 people were killed, including Government
officials. On 5 July 2014, Al-Shabaab attacked the Federal Parliament,
killing 4 people and injuring 7 others. 131
Under the circumstances, AMISOM's miSSion IS likely to continue
facing enormous challenges.
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B. Challenges encountered
Challenges facing Somalia m general are diverse, formidable and
complex. The discussion here is, however, limited to those challenges the lJN,
AU and IGAD, have encountered in undertaking the peace support initiative in
Somalia, including the challenges in the cooperation between these organizations.
The cont1ict in Somalia highlighted the crisis inherent in African peace
initiatives at the international, regional, sub-regional and local levels. On the
international level, it shows the reluctance of the UN Security Council to get
physically involved in the African conflicts. United Nations has largely delegated
the peacekeeping operation to the AU. Its involvement in the area of
peacekeeping in Somalia has been less active. Clearly, UN's involvement in
Somalia remains well behind AU and IGAD.
Inadequate funding is one of the maJor challenges for both the
deployment of AMISOM and the capacity building endeavors of the Transitional
Federal Institutions (TFI) in Somalia. Unlike the UN, AU doesn't have a system
of assessed contribution to fund peace support operations. Inadequate funding has
been one of the biggest obstacles shared by other African political and security
organizations in filling the gap created by the inaction of the UN Security
Council. 132
Funding AMISOM was, indeed, one of the thorny issues within the
African Union. The AU Assembly has been consistently calling upon the UN to
examine, within the context of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the possibility of
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funding through assessed contributions, peace-keeping operations undertaken by
AU or under its authority and with the consent of the UN. 133 Similarly, the
Chairperson of the AU Commission had been blaming the international
community for its failure to provide immediate and sustained support to the TFI
C'
. .m soma1'1a. 134
an d 10r
the peace support operatiOn

The fact that the Security Council is still hesitant to transform AMISOM
into a UN peace-keeping operation makes the situation even more compelling. 135
As articulated by the Chairperson of the AU Commission, the
limitations in AU's management capacity to oversee large-scale peace support

.
. anot her dauntmg
. cha11 enge. 136
operatiOns
IS
The UN Secretary General noted in his series of reports that the African
Union continues to face serious, financial, logistical, and force-generation
constraints in completing the deployment of AMISOM. 137
The delay of responsiveness on the part of the UN Security Council to
demands of AU is the third major challenge. The delayed response of the Security
Council to AU's demand for waiver of the arms embargo undermined the results
of the Somali National Reconciliation Conference-a unique and unprecedented
opportunity for national reconciliation in Somalia. 138 This also has contributed to
the present challenges of AMISOM's deployment in Somalia. In addition to the
skepticism and the 'wait and see' approach of the Security Council to transform
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AMISOM into a UN operation, the Council's failure to timely respond might pose
a vexing dilemma for the AU, especially when the AU admittedly has limitations
in its management capacity to oversee large-scale operations. This, along with
other internal problems, can undermine the role of the AU stabilization force and
provide the insurgents the opportunity to drag out and aggravate the crisis.
Another challenge concerns the Jack of regular consultations between
the UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council. Though the AU
Peace and Security Council has often expressed a desire to be consulted more
regularly on the contents of the UN Security Council resolutions or presidential
statements that impact joint endeavors, the experience suggests that there is a long
way to go. However it should be noted that the recent UN Security Council visit
to Somalia is a step in the right direction for a meaningful cooperative effort. Joint
United Nations-African Union experience highlights the need for more informal
communication and consultation between the two bodies.
Equally challenging for the efficacy of the stabilization force is the delay
on the part of AU member states in contributing troops to AMISOM. This is
perhaps one factor for the extended fragile security situation in Somalia. It also
appears that the lessons of Somalia in the beginning of 1990s resulted in a
distinctive reluctance of African nations to volunteer troops to the AU
Stabilization Force. In this respect, Berman and Sams argued that the council's
reliance on burden sharing is particularly troubling as concerns Africa, where the
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demand for peace keepers is arguably the greatest and the indigenous supply faces
the most obstacles. 139
The proliferation of initiatives and the involvement of many actors,
sometimes with competing interests, such as the EU, Arab League, the
International Contact Group on Somalia, IGAD, AU, UN, Yemen, Egypt and
Sudan, is another serious challenge for the peace support initiative in Somalia.
The absence of administrative structures and institutions in Somalia and the
existence of underground residual elements of the Union of Islamic Courts are
also challenges that need to be overcome to make the peace support initiative a
success. 140
UN expenence m Somalia has affected the UN's approach to the
division of labor with regional organizations in the management of international
security. 141

Its enforcement operation back in the 90s made the UN wary of

operating multidimensional peace missions. UN's reluctance to deploy UN
peacekeeping operations demonstrate how much its earlier experience adversely
affected the political will of many Western Europeans and Americans to commit
themselves for UN peacekeeping in Somalia. The wait and see approach of the
Security Council in African conflicts was practically demonstrated by the Security
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Councils' increasing application of political considerations rather than security
and humanitarian needs in intervening in African conflicts. 142

5.2.2 The Case of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
The war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is considered as one
of the worst humanitarian crises since World War II. 143 The International Rescue
Committee estimates that the conflict and humanitarian crisis in DRC have caused
5.5 million deaths since 1998. 144 The DRC crisis also involved many external
actors, including its neighboring states.
The DRC crisis can be traced back to the colonial period, and thereafter
m the political situation after independence. 145 Post colonial DRC (formerly
known as Zaire) under the late President Mobutu SeseSeko is characterized by a
lack of national cohesion where several of its border towns such as, the mineral
rich Goma, essentially becoming economic appendages of its neighboring African
146 Th
•
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countnes.
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DRC is located further made the states' relations in the Great Lakes region
somewhat unstable.
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The current DRC crisis is the product of three overlapping conflicts
which are more complex than a competition over mineral resources, involving
ethnic conflict over land, autocratic rule, citizenship and local political power. 149
The first conflict started in 1996, and it ended up with the overthrow of
late President of Zaire Mobutu Seseseko in 1997. 150 The beginning of this conflict
is closely connected to the Rwanda genocide in 1994, where the Tutsi led
Rwandese government invaded DRC in pursuit of extremist Hutu militias that
instigated the slaughtering of over 800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda.

151

Note that

president Mobutu let the Hutu Interahamwe militia, which was responsible for the
Rwanda genocide, to regroup in the eastern part of Zaire under the pretext of
hosting refugee camps. 152 The Rwandan government which was upset with
President Mobutu's complacence provided support to the Congolese Rebels,
known as the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
(AFDL). 153 Supported by Rwanda, AFDL used the opportunity to overthrow the
late President Mobutu SeseSeko and they installed the late President Laurent
Kabila in 1997. 154 Kabila then renamed the country as Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), which was formerly known as Zaire. 155
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The second conf1ict signified the end of the late Congolese President
Laurent Kabila's dependence on Rwanda and Uganda. 156 This happened in 1997
after President Kabila's former allies, i.e. Uganda 157 and Rwanda, started backing
DRC rebels, the Congo Liberation Movement (CLM) and the Congolese Rally for
Democracy (CRD) respectively, following a rift between Kabila and the two
former allies. 158
A third conflict running concurrently and continuing to the present is
taking place in the country's eastern provinces between armed factions. 159 The
competition among armed groups for control of minerals, notably gold and
cassiterite, has been a major factor in this conflict. 160 The fact that the mineral
resources in eastern DRC are controlled by rebel groups has played a significant
. fimancmg
. the v1o
. 1ence. 161
ro Ie m
DRC has effective control only on part of its territory. 162 Vast areas of
the North, some provinces in the South around Katanga and large areas of the east
are either of dubious loyalty or are under the control of micro-level regional
players that may or may not be loyal to Kinshasa. 163 The difficult geographical
terrain, and the involvement of multiple external actors conducting proxy war
156
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worsened the security situation in DRC. 164Local, national and regional forces,
including forces from neighboring countries, are involved in the DRC conflict. 165
Though DRC had its first free elections in 2006 which brought President
Joseph Kabila in power, the situation on the ground remained fragile. 166 The
competition for the plunder of mineral resources among various armed groups has
remained a central reason for the continued violence and the fragile situation in
DRC.

167

The crisis in DRC not only resulted in the collapse of the state but the UN

considered it as a threat to regional peace and security. 168

A. UN, AU & SADC on the DRC Crisis
AU's predecessor, the Organization of African Unity, first got involved in
the DRC crisis in 1996 when it reacted to the silence of the UN Security Council
at the regional summit organized in Nairobi, Kenya. 169 However, OAU was not
prepared to handle the DRC crisis of this magnitude because of its structural
weakness combined with its shortfall of resources needed to support this type of
initiative in the DRC. While recognizing the need for a continuing process of
genuine national Reconciliation in DRC, the UN Security Council called upon
AU's predecessor, OAU, to help all the Congolese in organizing a national
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dialogue and to finalize agreement on the facilitator for a national dialogue. 170
OAU's involvement in the DRC crisis was, therefore, limited at the beginning.
This

provided

a

vacuum

for

SADC's

involvement

in

DRC.

Nevertheless, SADC was not initially forthcoming to get involved in the DRC
crisis. DRC, Angola and Zimbabwe intentionally avoided the discussion of the
DRC crisis at the monthly meeting of SADC Inter-State Defense and Security
Committee (ISDSC) by not sending their delegates to the meeting.
After a while, only Defense ministers of Angola, Zambia, Namibia and
Zimbabwe met in Harare and agreed that SADC will support DRC's government
to ensure its survival. 171 The SADC defense Ministers decided to intervene in the
DRC with a view to secure DRC's sovereignty, restoring its law and order, and
protect the government of Kabila which the Ministers consider as legitimate. 172
However the ISDSC did not have a mandate to make such a decision. More so,
there were only four SADC member states present at the August ISDSC 1998
meeting. 173 Paradoxically, President Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who was the then
chair of SADC, announced on behalf of SADC that it was unanimously agreed
that military aid should be sent to secure Kabila' s position. 174
This decision was opposed by South Africa, which is a SADC member
and the hegemonic power in Southern Africa, on the ground that military
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intervention is not the right approach to resolve the cns1s m DRC.

175

Such

position is perhaps understandable given its geographical distance from DRC and
lack of any particular interest in DRC. The attitude of South Africa in the DRC
conf1ict opened a floodgate of interventions by other states with stakes.
Noteworthy is the military interventions of the three SADC member states, i.e.
Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola. Their military interventions under a Mutual
Defense Pact on the one hand and South Africa's attempt to maintain neutrality
deeply polarized SADC. 176 The other SADC members chose to remain silent
following the foregoing decision by SADC. SADC was, therefore, divided in its

. . . 1 response. 177
m1t1a
Another challenge for SADC to devise a strategy of its own to help DRC
was the fact that none of the Great Lakes countries are members of SADC.

178

Interestingly, South Africa shifted its position in September 1998, and
declared that military intervention in DRC is reasonable at the mini SADC
Summit in Durban, South Africa. 179 However South Africa made it clear that it
would not send troops to DRC. 180
Though Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola invoked alliance claims under
SADC Treaty, their military intervention was outside SADC's institutional
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framework. 181 However, the intervention played an important role in protecting
the DRC capital, Kinshasa, against advancing rebel forces. 182 Even though SADC
Summit did not initially approve the intervention in DRC, it subsequently adopted
a declaration welcoming this SADC initiative and commending Angola, Namibia
and Zimbabwe for providing troops to assist the peace process in DRC.

183

Unfortunately, the OAU did not even try to comment on the interventions in the
DRC.
SADC found a common ground in pursuing diplomatic initiatives, led
by South Africa, Mozambique and Zambia. 184 This diplomatic effort was
supported by OAU and the UN.

185

Months of SADC's diplomatic efforts in the

Lusaka peace process led to the signing of the Lusaka Ceasetire Agreement in
July 1999. 186 The Agreement provided a road map for the resolution of the
conflict in DRC. It basically established the political imperative to hold the InterCongolese Dialogue among the DRC government representative, the armed
opposition, the political opposition and civil society. 187
UN's first operation in DRC is traced back to November 30, 1999 when
UN authorized the establishment of the UN Observer Mission in DRC (commonly
referred to as MONUC), following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire

181

Van As, Supra note 145 at 333

1821d
183

Majinge, Supra note 142 at 482-3
Kurt Shillinger, ed., AFRICA'S PEACEMAKER?: LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICAN
CONFLICT MEDIATION, (2010), 70
185 ld.
186 !d.
187
World Movement for Democracy, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF CONGO AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF NGOS IN THE PEACE PROCESS,
available
at
http://www. wmd.org/resourcesiwhats-being -dof]e/ngo-participation-peacenegotiationsihistOJponflict-democratic-rg?ublic, (Last visited 08/!2/20 14)

184

218

Agreement between DRC and five regional States, i.e. Angola, Namibia, Rwanda,
Uganda and Zimbabwe. 188
MONUC's initial mandate was to oversee the key components of the
Lusaka peace agreement, including the observation of the ceasefire and
disengagement of forces and to maintain liaison with all parties to the Ceasefire
Agreement. 189 However MONUC's mandate changed over the course of time. In
2000, the UN Security Council expanded MONUC's mandate to "facilitate
humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring, with particular attention to
vulnerable groups including women, children, and demobilize child soldier."

190

Despite the continued violence in DRC, the implementation of the
Lusaka Peace Agreement was continuously missed. 191 Whilst the majority of
Kabila's Southern African allies withdrew, rebel groups remained active in the
four Eastern provinces of South Kivu, North Kivu, Ituri, and Maniema. In 2004
Rebel fighting in the region intensified and widespread riots began in protest in
response to the UN' s failure to act.
As a reaction to this development, the UN Security Council expanded
MONUC's mandate to include to protecting civilians, humanitarian and UN
personnel, to discourage violence using force, if necessary, and to allow UN
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personnel to operate freely, particularly in the eastern part of DRC.

192

MONUC

also increased its personnel for the discharge of this mandate. 193
This led to the next phase under which MONUC was mandated relating
to the transition and organization of elections in DRC. 194 Following the 2006
election in DRC, MONUC's mandate was redefined with changes evolving on the
ground. The UN Secretary General identified the following as pillars for the
revised task:
Assist the government of the DRC in (a) building a stable security
environment, (b) consolidating democracy, (c) planning security sector
reform and participating in its early stages, (d) protecting human rights
and strengthening the rule of law, (e) contribute actively, ifrequested to do
so by the government, to the coordination of international assistance. 195
Given its importance for governance and the future stability for DRC,
MONUC gave priority to the Security Sector Reform in DRC. 196 In terms of
implementing this mandate, the UN Security Council advocated for a national
approach and a nationally owned process in pursuing the Security Sector
Reform. 197
Despite the February 25, 2008 decision to reform the armed forces and
the national Congolese police under the Security Sector Reform, MONUC fell
short of achieving this important objective of the Mission. Terrie attributed this to
the lack of a "doctrinal based campaign plan that clearly identified the role and
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task of its military forces in achieving the wider objectives ofthe mission."

198

The

lack of capacity of the DRC armed force, the continued proliferation of arms
further made the accomplishment ofMONUC's mission difficult.
In

early

2007,

MONUC

undertook

demilitarization and reintegration of foreign groups.

the
199

task

of coordinating

MONUC's task under this

phase included ensuring the total withdrawal of foreign groups from the
Congolese territory under the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
system (DDR). 200 MONUC established temporary reception center where
combatants could surrender their weapon to be destroyed by MONUC.
MONUC repatriated about 14, I 00 soldiers during this process.

201

202

MONUC had implemented multiple political, military, rule of law and
capacity-building tasks as mandated by the UN Security Council resolutions.

203

MONUC also endeavored to help the resolution of ongoing conflicts in various
DRC provinces. 204
MONUC remained on the ground until it was renamed and transformed
into United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC MONUSCO) in July 2010. Such transformation was
triggered by the need to overcome the challenges ensuing from DRC entering into
a new phase of its transition towards peace consolidation. 205 MONUSCO is given
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an additional power to use all means necessary to carry out its mandate relating to
the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders
under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the Government of the

DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts.
The UN Security Council duly recognized the linkage between "the
illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources and the proliferation and
trafficking of arms is among the major factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts
in the Great Lakes region". 206 In establishing MONUSCO, the UN Security
Council expressed its serious concern over the humanitarian and human rights
situation in the areas affected by armed conflicts in DRC, especially the targeted
attacks against the civilian population, the widespread sexual violence, the
recruitment and use of child soldiers and extrajudicial executions. 207
UN Security Council authorized M ONUSCO a maximum of 19,815
military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050
personnel of formed police units. 208 This was in addition to the civilian, judiciary
and correction components?

09

The Intervention Brigade of MONUSCO is a more

aggressive kind of force which is mandated to use military force to restore peace
and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 210 This mandate allows the
Intervention Brigade to conduct offensive operations in the protection of
civilians. 21 1
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A technical committee was also established to define the regional
benchmarks anticipated under the UN Security Council Resolution 2098
(2012). 212 MONUSCO strongly feels that only good army could address the
problem by armed forces? 13 Hence its underlying emphasis is working on the
Security Sector Reform, which would help DRC to have its own strong army? 14
MONUSCO has been playing an important role in coordination with the
DRC army for the restoration of state authority in the areas previously controlled
by the rebellion? 15 The restoration of state authority in the areas previously
controlled by March 23 (M23) rebellion is worth mentioning in this regard. 216
The continued cycle of conflict and persistent violence by Congolese
and foreign armed groups in eastern DRC led into the signing ofthe Addis Ababa
Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region on
February 24, 2013? 17 The Movement of March 23 (M23) rebel group plunged
the eastern DRC in chaos, which was perhaps the immediate triggering factor for
the negotiation of the Framework? 18 This Framework was signed by ten

http://ww\y. securitvcouncilreport.orglmonthly-forecast/20 1307 /democratic republic of the congo-.J..J2hp, (Last visited 09/13/20 13)
212
ld
213
Press briefing by Martin Kobler, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Head of MONUSCO, on the situation in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, 13 January 2014, available at http://webtv.un.org/search/martin-koblermonusco-on-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-security-council-media-s!j_ikeout-13:ianum:y
20 14/3049463582001 ?term=drc, (Last visited 03/09/20 14)
Id
PSC/PR!COMM.2(CDVI), Communique of the AU Peace and Security Council, 406th
Meeting, 13 November 2013
216 Id
217
Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the
region, 24 February 2013, available at http://www.peaceau.org/en!article/peace-security-andcooperation-framework-for-drc-and-the-region-signed- in-addis-ababa#, (Last visited 03/ I 0/20 13)
218
Institute for Security Studies, PEACE, SECURITY AND COOPERATION FRAMEWORK
FOR THE DRC: HOPES AND CHALLENGES, 8 March 2013
214
215

223

countries, namely DRC, Central African Republic, Angola, Burundi, the Republic
of Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Uganda, Zambia and Tanzania. 219
The UN, AU, SADC and the International Conference on the Great
Lakes Region signed the Framework as witnesses. These organizations put their
etTorts together for the signing of the Framework though UN led the initiative. 220
The Addis Ababa Framework describes the extent of the conflict and the
violence as follows: The consequences ofthis violence have been nothing short of
devastating. Acts of sexual violence and serious violations of human rights are
used regularly and almost daily as weapons of war. Displacement figures are
among the highest in the world and persistently hover near two million people.
The implementation of the country's reconstruction, security sector reform and
poverty alleviation program is regularly disrupted. 221
The countries of the region recognized that the path followed thus far
was untenable and the Framework Agreement is meant to address the root causes
of the conflict. 222
The Addis Ababa Framework provided the principles of engagement
among the countries of the region and the international community at large,
including the UN Security Council. As far as the UN Security Council is
concerned, the Framework provides that the Security Council would remain
seized of the importance of supporting the long-term stability of DRC and the
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Great Lakes region? 23 It also anticipates a strategic review of MONUSCO with a
view to supporting DRC to address security challenges and extend state
authority. 224 The Framework further provided an oversight mechanism for the
proper implementation of the Framework under which the signatories, UN, AU
and SADC could work together. 225
In February 2013, the SADC Summit, which called for a peaceful and
durable resolution of the conflict in eastern DRC, decided to deploy a peacekeeping force in DRC? 26 This decision challenged existing peace-keeping
procedure and could have far-reaching consequences for all future peace-keeping
.
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B. Challenges Encountered
The complexity of the conflict in DRC made the UN mission long and
very expensive. 228 It is not an easy venture to evaluate the success of the UN
operation in DRC given the complexity of the problem in a vast country like
DRC. The UN was clearly slow in initially responding to the DRC crisis. It took
the UN over three years to authorize the deployment of peacekeeping force in
DRC reflecting the strategic marginality of the African continent. This is not to
undermine the important role the UN has been playing in the maintenance of
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peace and security in DRC since the late 90s but to emphasize on the importance
of timely response to mitigate the damages.
Though MONUC's initial role was limited to monitoring the
implementation of the Lusaka Agreements, its mandates progressively expanded
to include intervention and assistance. UN has also been involved in the
reconstruction of DRC by assisting this war ravaged country in the establishment
of rule of law, Security Sector Reform and the improvement of human rights.
Though UN has the largest peacekeeping in the DRC, it has not done
enough to addressing the root causes of the conflict, especially the unlawful
exploitation of mineral resources, which still put the security situation in eastern
DRC fragile. Among other things, the absence of credible political process and
the international community's selective and inconsistent engagement adversely
impacted on the effectiveness ofthe UN? 29
As articulated by Ricci, the lack of familiarity with the environment and
the culture of the population also attributed for MONUC's inefficiency.
Inadequate financial resources and inadequate number of peacekeepers given the
vast size of DRC also attribute to MONUC's inefficiency. 230 The challenges,
facing the mission include inadequate financial resources and the inadequate
number of peacekeepers who are too few, given the vast size of DRC.
The Addis Ababa Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework
recognized this shortcoming of the UN operations in DRC. The proper
229
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implementation of the Framework, which is perhaps designed to address the root
causes of the problem in DRC, is critical to realize the security objectives of the
UN. The appointment of Mary Robinson as a special representative of the UN
Secretary General in DRC helps a lot to facilitate cooperation among international
actors and more importantly in the implementation of the Addis Ababa Peace,
Security and Cooperation Framework.
Given the track record in the region where implementation of previous
peace

agreements

regarding

DRC

crisis

was

a

serious

problem,

the

implementation of the Framework has already encountered some challenges.
These include:
(i) the continued presence of negative forces in eastern DRC, including the
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR); (ii) the delay in
the implementation of the Conclusions of the Kampala Direct Dialogue
between the DRC Government and the M23, as contained in their
statements adopted in Nairobi on 12 December 2013; (iii) the illegal
exploitation of natural resources in eastern DRC; and (iv) the persistence
of impunity despite the reforms that the Congolese Government is
endeavouring to bring about. 231
The fact that the Framework is vague would further put some doubt on
the genuine commitment of the signatories to address the root causes of the DRC
crisis. Moreover the involvement of multiple actors in the implementation of the
Framework may adversely impact on the smooth implementation of the
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Framework. Yet one should remain optimistic taking into account the positive
steps thus far taken towards the implementation of the Framework. UN should
therefore assert its leadership role if sustainable peace is to be achieved in DRC.

5.2.3 The Case of Liberia
In 1989, a civil war broke out in Liberia following a fraudulent election
under President Samuel doe's regime? 32 This resulted in the collapse of the
Liberian government and a major humanitarian crisis with a high refugee inf1ux
that threatened the security of the sub-region.
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In July 1990, President Doe

requested for the deployment of ECOWAS peacekeeping force alleging that the
rebellion led by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front would devastate the
entire sub-region. 234

A. UN and ECOWAS on Liberia Crisis
ECOWAS member states were initially divided on how to respond to
this call. Whereas Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida, who is a personal friend
of President Doe, favored military intervention, the two leading Francophone
states in ECOW AS, i.e. Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, expressed support to
Taylor's rebellion and opposed ECOWAS' intervention in Liberia. 235 ECOWAS
heads of state and government formed a Standing Mediation Committee
composed of Nigeria, Gambia, Ghana, Mali and Togo to identify a peaceful
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solution to the crisis in Liberia. 236 The committee's initial attempt to negotiate a
ceasefire did not succeed because of President's Doe's refusal to step down? 37
The rebel leader, Tayor, on the other hand aspired to gaining ground and political
power.238
In July 1990, the ECOW AS Sub-Committee on Defense convene a two
days meeting in Sierra Leone and drew up a plan for military intervention force in
Liberia. 239 On August 7, 1990, the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee met
and adopted the ECOW AS Peace Plan for Liberia? 40 Accordingly it established
an ECOW AS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) to help resolve the internal
armed conflict in Liberia on August 7. 1990. 241 The Committee further made a
call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and deployed ECOW AS Ceasefire
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG, and codenamed Operation Liberty by Nigeria) on
August 24, 1990?42
Despite the resistance from some ECOWAS member states, the
ECOWAS Authority ultimately not only endorsed the ECOWAS SMC peace plan
but also considered it as a "timely initiatives taken on behalf of the entire
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community' .243 This after the fact unammous endorsement was made at an
emergency meeting inN ovcmbcr 1990 following the killing of President Doc?

44

ECOMOG was originally mandated to arrange and supervise a ceasefire in Liberia to be followed by the establishment and sustenance of an interim
government leading to democratic elections within twelve months. 245 Its role
shifted into that of enforcement after the rival forces murdered President Doc few
weeks after ECOMOG's arrival in Liberia which left a governmental power
vacuum.
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The hostile reception from the rebel army in Liberia is an important

factor that triggered the need for ECOMOG's peace enforcement mandatc.

247

It

was the first peace enforcement operation by an African sub-regional
organization. 248
ECOWAS neither sought nor obtained the UN mandate to take
enforcement action in Libcria. 249 The Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) that
established ECOMOG only sought international financial support for the
intcrvcntion. 250 In a letter addressed to the UN Secretary General two days after
ECOMOG's creation, Nigeria's Minister of External Affairs stated the following:
In view of our shared responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security, we have no doubt that you will lend your considerable
243
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moral support to the ECOWAS initiative in Liberia. We are also confident
that [you will] generously contribute materially towards the attainment of
the stated ECOWAS objective in the Republic of Liberia? 51

This rmses a legally contentious Issue as to whether ECOWAS
intervention is consistent with Article 53 of the UN Charter that requires regional
organization to get the UN Security Council authorization for undertaking
enforcement actions. Though ECOMOG's initial intervention strictusensu goes
against the Charter of the UN, ECOW AS attributed the blame on the UN Security
Council for its failure to be forthcoming to resolve the Liberian crisis. 252
Except ECOW AS, other international actors such as UN and OAU did
not intervene in Liberia except for an international condemnation of one faction or
another by the UN. 253 At the time, the focus of the international community was
on the conllicts in the Gulf, former Yugoslavia and Somalia. 254
Despite calls for UN effective engagement and eventual takeover from
ECOWAS of the mission in Liberia, UN was not forthcoming to do so? 55 The
Secretary General of the UN wrote to the ECOWAS Chairman that he was
"wishing the organization's initiative in Liberia every success". 256 The UN
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Secretary General Boutros BoutrosGhali considered ECOMOG's intervention as a
landmark event that heralded 'a new division of labor between the United Nations
' .257
. 1 orgamzatwns
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an d regwna

The UN Security Council had its first deliberation on the Liberian crisis
in January 1991 and formally commended the actions of the ECOWAS in May,
1992. characterizing the Yamoussoukro Four Accord as presenting an appropriate
framework for the peaceful resolution of the cont1ict.

It is important to note that the lJN Security Council adopted fifteen
resolutions between January 1991 and November 1996 on DRC crisis and the
President of the UNSC issued nine presidential statements relating to the situation
in Liberia and none of these resolutions condemned ECOMOG's intervention? 58
Instead, they commended ECOMOG for its effort; called upon member states to
provide financial assistance to this effort; and called upon African states to
contribute troops to ECOMOG.
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For example, In January 1991, the UN Security

Council president commended efforts made by the ECOW AS Heads of state and
government to promote peace and normalcy in Liberia. 260
Two years after ECOMOG's intervention, the UN Security Council
adopted Resolution 788, determining that the deterioration of the situations in
Liberia constitutes a threat to international peace and security, particularly in
West Africa as a whole. 261 Through this resolution, the UN Security Council gave
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formal endorsement to ECOMOG intervention by commending ECOWAS for its
efforts to restore peace, security and stability in Liberia. 262 While imposing arms
embargo against Liberia, the UN Security Council made exception to arms
deliveries destined to ECOWAS forces in Liberia. 263 This is an important step to
facilitate ECOMOG's operation in Liberia.
The July 25, 1993 Peace Agreement signed between the three Liberian
parties called upon the UN and ECOMOG to assist in the implementation of the
Peace Agreement. 264 UN Security Council responded to this call through the
adoption of Resolution 866 under which it established the UN Observer Group in
Liberia (UNMTL) to be co- deployed with ECOMOG. 265 It became the first peacekeeping mission undertaken by the United Nations in cooperation with a peacekeeping mission already set up by a regional organization. 266 The resolution
provides the following as mandates ofECOMOG:
(a) To receive and investigate all reports on alleged incidents of violations
of the cease-fire agreement and, if the violation cannot be corrected, to
report its findings to the Violations Committee established pursuant to the
Peace Agreement and to the Secretary-General;
(b) To monitor compliance with other elements of the Peace Agreement,
including at points on Liberia's borders with Sierra Leone and other
neighbouring countries, and to verify its impartial application, and in
particular to assist in the monitoring of compliance with the embargo on
delivery of arms and military equipment to Liberia and the cantonment,
disarmament and demobilization of combatants;
(c) To observe and verify the election process, including the legislative and
presidential elections to be held in accordance with the provisions of the
Peace Agreement;
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(d) To assist, as appropriate, in the coordination of humanitarian assistance
activities in the tl.eld in conjunction with the existing United Nations
humanitarian relief operation;
(e) To develop a plan and assess financial requirements for the
demobilization of combatants;
(f) To report on any major violations of international humanitarian law to
the Secretary-General;
(g) To train ECOMOG engineers in mine clearance and, in cooperation with
ECOMOG, coordinate the identification of mines and assist in the clearance
of mines and unexploded bombs;
(h) Without participation in enforcement operations, to coordinate with
ECOMOG in the discharge of ECOMOG's separate responsibilities both
formally, through the Violations Committee, and informally. 267

The UN Security Council also endorsed the plan of the UN SecretaryGeneral to conclude an agreement with the Chairman of ECOW AS detl.ning the
roles and responsibilities of UNOMIL and ECOWAS in the implementation of
the Peace Agreement. 268
UNOMIL was originally designed to remain unarmed, while ECOMOG
troops were to provide security for UNOMIL. 269 By February 1994, UNOMIL
was established on the ground with a military,

medical,

engineering,

communication, transportation and electoral component. 270 ECOMOG's mandate
in Liberia came to an end on February 2, 1998. 271
Some key members of the UN Security Council were also in favor of
ECOMOG's peace plan. For example, the United States Ambassador to the UN
stated the following in support of ECOMOG intervention:
The dispatch of a six nation West African peacekeeping force in 1990
demonstrated unprecedented African determination to take the lead in
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regional conflict resolution . . . we have supported this effort from its
inception. 272

US further complemented ECOW AS mediation efforts as supportive of
the UN Security Council goals 'of regional solutions to regional problems' .273
The earliest involvement ofthe Organization of African Unity (OAU) in
Liberia crisis came in July 1990 by sending two delegations, i.e. one to Liberia
and the second one to countries ofthe sub-region involved in ECOWAS Standing
Mediation Committee? 74 Upon the reports of the delegations, the then OAU
Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim issued a statement outlining the probable
necessity of establishing an OAU formal mechanism for tackling internal conflicts
in Africa. 275 However, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) did not intervene
in Liberia because of lack of resources and political will reinforced by vivid
memories of its perceived failure in Chad in 1981. 276 But it expressed its total
support of ECOWAS initiatives in Liberia. 277
The Organization of African Unity not only endorsed ECOMOG's
intervention but also made considerable efforts to legitimize its military
intervention. 278 This really helped ECOMOG to generate international legitimacy
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for its military intervention in Liberia. 279 OAU's support was consequential in
getting endorsement and assistance for ECOW AS' action in the UN Security
Council. Moreover OAU appointed Cannan Banana as the Special Representative
of the OAU Secretary General to liaise with the UN and ECOWAS in resolving
the Liberian crisis.
Acting Executive Secretary of ECOWAS had even claimed that as the
Liberian war developed, all along ECOWAS was in touch with the UN, warning
that the situation was getting worse, but there was no help forthcoming. Therefore
ECOWAS countries decide to act together.
Among ECOWAS member states, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra
Leone contributed troops? 80 Other ECOWAS member states and two nonECOWAS states, i.e. Tanzania and Uganda, also subsequently contributed troops
to ECOMOG? 81 However Nigeria which is the strongest sub-regional military
power took the lead.
In a short span of time ECOMOG was able to establish control over the
capital Monrovia thwarting Taylor's attempt to seize power though unable to save
President Doe. 282 Based on its experience in Liberia, ECOW AS member states
adopted the 1993 revised ECOWA Treaty which provides for the establishment of
peace-keeping or enforcement forces where necessary? 83
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The UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that the
situation in 'Liberia represent(ed) a good example of systematic cooperation
between the United Nations and regional organisations, as envisaged in Chapter
VIII of the Charter.'

284

One of the challenges of an ad hoc force such as ECOMOG is the lack
of joint training that makes their operation a bit difficult. This also holds true for
the other peacekeeping operations in Africa.
The division between Anglophone and Francophone within ECOWAS is
also another source of problem for ECOW AS to take actions in Liberia. 285 After
series of efforts, ECOMOG managed to commence the disarmament of the
warring groups in November 1996 and elections were conducted under UN and
ECOWAS supervision on 19 July 1997. 286The rebel leader, Charles Taylor, was
elected as president partly because of his threat to renew hostilities unless he is
elected as president. 287 Subsequent to the election, UNOMIL and ECOMOG
withdrew from Liberia in September and November 1999 respectively. 288
In 1999 another civil war broke in Liberia which eventually forced
President Taylor to relinquish his power and went into exile in Nigeria. 289 0nce
again, ECOW AS got involved in peacekeeping efforts but with a UN mandate
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and with the understanding that UN peacekeeping mission will take over the
responsibility. 290
On June 28, 2003, the UN Secretary-General wrote a letter to the
President of the Security Council calling for the deployment of a multinational
force, under the lead of a Member State, to reverse Liberia's drift towards total
disintegration. 291 Four days later, ECOWAS leader convened a Summit in Dakar
and decided to deploy a vanguard force to Liberia to help to stabilize the security
situation and facilitate the handover of power by President Taylor. 292
On August 1, 2003, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1497
authorizing the establishment of multinational force in Liberia to support the
implementation of the June 17, 2003 Ceasefire Agreement. 293 Resolution 1497
enumerates the following as tasks ofthe multinational force:
establishing conditions for initial stages of disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration activities, to help establish and maintain security in the
period after the departure of the current President and the installation of a
successor authority, taking into account the agreements to be reached by
the Liberian parties, and to secure the environment for the delivery of
humanitarian assistance, and to prepare for the introduction of a longerterm United Nations stabilization force to relieve the Multinational
Force? 94
The first team of the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) was
?95

deployed on August 4, 2003.-

Two weeks after ECOMIL's deployment, a

Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed by the parties in Liberia. 296

290

291

ld
Report ofthe Secretary-General, Supra note 288 at para. 10

292

Id

293

S/Res/1497 (2003), I August 2003

294

Id

295

ld.
ld.

296

238

On September 19, 2003, the UN Security Council adopted resolution
1509 establishing a stabilization force by the name United Nations Mission in
Liberia

(UNMIL). 297

UNMIL

was

mandated

to

provide

support

for

implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement, support for humanitarian and human
rights assistance, support for security reform, and support for implementation of
the peace process. 298 The resolution specifically provides for coordination and
collaboration with ECOW AS in the discharge of UNMIL mandate. 299
The UN Security Council further decided that UNMIL would consist of
up to 15,000 United Nations military personnel, including up to 250 military
observers, and 160 staff officers, and up to 1,115 UN police officers, including
formed units to assist in the maintenance of law and order throughout Liberia, as
well as the appropriate civilian component. 300 Upon request from the UN Security
Council, ECOW AS transferred its peacekeeping duties from its forces, i.e.
ECOMIL, to UNMIL on October 1, 2003. 301 In November 2005, Ellen JohnsonSirleaf was elected as the president of Liberia in what international observers
called a free and fair election. 302
UN and ECOW AS play important role in facilitating a smooth transition
towards the free and fair election in the country bringing about a durable peace in
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Liberia. To borrow the words of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Liberia is now
. ten consecutive
. years o f peace an d progress. ''~ 303
"'ce Iebratmg

0

The UN multinational force deployed in Liberia was mandated to
support the transitional government and to assist in the implementation of a
comprehensive peace agreement for Liberia. 304 The Peace Agreement declared an
immediate end to the war and provided for the establishment of a national
Transitional Government in Liberia, in charge of the implementation of the
· peace agreement. 3M
comprehens1ve
ECOMOG has provided a modicum of security, especially around
Monrovia, and its contingents were less prone to human rights abuses than
Liberian factions in the civil war. 306 However, ECOMOG's economic excesses,
including black marketeering, theft, looting, and the wholesale exploitation of
Liberia's natural resources, diminished its popular support.

B. Challenges encountered
ECOW AS involvement in Liberia demonstrates the significant role that
regional organizations can play in international legal enforcement and offers
insights into contemporary conf1icts in Africa and elsewhere throughout the
world.
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ECOMOG's peace enforcement operation is considered as a test case for
regional conflict management.

307

It has indeed served as a model for other

African organizations considering regional peace enforcement operations.
The problems encountered by ECOMOG include financial constraint,
issues of mandating and command and control within ECOMOG and relations
between ECOW AS, OAU and UN.

308

The financial burden for ECOWAS

operation was primarily shouldered by Nigeria. 309 Few other states such as the
United States also provided financial support. 310 Yet ECOWAS suffered financial
constraints to finance ECOMOG operations.
It took years for the UN to actively engage and intervene in the Liberian
crisis. Given the magnitude of the problem, the situation would have been worse
had it not been for the swift actions of ECOWAS that played an important role in
stabilizing the situation in Liberia. One popular reason has been the United
Nations fear of getting entangled in one more ethnic conflict with its long drawn
out problems. This may have informed Javier de Cuellar's initial statements
concerning the crisis being a local one.

5.2.4 The Case of Ethiopia/Eritrea War
Eritrea was a maritime province of Ethiopia since time immemorial. It was
separated from Ethiopia by a historical incident in 1885 when Italy occupied
coastal positions in Ethiopia. Italy maintained its colonial hegemony in Eritrea
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until 1941. During the colonial period the Eritrean port of Assab played an
important role in the relationship between Ethiopia and Italy/Eritrea. The Treaty
of 1928 on the use of the Port of Assab by Ethiopia which was signed between
Ethiopia and Italy guaranteed a free zone in the Port of Assab and it also
envisaged the cession of free port facilities to the former. 311
After the defeat of Italy in 1941, Eritrea became a mandated territory
under British rule until it was finally decided by the UN General Assembly that
Eritrea should be federated with Ethiopia. 312 The decision by the Ethiopian
Emperor to dissolve the federation and unify Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1961
unleashed the 30 years' war of independence by Eritreans which culminated in the
de facto independence of Eritrea in 1991. 313 Almost two years later a referendum
was held and Eritrea formally declared its independence with full support of the
314
Ethiopian Government though it turned Ethiopia landlocked.

However Ethiopia, Eritrea and the international community at large were
optimistic about the booming cooperation between the two countries following
Eritrea's independence. Tekle considered the relationship as one that opened
"new chapters in their respective histories". 315
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Immediately after the referendum, Ethiopia and Eritrea entered into
cooperation arrangements to cooperate in a number of areas of mutual concern.
The Friendship and Cooperation Agreement that was signed in September 2003,
for example, provides for cooperation in a number of areas including
"preservation of the free flow of goods and services, capital and people;
Ethiopia's continued free access to Eritrea's sea ports, paying for port services in
its currency (the birr); cooperation in monetary policy and continued use of the
birr by both countries until Eritrea issued its own currency; harmonization of
customs policies; and cooperation and consultation in foreign policy." 316
Ethiopia and Eritrea entered into a large-scale and deadly armed conflict
m May 1998 under the pretext of a border war. Though the border between
Ethiopia and Eritrea was never demarcated, it was not the sole reason for the
eruption of the border war between the two countries. The war was rather a
culmination of the controversy on trade, fiscaL and access to the sea issues
between the two countries. With the introduction of Eritrea's local currency,
known as Nakfa, Ethiopia took a position that the trade between the two countries
should be conducted like any international trade through the use of convertible
foreign currency. This had a spillover effect on the port fee and port usage.
The war was formally started with Eritrea's mobilization of the
mechanized army to the Ethiopian border town of Badme on 12 May 1998 and
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Ethiopia's statement that Eritrea invaded its sovereign territory on, 13 May
1998. 317 The conflict resulted in the displacement of 1.2 million people. 318

A. UN and OAU on the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict
Immediately after the eruption of the war, United States and Rwanda
launched a mediation effort by putting forward a four point peace proposal. This
proposal demanded the withdrawal of Eritrean forces from Badme (the flash point
of the war) and their redeployment to positions they held before 6 Mayl998 and
the reconstitution of the civilian administration. While Ethiopia accepted the
peace plan, Eritrea rejected it.
The OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government deliberated on
the conflict situation at its 34th Ordinary Session that was held in Ouagadougou,
Burkina Faso from June 1-10, 1998. 319 The Summit established a High-Level
Delegation consisting of the heads of states of Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Zimbabwe
and Rwanda. and the OAU chairperson, to facilitate negotiations between
. . andE ntrea.
.
32o
Eth10p1a
On June 26, 1998, 1.e. over a month after the war erupted, the UN
Security Council made its initial reaction by adopting resolution 1177. 321 While
commending the efforts ofthe OAU for its effort to the peaceful settlement ofthe
conflict, the UN Security Council condemned the use of force, and demanded that
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both parties to immediately cease hostilities and refrain from further use of
force. 322
The OAU then took over the mediation effort and developed an OAU
Framework Agreement to guide the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
OAU further elaborated Modalities for the implementation of the Framework
Agreement and Technical arrangements.
On January 29, 1999, i.e. about six months after the war erupted, UN
Security Council adopted its second resolution expressing its strong support for
the mediation efforts of the OAU and for the Framework Agreement as approved
by the Central Organ Summit of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management, and Resolution. 323 The resolution further affirmed that "the OAU
Framework Agreement provides the best hope for peace between the two
parties." 324

While

welcoming

Ethiopia's

acceptance

of the

Framework

Agreement, the UN Security Council calls for cooperation with the OAU and full
implementation of the Framework Agreement without delay. 325 The resolution
also endorsed the appointment of a UN special envoy to the Hom to bolster the
OAU peace initiative. 326 The resolution further urged both Ethiopia and Eritrea to
remain committed to the peace process and to abstain from use of military force
against each other. 327
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Nine months after the eruption of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea
the UN Security Council determined that the situation between Ethiopia and
Eritrea constitutes a threat to peace and security. 328
Following the outbreak of renewed fighting between Eritrea and
Ethiopia, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1227 on February 10, 1999
condemning both Ethiopia and Eritrea for their recourse to use force. 329 The
resolution further called the two countries to immediately halt the hostilities and
to resume diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. 330
In May 2000, i.e. two years after the eruption of the war, UN Security
Council decided to send a special mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia. The Special
mission which was composed of the Ambassadors of the United States of
America, France, Mali, Namibia, The Netherlands, Tunisia, and United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 331 The Security Council Special Mission
made two visits to the capitals of the two countries within a span of two days.
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The Mission also held consultation with officials of the OAU about the status of
the Ethiopia/Eritrea peace process and the challenges encountered in pursuing the
OAU peace plan. 333 In the wordings of the Special Mission's report, the special
mission's understanding of the complexities of the problem grew after the
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visit. 334 This signifies the importance of Security Council's closer and timely
engagement over the matters on its table.
Immediately after the Security Council's Special Mission visit, a
renewed fighting erupted between Eritrea and Ethiopia which triggered the
adoption of another Security Council resolution on May 12, 2000. 335
The resolution recognized that the ''renewed hostilities constitute an
even greater threat to the stability, security and economic development of the subregion". 336 Strongly condemning the renewed fighting between the two countries,
the Security Council

demanded the two countries "the earliest possible

reconvemng, without preconditions, of substantive peace talks, under OAU
auspices, on the basis of the Framework Agreement and the Modalities and of the
work conducted by the OAU". 337 Interestingly, the Security Council also decided
to meet within 72 hours "to take immediate steps to ensure compliance with this
resolution in the event that hostilities continue". 338
Five days later, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo
against both Ethiopia and Eritrea under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 339 The
arms embargo was imposed for one unless the UN Secretary-General reports that
a peaceful definitive settlement of the conflict has been concluded. 340 The Council
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also established a special committee composed of member countries of the UN
Security Council to ensure compliance with the resolution. 341
Ethiopia was bewildered by the arms embargo feeling betrayal by its
treatment as an aggressor. 342

And it perhaps became the turning point of

Ethiopia's relations with the UN over its dispute settlement endeavor. 343 The
Ethiopian Parliament condemned the UN Security Council Resolution for the
imposition of a provocative arms embargo.

344

This set in a distrust by Ethiopia in

the UN's role as a neutral mediator.
This development ignited another round of mediation effort led by the
OAU. The OAU facilitated a proximity talk between Ethiopia and Eritrea from 29
May to 10 June 2000 which led into the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities
Agreement between the two countries on June 19, 2000.
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The proximity talk

took place under the Chairmanship of Algeria, i.e. the then Chair of the OAU i.e.
Algeria.
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United States and European Union were also involved in the proximity

talk. Note that the UN did not directly participate in the proximity talk? 47
Under the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, Ethiopia and Eritrea
agreed to an immediate cessation of hostilities. They further agreed on the
!d.
The Ethiopian nationals also expressed their loss of confidence on the United Nations and the
Security Council through an open letter addressed to the members of the UN Security Council.
The Ethiopians questioned the inherent injustice and double standard reflected in the UN Security
Resolution 1227 (1999) that imposed arms embargo on both Ethiopia and Eritrea. See Focus
Ethiopia, Vol. I issue, 9 March 1999
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deployment of a peacekeeping miSSIOn by the UN under the auspices of the
OAU. 348 The agreement established a temporary security zone along the common
borders of the two countries and also defined the mandates of the peacekeeping
mission? 49 The mandate included monitoring of cessation of hostilities;
monitoring the redeployment of Ethiopian troops; ensuring the observance of the
security commitments agreed under the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement; and
monitoring the Temporary Security Zone. 350
The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement also calls upon the UN and
OAU to establish a Military Coordination Commission, to be composed of
representatives of both parties under the chairmanship of the head of the
peacekeeping mission. 351 The primary tasks of the Military Coordination
Commission is coordinating and resolving issues relating to the implementation of
the mandate of the mission, in particular, military issues arising during the
implementation period. 352
The Cessation of hostilities Agreement provided for the deployment of
peacekeeping forces and the creation of a 25 kilometers buffer zone inside the
territory of Eritrea. The agreement required Ethiopia to withdraw its troops from
positions it occupied after 6 February, which were not under the Ethiopian
administration. Eritrea, on the other hand, agreed to settle its troops 25 kilometers
away from the Ethiopian settlements. The agreement further envisaged the
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formation of a military coordination commission to facilitate the settlement of a
peacekeeping mission and monitor the implementation of the agreement.
On July 31, 2000, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1312
(2000) establishing the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)
consisting of up to 100 military observers and the necessary civilian support staff
until 31 January 2001, in anticipation of a peacekeeping operation subject to
future Council authorization. 353 The resolution mandated UNMEE to establish and
maintain liaison with Ethiopia and Eritrea; to visit their military headquarters and
other units in all areas of operation of the mission deemed necessary by the UN
Secretary-General; to establish and put into operation the mechanism for verifying
the cessation of hostilities; to prepare for the establishment of the Military
Coordination Commission, and to assist in planning for a future peacekeeping
operation as necessary. 3"4
)
On September 15, 2000, the UN Security Council authorized the
deployment within UNMEE of up to 4,200 troops, including up to 220 military
observers. 355 The Security Council broadened UNMEE's mandate under resolution
1320.
UNMEE's mandate included monitoring the cessation of hostilities;
assist, as appropriate, m ensuring the observance of the agreed upon security
commitments agreed by the parties; monitoring and verifying the redeployment of
Ethiopian troops from positions taken after 6 February 1999 which were not under
Ethiopian administration before 6 May 1998; monitoring the positions of
351
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Ethiopian forces once redeployed; simultaneously, monitoring the positions of
Eritrean forces that are to redeploy in order to remain at a distance of 25
kilometers from positions to which Ethiopian forces shall redeploy; monitoring
the temporary security zone (TSZ) to assist in ensuring compliance with the
Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities; chairing the Military Coordination
Commission (MCC); coordinating and providing technical assistance for
humanitarian mine action activities in the TSZ and areas adjacent to it, and
coordinating the Mission's activities in the TSZ and areas adjacent to it with
humanitarian and human rights activities of the United Nations and other

. .
. those areas. 356
orgamzatwns
m
This was followed by the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement
between Ethiopia and Eritrea on December 12, 2000. The peace agreement is
premised on the acceptance by both parties of the OAU Framework Agreement
and the Modalities for its Implementation. 357
The UN Secretary General and the OAU Secretary General signed on
the Peace agreement as a witness. 358 The Peace Agreement is aimed at bringing an
end to the conflict between the two countries. Among other things, the peace
agreement provides for the establishment of the boundary commission and claims
commission. The Boundary commission was mandated to delimit and demarcate
the boundaries of the two countries in accordance with the colonial treaties and
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international law. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission awarded its
delimitation decision on April 13, 2002. 359
Though

both

Ethiopia and Eritrea accepted the

Commission's

delimitation decision, Ethiopia subsequently sought interpretation, correction and
consultation of certain aspects of the Commission's delimitation decision that has
become a serious source of tension between the two countries. 360 The Boundary
Commission rejected Ethiopia's request and the boundary between the two
countries. 361 Following unsuccessful attempts by the Boundary Commission to
enter dialogue with both Ethiopia and Eritrea in August and November 2006, the
commission made a decision to mark the border through virtual demarcation,
using image processing and terrain modeling in the emplacement of boundary
pillars on the ground? 62 Accordingly, the Boundary Commission made available
to Ethiopia and Eritrea a list of pillars and maps illustrating the emplacement so
that it could resume its demarcation operations. 363 Since the two countries did not
comply with the commission's request within the one year deadline, the
commission ended its work with the virtual demarcation. 364
The Claims Commission, on the other hand, was authorized to determine
compensation issues accruing from the war. The Commission also gave its awards
on the claims. The awards have not yet been enforced.
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On April 18, 2001, UNMEE declared the formal establishment of the
Temporary Security Zone. 365 UNMEE remained an effective buffer separating the
two countries which had concentrated their troops along the common border.
In 2002, the UN Security Council adjusted UNMEE's mandate to assist
the Boundary Commission in its work, including demining in support of the
demarcation process? 66 The resolution also mandated UNMEE to provide
administrative and logistical support to the field offices of the Eritrea-Ethiopia
Boundary Commission. 367 Though Ethiopia signed the Status of Force
Agreement, Eritrea became reluctant to sign the Agreement until the end of
UNMEE's mission. 368
In January 2004, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed the
former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy as his special representative
to help the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace process move forward.
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Eritrea rejected the

appointment and never let the special representative visit Eritrea.
Due to changes in political and security environment m UNMEE's
mission area, the Security Council decreased UNMEE's military component to
2,300 troops, with a mandate renewal every four months. 370
The Military Coordination Commission, which was perhaps the only
forum where the two governments meet face to face, stopped its regular meeting
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since July 2006 because of Eritrea's violation of the integrity of the Temporary
Security Zone. 371 This was triggered by Eritrea's decision to restrict all UNMEE's
helicopter flights in Eritrean air space, including in the Temporary Security Zone
in 2005. 372 Such restriction hampered the operation and security ofUNMEE. 373 In
January 2008, Eritrea took further actions deploying its army in the Temporary
Security Zone and blocking fuel supplies to UNMEE. 374It considers the EEBC's
virtual demarcation the end of the border dispute and argues that the continued
presence of UNMEE or Ethiopian troops on its territory is tantamount to
occupation.
On July 30, 2008, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1827
terminating the mandates of UNMEE effective July 31, 2008. 375 The underlying
reason that triggered the termination was Eritrea's obstructions which undermined
the basis ofUNMEE's mandate. 376

B. Challenges Encountered
According to the Secretary General of the United Nations, the nonimplementation of the Boundary Commission's decision, and the erosion of other
aspects of the Algiers Agreements such as Eritrea's restrictions of UNMEE's
flights and the invasion of the Temporary Security Zone, have undermined the
prospects for a lasting peace between the two countries. 377
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Kroslak characterized the Ethiopia/Eritrea situation as "unfinished peace
in the Horn of Africa." 378 Though both the boundary commission and the claims
commission gave their final awards, the decisions have not been implemented
until today. There is, therefore, now a cold peace between the two countries. The
approach pursued by the UN Security Council appears to be weak, especially its
failure to put pressure on Eritrea for its obstruction to UNMEE's operation in
Eritrea and the temporary security zone. More so, its approach was only confined
on the border issue rather than pursuing a comprehensive approach to bring a
lasting solution to the conflict between the two countries.
Moreover, UNMEE's lack of a clear mandate of enforcing the decision
of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission crippled the effectiveness of the
mission. The UN Security Council acted indecisively even when it was clear that
the actions of the two countries were undermining the peace process. As is the
case with other conflict situations in Africa, the UN Security Council pursued a
wait and see approach in the discharge of its security mandate.
The lack of trust by the Ethiopian government is another factor that
impeded the efiectiveness of the UN Security Council in pursuing its conflict
resolution endeavor.
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Conclusion and Recommendations
"Peace cannot be kept by force; it can only be achieved by understanding", Albert
Einstein

The African continent has had its share of violence, from ancient tribal
wars through colonial conflicts to current day internal strife and destruction. In
the past forty years only there have been at least thirty major conflicts which
claimed the lives of seven million people, and displaced more than twenty million
people.
Following the end of the cold war, a number of welcome indications such
as the establishment of the OAU conflict prevention mechanism and the end of
the 30 years war in Ethiopia, signaled that Africa was headed into a more
predictable era. The African countries also apparently moved to a new era taking
charge ofthe regional security issues.
However the end of the Cold War era in and of itself did not remove the
underlying causes of conflict and tension in Africa. Destabilizing factors
continued unabated. Africa currently portrays the image of a continent riddled
with territorial disputes, ethnic conf1icts, civil wars, violence, conflict over natural
resources, maritime piracy, governance related conflicts and fragility of states.
Somalia is if anything worse than a failed state: it has become virtually a
phantom state, since the fall of President MuhammedSiadBarre in 1991. The
Somali conf1ict is multidimensional. It is a clan conflict. It is a national conflict
because of the conf1ict between the South and the North. It is also a platform for
proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. It also has a wider international
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dimension because of the interest of the international community to fight
terrorism in Somalia. Despite a sign of progress because of the engagement of the
international community, including the UN, AU and IGAD, Somalia is still in a
state of civil war.
The 1998 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which resulted in the death of
over 70,000 lives, remains unresolved and they rather entered into proxy war in
Somalia. The tension between the two countries, therefore, continues.
The conf1ict in the Great Lakes area that involves six African countries has
been around for over sixteen years now. Democratic Republic of Congo is the site
of one of the world's ongoing humanitarian crisis. Up to 1,200 people continue to
die each day from conflict-related causes, mostly disease and malnutrition but
ongoing violence as well.
The conflict in Darfur that flared in 2003 caused the death of over 300,000
population and the displacement of more than 2.3 million people is far from over.
The level of violence has once again stepped up in 2013 causing displacement for
nearly 400,000 people in the first half of 2014. 379
The twenty years of civil war in Sudan had claimed the lives of two
million people and caused the greatest displacement of people in Africa. The civil
war that broke out in December 2013 in South Sudan few years after its
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independence resulted in the death of I 0,000 people and the displacement of more
than 1 million people. 380
The border dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea resulted a no peace no
war situation between the two countries. The war with the Lord's Resistance
Army in Uganda that started in 1986 has displaced an estimated one million
people since 1986.
The fragile security situation in the North of Mali and the continuing
activities of terrorist organizations, including AI Shabab in Somalia, Al-Qaida in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West
Africa

(MUJAO)

continue

to

be

threats

to

peace

and

security

m

Africa. 381 Unfortunately, armed conflicts cost Africa equivalent to or more than
what it received in international aid. 382
The

UN

Undersecretary-General

for

Peacekeeping

Operations

HerveLadsous in his October 28, 2014 statement to the Fourth Committee of the
United Nations stated the following regarding the state of security in Africa:
The conflicts of today, while fewer in number, are deeply rooted. For
example, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur, and South Sudan
today, are in a second or
third wave of conflict. And many are
complicated by regional dimensions that are key to their solution
... Conflicts today are also increasingly intensive, involving determined
armed groups with access to sophisticated armaments and techniques.
They involve a mix of armed groups as well as transnational criminal
networks and, in Mali, terrorist organizations. In the past year, we have
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also seen the outbreak of the devastating Ebola virus which may have
383
enduring security, economic and social impacts.
UN itself clearly sees the need for stable Africa. It has increasingly put a
great deal of efforts to address the security challenges of Africa in the post cold
war era. The United Nations' operation in Africa has dramatically increased with
the end of the Cold War with an emphasis on conflict resolution, peace building,
conflict prevention and mediation. UN has also focused its attention on human
security, and environmental security as these also affect security of the African
continent in the present era. Noteworthy is the recent resolution of the UN
Security Council 2177 which recognized the unprecedented extent of the Ebola
outbreak in Africa as a threat to international peace and security. 384 These issues
continue to demand the undivided attention of the international community.
Of the 50 matters presented to the UN Security Council in 2014 (i.e. until
November 2, 2014), 25 ofthem directly concern Africa. 385 Out of the current 16
UN peacekeeping operations, 9 are in Africa. 386 In the area of peace building, UN
has laid the ground to closely work with Africa. The UN has indeed been
advancing Security Council reform in which Africa coordinates its position
through the African Union.
UN has also undertaken a number of measures to promote cooperation
with the African Union and African sub-regional organizations, such as
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ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD, with a view to addressing the security challenges
of the African continent. There is now a more streamlined cooperation between the
UN, AU and the African sub-regional organizations in the domain of peace and
security.
Although UN has been able to register notable achievements in the
maintenance of peace and security in Africa in the past decades, it has
experienced various setbacks in fulfilling its primary obligations of maintaining
international peace and security in the African continent.
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The foregoing

chapters illustrate the extent of the challenges as well as the weaknesses of the
UN in the discharge of its security mandate in Africa. As once articulated by the
UN Secretary General, "a considerable gap remains between rhetoric and realty".
Therefore, it is still work in progress.
Of course, assessing the effectiveness of the UN Security mechanism in
addressing the contemporary security challenges of the African continent is a very
vexing issue. Here, it is contended that UN has a significant role to play in
effectively overcoming the contemporary security challenges of Africa. As stated
above, there is some goodness in having the UN, especially the UN Security
Council providing greater attention to the security challenges in Africa. However,
the way to strengthen the African security requires a more robust action and
serious commitment on the part ofthe UN.
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Such analyses are important due to the never declining security problems
in Africa.Afterover two decades since the end of the Cold War, several conflicts
remain unsettled in Africa. And Africa has continued to be riddled with conflicts
and internal strife.
Given the contemporary security challenges of Africa, including
governance related intrastate conflicts, terrorist threats, Transnational Organized
Crimes, maritime piracy, border problems, ethnicity, serious, gross, and
systematic human rights violations, and climate change, and their far reaching
impact in the global security, Africa is not only a vital concern of the African
nations and their regional organizations, but also of the international community
at large.These contemporary security challenges act as powerful reminders for
revisiting the UN peace and security architecture. The track record of the UN
peace and security architecture are indeed further reminders that the UN should
provide the requisite attention to make its peace and security architecture
effectively work in Africa. It is perhaps in the interest of the rest of the world as
Africa has also recently seen an upswing in the economic fortunes, especially
with the discoveries of valuable natural resources.
The current situation, therefore, demands that the United Nations should
draw lessons from its experience, and takes appropriate measures to revisit its
policy and existing mechanisms to effectively overcome the contemporary
security challenges of the African continent. Generally speaking, much remains to
be done on the part of the UN.
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In this situation, the United Nations faces a number of fundamental
questions. What policies should the UN pursue to fill the lacunae exhibited in the
discharge of its principal responsibility to ensure the maintenance of international
peace and security in Africa? What formulas should UN prescribe to strengthen
its capabilities and to boost its effectiveness in this regard? What further steps by
the UN will help assure regional security in Africa? What should be the role of
the African regional and sub-regional organizations in these processes?How
should the UN further streamline the coordination with AU and African subregional organizations in the implementation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter?
The foregoing chapters illustrated the challenges inherent in peace
initiatives in Africa at the United Nations, regional, and sub-regional levels. In
many cases, the UN watches conflicts and crises in the African continent develop;
in the worst cases, as in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, UN did nothing to
intervene. This is not to completely undermine the role of the UN in the
maintenance of regional peace and security in Africa. For example, UN
peacekeeping missions in West Africa were critical to bringing countries like
Liberia and Sierra Leone out of civil war. 388
There is a consensus that the primary responsibility to maintain
international peace and security squarely falls on the shoulders ofthe UN Security
Council. But in reality the Security Council has not come out with objective
criteria whether a situation involving international peace and security merits the
388
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UN intervention. The decision of the Council is rather dictated by political
considerations than actual human suffering and the potential ramification of the
situation on international peace and security.
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The major global powers that primarily dictate the operation of the UN
peace and security architecture have now a heightened interest in Africa. For
example the United States policy towards Africa is dictated by its commercial
interest, security interest and the promotion of democracy.
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interest on Africa is dictated by its economic and political interest.

391

The Chinese
The list goes

on. The competing interests and the different expectations of the major players in
the UN Security Council obviously shadow on the operations of the
organization.The political will on the part of the major players, especially the
Permanent Members of the Security Council, is, therefore, crucial.It is against this
background that the following recommendations are put forward.
The case studies under Chapter 5 illustrate that these competing interests
have been one of the reasons for the belated actions of the UN Security Council
on African conflicts and crisis. Hence, the UN Security Council should formally
adopt general objective criterion on what constitutes threats to international peace
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and security.It should indeed set in place a clear set of guideline for intervention
by the SC.
Such definition and guideline should take into account the contemporary
security challenges that evolve over the course of the past decades. The adoption
of an objective standard and a clear set of guideline would not only halt the use of
double standard but also would help ensure that Africanswho exhibited
misgivings on the past actions of the UN Security Council will have trust on the
system.Failing to get the support and trust of Africans would prove unproductive
and damaging for the UN endeavors in the area of peace and security.
The UN, AU and sub-regional organizations in Africa should also address
the gaps between them with respect to the conceptualization of what constitutes a
threat to international peace and security. The rejection by the UN Security
Council of AU's demand for the deferral of Kenya's ICC trial on the ground that
the threat does not rise to the level of threat to international peace and security is
one recent example where such gap between UN and AU had recently manifested.
AU's request was based on Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which allows the UN
Security Council to postpone the prosecution at ICC if pursuing the case will
constitute threat to international peace and security. Though AU took a firm
position that pursuing the case at the ICC will constitute a threat to international
peace and security given the volatility of the region, UN rejected AU's demand.
This resulted in a row between the UN Security Council and AU member
states.This is a significant gap that should be part of the broader policy
discussions between UN, AU and sub-regional organizations because it has
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practical implications on the effectiveness of the UN m the maintenance of
international peace and security on the African soil.
Due to the change in the international landscape over the past seven
decades, regional and sub-regional organizations such as AU, ECOWAS, SADC
and IGAD have emerged to address security challenges in Africa because the UN
was either unwilling or unable to address those challenges.The increasing
involvement of these regional and sub-regional organizations is perhaps in tandem
with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, at the heart of which is the need to
complement the international legitimacy and legality of the UN with the
advantages embedded in regionalism.
Given the intimate knowledge regional and sub-regional organizations
most often have, and also the greater interest they have in solving and managing
cont1icts in their respective areas of responsibility, they have a comparative
advantage in addressing conflicts in their respective regions or sub-regions.AU
and African sub-regional organizations have cornea long way creating ambitious
legal and institutional frameworks aimed at addressing the security challenges of
the continent.Today they play a vital role in many cases in the maintenance of
regional peace and security, including in cont1ict prevention, peacekeeping and
peace building in Africa.
Recognizingthis important role of AU and

African

sub-regional

organizations in the maintenance of regional peace and security, UN has been
coordinating its endeavors with these African institutions in the area of peace and
security in line with the spirit of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. While the
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coordination between UN, AU and African sub-regional organizations has not
been without its challenges, their coordinated efforts have already demonstrated
the tremendous potential to help the maintenance of regional peace and security.
Despite a growing cooperation between the UN and these African
institutionsin the areas of peace and security, their cooperationmostly tend to be
ad hoc, more complicated and often more costly.The efforts to ensure cooperation
between them have indeed often faltered because such efforts were mostly ad hoc
and lacked coherence. A truly strategic and predictable partnership between UN,
AU and African sub-regional organization is, therefore, in order if the UN is to
effectively discharge its security mandate in Africa.This requires refocusing
attention on the strategic partnership beyond the support and assistance currently
provided by the UN to broader issues of mutual strategic interest in the areas of
peace and security.
In the present era where regional organizations have become indispensable
pillars of multilateralism, UN Security Council should surpass the rhetoric of
advocating strategic partnership and institutionalize a strategic and predictable
partnership through a formal agreement with AU, which is recognized as the
regional organization with primary responsibility to maintain and promote peace,
security and stability in Africa. 392 This partnership agreement provides the general
framework for the strategic partnership, which would eventually serve as the basis
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for the specific collaborations in the field that are determined on a case by case
basis.
The partnership agreement should be framed along the spirit and intent of
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter in the context of collective security. It should
however be notedthatapragmatic and more flexible application of Chapter VIII
would contribute to developing a more realistic global order. Though the UN
Charter explicitly prohibits regional organizations from taking enforcement action
without the authorization of the Security Council, the post-Cold War Era has
witnessed a trend where regional organizations claim legal competence for
enforcement actions on the basis of their founding treaties, without deference to
the Security Council. It is even more so with the AU as its founding instrument
provides for AU's enforcement action on grounds that are not anticipated when
the Charter of the UN was crafted, i.e. war crimes, genocide and crime against
humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order. This development should
be taken into account in framing the partnership between the UN, AU and African
sub-regional organizations.
The starting point for the partnership agreement should be the agreed upon
guidelines to govern the cooperation between the UN and regional organizations.
These include "the supremacy of the Charter in governing the partnership, the
primary responsibility of the Council in international peace and security, the need
for consistency and impartiality by both the United Nations and all partner
organizations, the need for flexibility and pragmatism, and the need for the
partnership to reflect comparative advantage of all, developing an effective
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division of labor in ... operational collaboration".

393

In defining the principles of

the partnership, lessons drawn from UN-AU-African Sub-regional organizations
cooperation in the area of peace and security and the changing dynamics of
international security should be taken into account.
Furthermore, the UN Security Council should seriously consider the
principles which the AU Assembly of Head of States and Governments recently
outlined as the underpinning principles of AU-UN cooperation. These principles
include support to African ownership and priority setting; consultative decision
making; division of labor and sharing of responsibilities; and effective use of the
respective comparative advantages of the two organizations.It is interesting to
note that the current UN Secretary General also suggested comparative
advantages, complementarity of mandates, and the optimal use of resources and
capacities as important basis of cooperation. 394 This shows that there is a common
ground to lay out the cooperative arrangement.
The division of labor is crucial for the success of the strategic partnership.
It should, therefore, be one of the key pillars of the strategic partnership to help

avoid duplication of efforts and resources in managing conflicts and crisis in
Africa. The partnership agreement should define the role of AU and the African
sub-regional organizationsto ensure that a structured system of cooperation is put
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m place,and perhaps to bring about coherence of international and regional
responses to conflicts and crisis in Africa.
On the UN level, the international community appears to be unprepared to
get physically involved in the African conflicts. The UN is rather increasingly
inclined to leave for Africans to deal with their continent's conflicts and to find
African solutions. Given also the current trend whereby the de facto division of
labor in peacekeeping operations is such that regional organizations pursue rapid
deployment while UN deploys the blue helmet forces, 395 such division of labor
should be ref1ected in the proposed partnership agreement.Generally speaking, the
partnership agreement should set out procedures for enhancing cooperation and
coordination among UN, AU and African sub-regional institutions and
appropriate burden-sharing in peacekeeping operations, suitable to the specific
political circumstances.
In this respect, it is contended that African owned continental and subregional peace and security initiatives should be supported rather than duplicated
by the UN. This is not to say that UN should defer all African conflicts and crisis
situation to African institutions. Rather UN should support and utilize the solid
regional initiatives, such as the African Standby Force, the Continental Early
Warning System, the AU Border Program, and the African sub-regional security
mechanisms discussed under Chapter 3. UN should further ensure that its actions
are complimentary to regional initiatives.
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Another important component of the partnership agreement should be
defining the cooperation in conflict prevention. Though UN, AU as wells as
African sub-regional institutions generally recognize the importance of conflict
prevention for the maintenance of the regional peace and security and perhaps
instituted some level of cooperation on conflict prevention, they remain to be adhoc. Hence more needs to be done to structure the cooperation in conflict
prevention. There is a need for greater political strategic coherence in conflict
prevention, and permanent mechanisms have to be in place to avoid duplication
and to reconcile and align conflict prevention approaches of the UN, AU and
African sub-regional organizations.
While this research paper is being finalized, the UN Security adopted a
resolution reaffirming its commitment to addressing the prevention of armed
conflicts in all regions of the world and instructed the UN Secretary General to
submit a report ''on actions taken by him to promote and strengthen conflict
prevention tools within the United Nations system, including through cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations, by August 31, 20 15."396
This provides a basis for structured cooperation between UN, AU and African
sub-regional organizations on conflict prevention.
Since AU and the African sub-regional organizations are well positioned
to understand the root causes of conflict in the African continent, and perhaps
more likely to act as first responders, the partnership agreement should recognize
this important role of AU and the sub-regional organizations in conflict
396
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prevention. The partnership agreement should set out procedures for consultation,
methodologies of conflict prevention, division of labor and coordination of
conflict prevention endeavors. Equally important is the need to leaving a room for
flexibility and adaptation to the often fluid circumstances on the ground.
Strengthening the linkage between early warning and early response

IS

very instrumental in ensuring successful conflict prevention efforts of the United
Nations. Such linkages enables the UN, especially the UN Security Council and
the UN Secretary General, operate with the required flexibility and act effectively
on the information provided regarding potential conflicts and crises. It is therefore
crucial that a mechanism should be in place to make sure that the information
gathered by the conflict early warning mechanisms of AU and African subregional organizations gets to the UN on a regular basis. The UN Office to the
African Union could serve as an important gateway to gather the information
from AU and the sub-regional conflict early warning mechanisms.Strengthening
the African conflict early warning mechanisms is also very important to prevent
conflicts and to take informed and timely decisions to manage crisis. The
partnership agreement should, therefore, provide a set of procedures on
strengthening the conflict early warning mechanism and enhancing the
cooperation in the conflict early warning system.
The UN Security Council should also establish an effective system
whereby peacekeeping forces are deployed to conflict areas in a timely fashion.
The deployment of UN peacekeeping missions normally takes a minimum of six
months which in quite a number of cases renders it meaningless because several
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lives have already been lost before UN peacekeepers are on the ground. Some
conf1icts are better handled and manage if peacekeepers were on the ground
before the conflict deepens.
AU and African sub-regional organizations clearly have an important role
to play in ensuring rapid deployment. UN's partnership with AU and African subregional organizations in the peacekeeping operations will only be productive
when AU and the sub-regional organizations are equipped with the necessary
resources to finance their peacekeeping operations. Given this resource limitations
of the AU and African sub-regional institutions, the importance of finding a
lasting solution to the funding of AU/Sub-regional organizations-led peace
support operations cannot be over-emphasized. Experience has demonstrated that
support using UN assessed contributions is the most viable response to the
challenge at hand, especially when the operations concerned, as is the case for
AMISOM, are undertaken with the explicit endorsement of the Security
Council. It is suggested that UN should set up a special fund to finance such
regional peace keeping operations. This fund will be financed by UN assessed
contribution. The UN Security Council should set out procedures and conditions
for accessing this special fund for use by regional/sub-regional peacekeeping
operations.
Drawing lessons from the DRC crisis where the Addis Ababa Peace,
Security and Cooperation Agreement provided for an oversight mechanism in
which the UN, regional organizations and stakeholders are regularly involved, it
is suggested that UN and AU should set up a Joint Oversight Mechanism in
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situations where UN is involved with AU and the sub-regional organizations in
the maintenance of international peace and security. This mechanism would serve
as a useful tool to bring together all the international actors to coordinate and
streamline their efforts, to tackle challenges, and to establish consensus on the
way forward.
As part of pursuing a strategic partnership between UN, AU and the
African sub-regional institutions, the need for achieving the goals of the UN
Security Council reform should be seen as a key component. The UN Charter was
drafted in an era when most African nations were still under colonial rule, and as
such their views and aspirations were not properly incorporated in the global
security architecture that was crafted in 1945. Though Africa represents more than
one billion people and though most of the matters dealt by the Security Council
directly concern Africa, no single African state is a permanent member of the UN
Security Council. Africa's non representation as a permanent member in the UN
Security Council violates the founding principles of the UN Charter. Though
increasing the SC membership may further frustrate the speed of crisis responses
by the Council, equitable representation with a strong voice is key to enhance the
effectiveness ofthe Security Council.
Africa is part of the broader global community, and Africans should be
given a place to contribute to African security. Africa's representation as a
permanent member of the UN Security Council not only makes the council
representative but also helps for its legitimacy. There is also a need to properly
reflect the changing world order in the global security architecture. Only genuine
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Security Council reform in which diversity is embedded would make the UN
Security Council legitimate, credible and more effective. Africa should perhaps
assume its rightful place within the UN Security Council. Given the leverage
Nigeria and South Africa have had in conflict management in Africa (as
illustrated in the case studies under Chapter 4), it is suggested that these two
countries could be ideal candidates for the Permanent Membership.
The launching of a joint annual consultative meeting between the UN
Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council has been an
important step forward to forge cooperation between the two organizations in the
maintenance of international peace and security. The case studies illustrate the
importance of even closer, more frequent and streamlined cooperation between
the two organs in the maintenance of international peace and security. Given the
high volume of African conflict and crisis situation annually dealt by the UN
Security Council, robust and regular consultation mechanisms between the UN
Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council should be in place.
Putting in place such frequent and regular consultation mechanism between the
two bodies would help ensure consistency, uniformity, timely response and
certainty m pursuing the objectives of maintenance of peace and security in
Africa.
This can be achieved in either of the following two ways. The first
potential avenue could be using the African non-petmanent members of the UN
Security Council as spokesperson of the AU Peace and Security Council in the
deliberations and works of the UN Security Council. This will require a closer
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coordination between AU Peace and Security Council and the African nonpermanent members of the Security Council. Since Article 7(1 )(K) of the Protocol
Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African
Union entrusted the Council with an authority to promote and develop a strong
"partnership for peace andsecurity" between the AU and UN, it simply takes a
decision of the AU Peace and Security Council to implement this mechanism.
The regular consultation mechanism could also be achieved by setting up
a Committee of Ambassadors composed of Permanent Representatives of African
countries to the United Nations that are also members of the AU Peace and
Security Council. This Committee of Ambassadors should be established by the
decision of the AU Peace and Security Council pursuant to its mandate under
Article 7(1 )(K) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and
Security Council of the African Union. And the Committee of Ambassadors that
is based in New York will be a subsidiary body of the AU Peace and Security
Council. This arrangement is not only economical but also facilitates a regular
consultation mechanism between the two important organs in the area of peace
and security. It also helps to overcome the barrier to hold emergency ad-hoc joint
consultative meetings if and when the need arises.
The African nations are also to blame. State security in most of Africa, is
not threatened by conventional threats of armed attack from other countries but by
more insidious measures many of which flow from the very weakness of the state,
governance related problems and its absence of control over its own territory. The
starting point is that each African Government bears primary responsibility for
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ensunng peace, stability and the protection of civilians in their respective
countries. This is perhaps a view endorsed by the UN Security Council in a series
of its Resolutions. However the UN has also a role to play in strengthening and
building African institution of governance. In this regard, the UN development
and capacity building works are very critical and should be seen part and parcel of
the UN peace and security mandate.
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